Dejana Vukasović

CONSTRUCTING A (EU)ROPEAN IDENTITY

The Balkans and the Western Balkans as the Other

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Belgrade, 2020.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

"Both Europe and the Balkans are imagined places and their imagined boundaries are far from being unequivocal"

(Muršič and Jezernik, 2007)

"In a way, the Balkans is the birthplace of EU foreign policy. More than anywhere else, it is where we cannot afford to fail"

(Catherine Ashton, 2010)

PREFACE

The term "the Balkans" sounds like a specter.[1] In academic circles, the region has been widely researched, both as a distinctive geographic category and in terms of its symbolic geography. It has been, and still remains, an attractive and challenging subject for many reasons. Leaving aside its general "attractiveness" as an object of analysis, I will briefly explain my own reasons for exploring this topic.

The fact that I am from the Balkans but also from "the Balkans" has been following me around for years. During my academic career, which has also involved academic stays abroad for longer or shorter periods of time, I was repeatedly faced with comments related to my "Balkan background" in both academic and social contexts. Most of these were less than pleasant and they tended to refer to the whole Balkan region as "backward", "violent", "savage", "underdeveloped", "poor", "corrupt". Until then, I had never reflected on the *nature* of differentiation in the self-other relation. At the same time, during my studies abroad, I discovered knowledge about the EU and I was fascinated. To me, it was an ideal construction of peace, stability and prosperity. Afterwards, this prompted me to think about the relationship between the EU and the Balkan region from the perspective of identity forming and shaping in the specific socio-cultural milieu. Thus, I wondered what the difference between the EU and the "others" was about and how it developed. How did I know all I knew about the EU? How did I know all I knew about the Balkans? And how can someone be "naturalized", "classified", placed into social categories in which they "naturally" belong?

This book is about hierarchies and subordination and the way they are generated in the process of identity construction through discourse. It seeks to answer the question how specific meanings are produced and attached to the subjects and objects creating "knowledge" that becomes "truth". In other words, it seeks to reveal the "truth" as produced by discourse, language and practices. At the same time, by interpreting this "naturalized understanding", it attempts to show that there is no single "truth",

1 Cf. Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.

but ways to "imagine" things differently, by revealing some other truth by means of interpretation.

The book argues that knowledge cannot be neutral but shapes the power relations. In other words, there is a close link between knowledge and the power that lies in discourse. Therefore, the aim of this book is to "denaturalize" dominant understandings by showing their historicity, to challenge the claims of "objectivity" and an independent existence of truth.

The book highlights the importance of the nexus between the collective Self and its Others in the process of identity construction. It argues that the EU identity is not framed solely by characteristics that are internal to the EU, in line with some of the constructivist thinking, but also by its external Others. Further, it implies that identity is discursively constructed and always dependent on the articulation of difference. In other words, the EU-Self is constructed by being delineated from Others which it constructs at the same time. In line with the poststructuralist view, on which this book draws, I argue that identity formation through differentiation implies a hierarchy and subordination. In other words, as William Connolly argues, the constellation of the constructed other becomes both essential to the truth of the identity and a threat to it, *by just being other*.[2] The book claims that the constitution of an "authentic", homogeneous EU identity implies the creation of boundaries between "us" and "them". It produces "knowledge" about the superiority of the EU-self in relation to its external other, enabling the legitimacy of representation practices. However, the book argues that the discursive framing of the difference between the EU-self and its others is not necessarily represented in terms of radical difference, i.e. of a threat or danger to be contained or excluded, to use the poststructuralist terminology, but also expresses the forms of other, non-radical degrees of otherness. In other words, boundary-drawing does not necessarily have to be clear-cut in order to create hierarchisation and subordination in the EU-self relations with its others. Thus, the aim of the book is to analyse the continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of different degrees of otherness in the construction of the EU identity according to different discourses in which it is constructed. The cases of "the Bal-

2 William Connolly, *Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1991, p. 66.

kans" and the Western Balkans demonstrate this difference in the degree of otherness. At the same time, however, the book reveals that, in relation to its others, the nature of difference between the EU and others is reduced either to exclusion or to sameness. The book thus argues that even in the case of less radical forms of otherness, where the Other does not stand as anti-EU-self, the Other is represented as a "threat", by "just being other".

That said, I dedicate this book to all the people from "the Balkans". They will find themselves.

Dejana M. Vukasović

Belgrade, 2020

INTRODUCTION

"Saying is doing"

(Nicholas Onuf)

If we quote Stuart Hall and ask ourselves: "who needs identity?"[3], we could answer also by quoting Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper who contend that "identity tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense) or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)".[4] Often defined as a "problematic", "fluid" concept[5], which is "elsewhere" and "nowhere", often "used" but also abused, as an "open, complex and unfinished game - always 'under construction'"[6]..., the concept of identity does not seem a "promising" intellectual task. However, in this book, we have "surrendered" to the word "identity" even though it could have intellectual costs. Given the variety of approaches to the concept of identity, our intention here is not to provide a definite conceptualization of identity, as that would have been a fruitless task. Instead, we start from the position that identity is relational and discursively constructed through difference. In this regard, our "use" of the concept of identity in this book draws on the poststructuralist approach to identity in international politics.

Identity as discursively constructed through difference

Any search for identity involves differentiating oneself from what is one is not. Identity is a two-faced phenomenon; it simultaneously implies similarity (sameness) and difference (distinctiveness).[7] It appears as an answer in relation to the "other", and hence presumes the difference vis-à-vis to that "other". We cannot define ourselves unless we differentiate ourselves from what is not "us"

3 Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Who Needs Identity?", in Stuart Hall, Paul Du Gay (eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity*, SAGE, London, 1996, pp. 1-17.

4 Rogers Brubaker, Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "identity"", *Theory and Society*, vol. 29, n° 1, 2000, pp. 1-47, p. 1.

5 Bo Strath, "A European Identity. To the Historical Limits of the Concept", *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 5, n° 4, 2002, pp. 387- 401, p. 387.

6 Stuart Hall, "Europe's Other Self", *Marxism Today*, August 1991, pp. 18-19, p. 19.

7 Richard Jenkins, *Social identity*, Routledge, London and New York, 2008, p. 17.

(other) and *vice versa*, we can only define and comprehend what the other is if we place it in relation to "us". Thus, the identity of the self is foundationally linked to the other.

What kind of difference are we talking about in the identity construction? Difference in identity construction does not necessarily have a negative connotation like exclusion, aversion, hostility[8], but can also be described in a positive manner, like admiration or recognition of the other.[9] Thomas Diez notes that the other can even be perceived only as different, without value-judgment representations.[10] However, perceiving the other only as different, in a neutral manner, is difficult, given the subjectivity of our ideas that come with a specific, burdened cognitive and emotional content.[11] As Gerard Delanty argues, "what matters is not the representation of the Other as such, but the actual *nature* of the difference that is constructed.[12] The concept of other thus represents the choice between the recognition of difference, which implies diversity, i.e. positive difference, or its negation, which implies division, i.e. negative difference.[13] When difference is marginalized or denied, we are left with the essential concept of identity based on binary hierarchies and generating various forms of discrimination. As William Connolly points out, "identity requires difference in order to be and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty".[14] Hence, otherness, as a negation of other, is about the "pathological form" of identity, to use Gerard Delanty's terminology, i.e. while difference is inherent to the identity for-

8 Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe*: *Idea, Identity, Reality*, MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, 1995; Sybille Reinke de Buitrago, "Othering in International Relations. Significance and Implications", in Sybille Reinke de Buitrago (ed.), *Portraying the Other in International Relations: Cases of Othering, Their Dynamics and the Potential for Transformation*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012; Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'", *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, vol. 33, n° 3, 2005, pp. 613-636; Iver Neumann, Jennifer Welsh, "The Other in European Self-Definition. An Addendum to the Literature on International Society", *Review of International Studies*, vol.17, n° 4, 1991, pp. 327-348.

9 Sybille Reinke de Buitrago, "Othering in International Relations. Significance and Implications", *op. cit.,* p. xv.

10 Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'", *op. cit.*, p. 628.

11 Sybille Reinke de Buitrago, "Othering in International Relations. Significance and Implications", *op. cit.,* p. xv.

12 Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe*: *Idea, Identity, Reality*, *op. cit.,* p. 5.

13 *Ibid.*

14 William Connolly, *Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1991, p. xiv.

mation, otherness belongs to the realm of discourse. Otherness in that sense represents the result of a discursive process by which a dominant in-group (the Self) constructs one or many out-groups (Other) "by stigmatizing a difference presented as a negation of identity and thus a motive for potential discrimination".[15] Otherness is less due to the difference of the Other then to the discourse of the person who perceives the Other as such.[16]

In this book, we deal with the "pathological form" of identity, i.e. with the marginalization of the difference in self-other relation. Therefore, consistent with the poststructuralist standpoint in IR, we emphasize the role of discourse in the understanding of international relations, the importance of representation and the relationship between power and knowledge.[17]

Poststructuralism can be described as an approach to criticism rather than a critical theory *per se*.[18] In the words of Jenny Edkins, it can be best described as "a worldview or even an anti-worldview".[19] As such, it has been criticized as a "dead tradition of thought"[20], as incapable to "establish any authentic theoretical innovations" in the understanding of international relations.[21] However, we align with David Howarth, who highlights the value of poststructuralist inquiry into the construction, form and role of different social and political identities in various contexts, into the nature of human subjectivity and its connection to the politics of identity or difference and its seeking to conceptualize the relationship between structure, agency and power.[22]

15 Jean-François Staszak, "Other/Otherness", in Rob Kitchin, Nigel Thrift (eds.), *International Encyclopedia in Human Geography*, vol. 8, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2009, pp. 43-47, p. 43.

16 *Ibid*.

17 Cf. David Campbell, "Poststructuralism", in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity*, third edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 223-246, p. 225.

18 David Campbell, Roland Bleiker, "Poststructuralism", in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, fourth edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 196-218, p. 210.

19 Jenny Edkins, "Poststructuralism", in Martin Griffiths (ed.), *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, pp. 88-98, p. 88.

20 Anthony Giddens, "Structuralism Post-structuralism and the Production of Culture", in Anthony Giddens, Jonathan H. Turner (eds.), *Social Theory Today*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1987, pp. 195-223, p. 195.

21 Brook M. Blair, "Revisiting the 'third debate' ", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 37, n° 2, 2011, pp. 825-854, p. 828.

22 David R. Howarth, *Poststructuralism and After. Structure, Subjectivity and Power*, Palgrave

The appearance of the poststructuralist approach in IR in the second half of the 1980s[23] challenged the positivist assumptions in the IR theory. Unlike the positivist approach, which seeks to find the causal relations that drive world politics, including the analysis of the dependent and independent variables, poststructuralist approach claims that we cannot understand world politics through cause-effect relations. Unlike positivist theories, which advocate that science is based merely on observation of the facts and that we can say whether something is true or not if we examine the facts, postructuralist view rejects empiricism.[24] It adopts an anti-foundationalist standpoint, advocating that pure, "objective" observation is not possible, that what counts as "objective", "facts", and "truth" differs from theory to theory and that, for this reason, we cannot find the "truth". The poststructuralist viewpoint is based on constitutive epistemology, claiming that structures are constituted through human action and cannot therefore be independent variables.[25]

Accordingly, the poststructuralist approach in IR challenges the traditional concepts of IR theory, such as state, sovereignty, anarchy, foreign policy. It considers them as structures of meaning that do not describe an independently existing state of international politics. The main focus of the poststructuralist approach is on representation, as well as on the ways in which the dominant framings of world politics produce and reproduce power relations, i.e., how they legitimise certain forms of action while marginalis-

Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013, p. 1.

23 The "first wave" of poststructuralist authors appeared with the works of Richard Ashley ("The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory of International Politics", *Alternatives*, XII, 1987, pp. 403-434), Robert Walker ("Realism, Change, and International Political Theory", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 31, n° 1, 1988, pp. 65-86), James Der Derian (*On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, Basil Blackwell, New York Oxford, 1987), Michael Shapiro (*The Politics of Representation. Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis*, The University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1988), who used theories developed by poststructuralist philosophers, notably Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, in order to highlight the power of language - Lene Hansen, "Discourse analysis, post-structuralism and foreign policy", in Steve Smith, Amanda Hadfield, Tim Dunne (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases,* 3rd revised edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 95-110, p. 95.

24 Robert Jackson, Georg Sørensen, "Post-positivism in IR", in Robert Jackson, Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations. Theories and Approaches*, fifth edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 232-241, p. 233.

25 Lene Hansen, "Poststructuralism", in John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, sixth edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 169-184, p. 171.

ing other ways of being.[26] More specifically, for poststructuralists, understanding international politics depends upon abstraction, representation and interpretation.[27] According to David Campbell and Michael Shapiro, the dominant representations of international politics are of dual nature: on the one hand, they are arbitrary, because they are only one kind of practice among a variety of possibilities, and on the other, they are non-arbitrary, in the sense that certain social and historical practices create the dominant ways of making the "world".[28] In this regard, poststructuralists are focused on the critiques of realist and neorealist theories of international politics, which established the dominant understanding of the "world".

As for the realists, the basic point of the poststructuralist view is that state is central to world politics. However, unlike realists, poststructuralists argue that the state cannot be regarded as "taken for granted", as some preexisting entity. There is no existence of the subject/state prior to political practice. States are continuously rebuilt through historical and political practices and they acquire an identity simultaneously with these actions. The existence of the state is thus an effect of performativity.[29] The main focus of poststructuralism is thus on the question how discursive practices produce a state-centric perspective. In the same vein, for poststructuralists, sovereignty is also crucial in the international relations theory. Unlike realists, they regard sovereignty through a binary opposition inside/outside. As Rob Walker argues, "as a practice of authorization, modern sovereignty works by affirming an ontology of spatial separations, of inclusions and exclusions, that enable a capacity to draw the line between the legitimate and the illegitimate, the legal and the illegal, the normal and the exceptional (...) Given this structure of inclusions and exclusions, it is possible to constitute new inclusions and exclusions, or superiorities and infe-

26 Asli Çalkivik, "Poststructuralism and Postmodernism in International Relations", *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, International Studies Association and Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 1-29, p. 2.

27 David Campbell, "Poststructuralism", *op. cit.,* p. 223.

28 *Ibid.,* p. 224. As David Campbell notes, when we speak about "war on terror", "Cold war", "humanitarian intervention", "new world order" etc, we are engaged in representation. Also Michael J. Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation. Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis*, The University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1988, p. 93.

29 Richard Devetak, "Postmodernism", in Scott Burchill *et all., Theories of International Relations*, third edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005, pp. 161-187, p. 180.

riorities, within any given community of inclusion".[30] We know the national-self only by what it is not (international other). The states "inside" (nation-states) are not only different from the "outside" (international system), but the latter is constituted as their opposition: the identity of the national "self" is constituted in opposition to the threatening international "other". On the one hand, there is the "inside" state, as a synonym for progress, democracy, order and integration, while, on the other, there is the "outside" international sphere, a place of conflict, chaos and fragmentation. "Knowing the other outside", notes Rob Walker, "it is possible to affirm identities inside" and vice versa, "knowing identities inside, it is possible to imagine the absences outside".[31]

Two aspects of the poststructuralist approach in international politics are important for the purposes of this book. First, identities are discursively constructed. Therefore, discourse represents the key mechanism in the social construction of reality and in the definition of power relations in society. According to David Campbell, discourse "refers to a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible".[32] In a similar manner, Roxanne Doty defines discourse as a "system of statements in which each individual statement makes sense, produces interpretive possibilities by making virtually impossible to think outside of it".[33] Hence, when we speak of a discourse, we are referring to a specific group of texts, but also to the social practices to which those texts are linked.[34] Discourses produce meaning, i.e. rhetorical strategies inherent in discourses contribute to the way we perceive social facts.[35] In

30 R.B.J. Walker, "Europe is Not Where it is Supposed to Be", in Morten Kelstrup, Michael Williams (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power Security Community*, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, pp.14-32, p. 26.

31 R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 174.

32 David Campbell, "Poststructuralism", *op. cit.,* p. 234-5.

33 Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37, n° 3, 1993, pp. 297-320, p. 302.

34 Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters. The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, p. 6.

35 Caterina Carta, Jean-Frédéric Morin, "Introduction: EU's Foreign Policy through Lenses of Discourse Analysis", in Caterina Carta, Jean-Frédéric Morin (eds.), *EU's Foreign Policy through Lenses of Discourse Analysis. Making Sense of Diversity*, Ashgate, Farnham, 2013, pp. 21-58, p. 22.

other words, discourses are performative, they are constitutive of "reality". That means that discourses do not merely describe the world, or transmit statements, but they give meaning to and make sense of "reality". Discourses are also changeable, they are not closed, stable and fixed. As Roxanne Doty notes, "it is the overflowing and incomplete nature of discourses that open up spaces for change, discontinuity, and variation".[36] Hence, discourses produce meanings that are temporarily fixed and enable us to make sense of the world. Therefore, discourses are powerful. Power lies in the discourse itself. The meanings that are produced by discourse become knowledge. In the words of Stuart Hall, discourse is a way of presenting a particular kind of knowledge about a certain topic.[37] Knowledge is closely linked to power: all power requires knowledge and all knowledge relies on and reinforces existing power relations.[38] In that sense, the subject with power produces the knowledge and then the same knowledge enforces the power of the subject who create it. According to poststructuralists, it is not possible to acquire objective knowledge through the use of reason, because knowledge is a constructed category that should be the object of study. This approach is skeptical of universal narratives attempting to offer an "objective" worldview because this assumption implies a pre-existing assumption of what is "objective". It is not possible to identify "objectivity" - as "truth" and knowledge are subjective entities that are produced rather than discovered.[39] Therefore, discursive representations are not merely an expression of power, but power is inherent in discourse itself.[40] In line with this view, the poststructuralist approach argues that there is no preexisting subjectivity. The subject is produced through acts of power. The subject and "social reality" are mutually constituted: the subject produces the world of which it is a part and at the same time the subject is itself produced.[41] Thus, postructuralists don't

36 Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters. The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations, op. cit.,* p. 6.

37 Stuart Hall, "The West and the Rest. Discourse and Power", In Stuart Hall, Bram Gieben (eds.), *Formations of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 275-331, p. 291.

38 Robert Jackson, Georg Sørensen, "Post-positivism in IR", *op. cit.,* p. 235.

39 Aishling Mc Morrow, "Poststructuralism", in Stephen Mcglinchey, Rosie Walters, Christian Scheinpflug (eds.), *International Relations Theory*, E-International Relations Publishing, Bristol, 2017, pp. 56-61, p. 56.

40 Thomas Diez, "Postmodern Approaches", in Siegfried Schieder, Manuela Spindler (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, Routledge, London and New York, 2014, pp. 287-303, p. 288.

41 Jenny Edkins, "Poststructuralism", *op. cit.,* p. 90.

take subjects as a point of departure but instead investigate the ways in which human beings are produced as particular political subjects through power relations.[42] Reflecting this view, the book is focused on how "power works to constitute particular modes of subjectivity".[43] In that context, the main challenge is to analyse how certain representations underlie the production of identities as well as knowledge and how these representations make various courses of action possible.[44]

Discourses produce knowledge through language, which is not merely a neutral transmitter, but a producer of meanings. Things do not have objective meaning independently of how we constitute them in language.[45] As David Campbell suggests, "the world exists independently of language, but we can never know that...because the existence of the world is literally inconceivable outside of language and our tradition of interpretation".[46] There is no "true" meaning beyond linguistic representations.[47] Hence, the language does not reflect but constructs "reality".

Language enables certain subjects and events to be placed in hierarchical pairs, i.e. in binary oppositions. What distinguishes the poststructuralist approach from other social theories, including constructivism, is that language/discourse make the basis of their ontology.[48] Contrary to the constructivist view, interested in what a state's identity is and how it affects foreign policy, poststructuralists are interested in how any difference is marginalized by discourse as danger, threat, or opposite. Therefore, in poststructuralist view, language is not a medium "that simply conveys the empirical world, but it is a "kind of practice".[49] Put differently, treating language as

42 Asli Çalkivik, "Poststructuralism and Postmodernism in International Relations", *op. cit.,* p. 6.

43 Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters. The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations, op. cit.,* p. 4.

44 *Ibid*.

45 Lene Hansen, "Poststructuralism", *op. cit.,* p. 172.

46 David Campbell, *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1992, p. 6.

47 Eva Herschinger, "'Hell is the Other': Conceptualising Hegemony and Identity through Discourse Theory", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies,* vol. 41, n° 1, 2012, pp. 65-90, p. 71.

48 Cf. Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice. Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, Routledge, London and New York, 2006.

49 Lene Hansen, "Discourse analysis, post-structuralism and foreign policy", in Steve Smith, Amanda Hadfield, Tim Dunne (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, 3rd revised edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 95-110, p. 96.

discourse involves regarding language as a kind of practice.[50] The intimate connection between language and practice enable us to view statements not on the basis of their "truth" but on the basis of their value.

Second, the poststructuralist approach holds that identity and foreign policy are mutually constitutive. As Lene Hansen argues, "identities are produced and reproduced in foreign policy discourse, and there is thus no identity existing prior to and independently of foreign policy".[51] Hence, identity and foreign policy are ontologically indivisible and this indivisibility is laid down in discourse. An "other" is the pivotal part of the establishment of a foreign policy identity. The foreign policy is the process of making the other "strange" in order to differentiate it from the self. According to David Campbell, foreign policy is "one of the boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates".[52] More specifically, the articulation of threats is important in order to create the inside/outside dichotomy as necessary for the construction of the foreign policy identity. Hence, the constitution of identity through foreign policy is based on the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an "inside" from an "outside", a "self" from an "other", a "domestic" from a "foreign".[53] However, according to poststructuralist standing, hegemonisation of the "inside" identity through foreign policy does not necessarily imply a clear-cut dichotomy with its "outside", i.e. international system. In other words, the construction of identity through difference does not necessarily mean that all foreign and security policies are always constructed through relations of radical otherness. Constructions of identity can take on different forms of otherness, including degrees of less radical differences where the other can be constructed through representations like "civilisations", "humanity", "civilians", etc.[54] These constructions of identity are articulated in temporal terms through repetition, progress, backwardness, development. In this way, temporal representations enable to locate a contemporary for-

50 Michael J. Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation. Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis, op. cit.,* p. 11.

51 Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice. Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, op. cit.,* p. 23.

52 David Campbell, *Writing Security, op. cit.,* p. 75.

53 *Ibid.,* p. 8. Also Rob Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, op.cit*.

54 Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice, op. cit.,* p. 6.

eign policy question within a historical discourse.[55] In addition, it is also possible to link the security inside with the threats outside. In this regard, the internal/external security linkage makes it possible to ensure the domination of the security discourse on the inside.

The EU identity and "the problem of difference"

The relationship between the Self and the Other is an important subject of academic thinking not only in the field of philosophy, but also in the field of sociology, psychology, history, anthropology, political sciences, etc. This relationship is widely explored in the process of identity formation. With the development of the constructivist approach in international relations, and its conceptualisation of global politics in terms of the processes of social interaction in which actors engage, identity had become a key variable in the field of European integration studies. Mainstream constructivism (conventional constructivism)[56] is focused on the role of norms and ideas in shaping international political outcomes. Positioned as the "middle ground" between rationalist and reflectivist approaches[57], it emphasizes that the material world exists, but that it is also necessary to explore its connection with the social world that is a product of human consciousness, which includes concepts, ideas, beliefs and symbols. Thus, normative or conceptual structures are equally important as the material structure.[58] According to Alexander Wendt, "a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them".[59] It is intersubjective understanding and expectations that constitute the actors' conceptions of the self and other. In other words, ideas and meanings determine the actors' behaviour and their change leads

55 *Ibid*.

56 On division of constructivism into conventional, interpretative and critical constructivism see: Jeffrey Checkel, "Social constructivism in global and European politics: a review essay", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 30, 2004, pp. 229- 244, p. 231.

57 Cf. Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 3, n° 3, 1997, pp. 319-363.

58 Dejana Vukčević, "Effects of the Socialisation Process on Europeanization of EU Members States' national identities", in Pero Petrović, Milovan Radaković (eds.) *National and European Identity in the Process of European Integration*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Belgrade, 2013, pp. 41-54.

59 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it : the social construction of power politics", *International Organization*, vol. 46, n° 2, 1992, pp. 391-425, pp. 396-397.

to the change of structure, which is their product.[60] The interaction between the structure and the actors is essential. Structures constitute actors in terms of their interests and identities, but structures are produced by the discursive practices of actors.[61] Thus, structures exist through reciprocal interaction of actors, and this means that the actors can change structures.[62] Mainstream constructivism is focused on social ontology, i.e. on the question how ideational or normative structures constitute agents and their interests (and their identity).

Some differences of this approach in comparison to the poststructuralist approach[63] should be noted for the purpose of this book. The constructivist approach argues that identity is a variable that has impact on international politics. According to the conventional constructivist conception, states acquire their identities in interaction with other states in the international system. In other words, states as actors interact and in this interaction, they constitute social structure of international politics which in turn shapes their identities and preferences. This understanding also presupposes the existence of an already formed state identity that precedes and shapes foreign policy.[64] For conventional constructivism, analysis of foreign policy is based on explaining why particular decisions resulting in specific courses of action were made.[65] The poststructuralist approach has a different perspective on the issue. As already mentioned, it proposes that there is no

60 Dragan Simić, *Nauka o bezbednosti. Savremeni pristupi bezbednosti*, Službeni list SRJ, Fakultet političkih nauka, Belgrade, 2002, str. 73.

61 Joseph Jupille, James A. Caporaso, Jeffrey Checkel, "Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism and the Study of the European Union", *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 36, n° 1/2, 2003, pp. 7-40, p. 14.

62 Dale Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay", *International Security*, vol. 25, n° 2, 2000, pp. 187-212, pp. 190-191.

63 Poststructuralist approach is often presented as similar to the critical constructivist approach, See notably: Zeynep Arkan, " 'Via Media' vs. the Critical Path: Constructivism(s) and the Case of EU Identity", *All Azimuth*, vol. 3, n° 2, 2014, pp. 21-36; Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", *Review of International Studies,* vol. 30, n° 1, 2004, pp. 27-47; Bahar Rumelili, Münevver Cebeci, "Theorizing European Identity: Contributions to Constructivist IR Debate on Collective Identity", in Victoria Kaina, Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, Sebastian Kuhn (eds.), *European Identity Revisited: New Approaches and Recent Empirical Evidence*, Routledge, London, 2016, pp. 31-43.

64 Zeynep Arkan, " 'Via Media' vs. the Critical Path: Constructivism(s) and the Case of EU Identity", *op. cit.,* p. 27.

65 Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines", *op. cit.,* p. 298.

social reality outside language. Social reality is constructed through discourse. It also argues that identity cannot be treated as a variable in foreign policy because the representations of identity are constitutive of foreign policy. There is no causality between identity and foreign policy because they are related through discourse. From the poststructuralist point of view, what matters is how "subjects, objects and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made possible".[66] In other words, the poststructuralist approach seeks to understand how meanings are produced and not to explain why some events occurred.

The difference also exists when it comes to the dynamics of the process of identity construction.[67] By seeking to answer the question how collective identities relate to other identities, the conventional constructivism neglects the relationship between identity and difference. It underplays the role of others in the process of collective identity formation. With specific regard to the EU, it considers that the EU identity is constituted by characteristics that are internal to the EU, ignoring the effect of external others in the constitution of this identity.[68] Hence, the EU is perceived as a new type of international actor with a value-based or normative identity given its singularity in terms of its evolution and character. According to Alexander Wendt, the process of identity construction is mainly seen as an internally driven process that does not involve discourses of outsiders.[69] Hence, identity does not necessarily have to be constructed through difference. Contrary to this view, poststructuralism claims that identity is constructed through difference. In other words, the collective identity formation is a process that inevitably defines other identities and produces them as different.[70] Identity requires the existence of a different other.

This divergence in approaches is also visible in the debate concerning the nature of the EU as an international actor. On

66 *Ibid*.

67 Zeynep Arkan, " 'Via Media' vs. the Critical Path: Constructivism(s) and the Case of EU Identity", *op. cit.,* p. 27.

68 Bahar Rumelili, Münevver Cebeci, "Theorizing European Identity: Contributions to Constructivist IR Debate on Collective Identity", in Victoria Kaina, Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, Sebastian Kuhn (eds.), *European Identity Revisited: New Approaches and Recent Empirical Evidence*, Routledge, London and New York, 2016, pp. 31-43.

69 Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 24.

70 *Ibid*.

the one hand, some scholars consider that the EU represents the post-modern polity that goes beyond the Westphalian, nation-like collectivity.[71] This camp argues that the EU is based not on firm boundaries but on zones of transition (frontiers), thus blurring the distinction between self and other.[72] In other words, the EU is viewed by these authors as a postmodern polity deprived of centralized sovereignty of nation-states and their fixed, coherent collective identity. While the identity of modern nation-states is based on clear-cut and unambiguous inside/outside and self/other distinctions, the post-modernity of the EU goes beyond the practices of exclusion, fear and danger of outside others. Therefore, the EU is seen as an example of the "collective identity formation" in international relations, where states begin to see each other as an extension of self rather than as other.[73] On the other hand, some scholars consider that the EU identity is shaped by the exclusion and othering of "them".[74] In this view, the EU reminds of a modern, nation-like collectivity, and in this case, the EU identity is described as a supranationalist. In other words, the EU's relations with its outside are based on a modern mode of differentiation implying the discursive construction of an EU identity through the delineation of the external other.

Some scholars have presented this difference in the form of digital vs. analog mode of differentiation.[75] Through the prism of

71 See, for example: John Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations", *International Organization*, vol. 47, n° 1, 1993, pp. 139-74; Peter Van Ham, "Europe's Postmodern Identity: A Critical Appraisal", *International Politics*, vol. 38, 2001, pp. 229-252; Ian Manners, Richard Whitman, "The 'Difference Engine': Constructing and Representing the International Identity of the European Union, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 10, n° 3, 2003, pp. 380-404; Frank Schimmelfennig, "Liberal Identity and Postnationalist Inclusion: The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", in Lars-Erik Cederman (ed.), *Constructing Europe's Identity: The External Dimension*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2001, pp. 165-186.

72 Bahar Rumelili, *Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia,* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p. 54.

73 Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", *Review of International Studies,* vol. 30, n° 1, 2004, pp. 27-47, p. 28.

74 See, for example, Iver Neumann, *Uses of the Other. "The East" in European Identity Formation*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999; Iver Neumann, Jennifer Welsh, "The Other in European Self-Definition. An Addendum to the Literature on International Society", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 17, n° 4, 1991, pp. 327-348; Bahar Rumelili, *Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007; Michelle Pace, "The Construction of EU Normative Power", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* vol. 45, n° 5, 2007, pp. 1041-1064.

75 Iver Neumann, "European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus", *Alternatives*, vol. 23, n° 3, 1998, pp. 397-416; Rainer Hülsse, "Imagine the EU: the metaphorical

this dichotomy, the EU as a modern polity practices digital mode of differentiation, while the EU as a post-modern actor is related to analog mode of differentiation. The digital mode of differentiation constructs the other in total contrast to the self. In this case, there is a clear-cut binary opposition, with clear-cut, unambiguous border, and there are only self and other with nothing in-between. In contrast to the digital mode, the analog mode of differentiation produces difference in a more nuanced and not in a sharp and absolute way.[76] In this case, the differentiation is not based on binary oppositions i.e. on a difference in kind, but on a difference in degree. The difference does not create clear-cut boundaries, but fuzzy frontiers, where self and other overlap in multiple ways.[77] Although the EU, at first sight, has a clearly defined external border, i.e. clear-cut border between the inside and outside, it does at the same time have not just one single border but a variety of borders. The EU is made of "concentric circles" which, taken together, make it difficult to distinguish between the self and the other. The borders of the EU become a fuzzy frontier zone: in one context, the other can be an absolute other, while in some other context, it can be a part of the self. Therefore, in line with this reasoning, the EU practices analog mode of differentiation. This practice leads to the blurring of the clear-cut demarcation of the EU-self from the other and the creation of fuzzy and fluid boundaries of the EU. However, the situation seems not to be so simple. As Bahar Rumelili argues, this does not mean that the threatening relationship with difference has vanished: the non definition of the boundaries creates "sites of ambiguity and liminality that may be perceived and represented as especially threatening".[78] This debate could also be regarded through a distinction of "hard" and "soft" borders. While hard borders are institutionalized, soft borders are encoded in texts indicating "the reality of what Europe is and who Europeans are and who are not".[79] In this regard, "soft" borders are part of the

construction of a supra-nationalist identity", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9, 2006, pp. 396-421; Ole Waever, "Discursive Approaches", in Antje Wiener, Thomas Diez (eds.), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 197-215.

76 Rainer Hülsse, "Imagine the EU: the metaphorical construction of a supra-nationalist identity", *op. cit.,* p. 400.

77 *Ibid*.

78 Bahar Rumelili, *Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia, op. cit.,* p. 54.

79 Klaus Eder, "Europe's Borders: The Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe", *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 9, n° 2, 2006, pp. 255-271, p. 256.

"hard" borders and the symbolic power inherent in soft borders helps to "naturalize" hard borders.[80] Therefore, the question of what meaning is given to borders is of crucial importance for the debate whether the EU represents modern or post-modern collectivity. This question is also related to the temporality and spatiality of the other in the self-other construction. Michel Foucault highlighted the importance of space, stating that "the anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with space, no doubt a great deal more than with time".[81] When speaking of the concept of "Europe", Rob Walker defines it as a "vertical and spatially defined series of lines of distinction situated by both temporal and spatial coordinates: a here and a there, a then and a now".[82] Therefore, when we speak in this book about identity in spatial terms, we refer to the construction of identity through the construction of boundaries and the delineation of space. On the other hand, as outlined by Thomas Diez, although the most common processes of othering in international relations are geographic in nature, the temporal dimension of othering should not be underestimated.[83] Temporal othering pays attention to the construction of spaces and subjects in time. It is linked to the temporal concepts like development, progress, transformation, change, continuity, repetition.[84] It is also a matter of question how the Other is temporally constituted in relation to the temporality of the Self. Therefore, temporal othering is important for the articulation of different degrees of difference in the Self-Other relation in time. i.e. in the past and the present. Therefore, by means of temporal othering, the Other can be doubly temporally displaced: it can be constituted as backward, but at the same time also permanently located within its backwardness.[85] Thomas Diez argues that the temporal othering is a self-reflective project of reengaging with one's one history and therefore does not require external otherness in the construction of one's identity.[86] The similar view is held by Ole Waever, who argues that the "European idea" after World War II was to a large extent shaped as a revolt against Europe's

80 *Ibid*.

81 Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces", *Diacritics*, vol. 16, n° 1, 1986, pp. 22-27, p. 23.

82 R.B.J. Walker, "Europe is Not Where it is Supposed to Be", *op.cit.,* p. 26.

83 Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics", *Review of International Studies,* vol. 17, n° 2, 2004, pp. 319-335, p. 325.

84 Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice, op. cit.,* p. 43.

85 *Ibid.,* p. 44.

86 Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics", *op. cit*.

own past.[87] However, it is difficult to conceive temporal and spatial othering as mutually exclusive. As Bahar Rumelili notes, the temporal location of the difference (internal) does not mean that it is not simultaneously located spatially (externally).[88] On the contrary, by constructing Europe's past as other in the present, the past/present dichotomy maintains the distinction between inside and outside.[89] She argues that "the absence of any spatial/external differentiation can ultimately only be based on a shared essentialist notion of European identity, which would contradict the normative basis of postmodern identity".[90] Therefore, the process of othering implies both forms, because any historical action combines "the abstraction of temporal negation with the concrete actuality of a negated spatial being".[91]

The EU identity as discursively constructed through difference

In keeping with the poststructuralist approach to IR, the EU, like every collective identity, represents an "imagined community" that needs the articulation of its meaning. The EU does not possess a prediscursive, stable identity. As devoid of ontological being, it is through discursive construction that the EU becomes meaningful. In other words, the EU identity is not "naturally" given, but framed through discourse. Therefore, the EU is dependent on representational practices for its being, for its meaning. The process of imagination is what constitutes the EU identity.

How has the EU been imagined through discourse? This book underlines the importance of the nexus between the collective Self and its Others in the process of the discursive construction of identity. Identity is always dependent on the articulation of difference. There is no self without an other. They are foundationally linked. Thus, the collective Self emerges by being discursively

87 Ole Weaver, "Insecurity, security and asecurity in the West-European non-war community", in Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 69-118.

88 Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", *op. cit.*, p. 33.

89 *Ibid*.

90 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

91 Sergei Prozorov, "The other as past and present: beyond the logic of "temporal othering" in IR theory", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 37, n° 3, 2011, pp. 1273-1293, p. 1273.

differentiated from the surrounding Others.[92] Thus, the constitution of identity does not mean the dynamics of homogenisation and association, but a continuous delineation of the Self from the Other. That said, we argue that the EU identity is discursively framed through difference. Namely, in this book we understand the EU identity as discursively constructed and ever dependent on the articulation of difference. In other words, the EU-Self is constructed by being differentiated from its Others. But, what kind of difference is at issue here?

In the poststructuralist perspective, identities are constructed through the practices of othering, as a way of articulating difference. Hence, the identity/difference dichotomy is based on opposition: the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an "inside" from an "outside", a "self" from an "other", a "domestic" from a "foreign".[93] Identity formation through differentiation implies a hierarchy and subordination in the process of othering. A hierarchy places the self in the position above the other.[94] Discourse makes possible to construct Other in a certain way by the Self and at the same time limits the other ways in which the Other can be constructed. As Stuart Hall argued, the power of discourse depends on its ability to impose its categories, to represent someone or something in a certain way, i.e. on the exercise of symbolic power through representational practices.[95]

Hence, we claim that the EU identity requires an other *against* which it is constructed and at the same time, it constructs the other. The "story" about the EU is also a "story" about "imagined other". Therefore, the discursively constructed EU identity through difference denotes not only the EU as a subject in international politics, but also determines the nature of the relationship the EU has with Others. This relationship is based on hierarchy and sub-

92 Jan Ifversen, Christoffer Kølvraa, "European Neignbourhood Policy as Identity Politics", Paper to be presented at the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17-19, 2007, p. 3, http://aei.pitt.edu/7915/

93 David Campbell, *Writing Security, op. cit.,* p. 8.

94 Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice, op. cit.,* Sybille Reinke de Buitrago, "Othering in International Relations. Significance and Implications", *op. cit*.

95 Stuart Hall, "The Spectacle of the Other", in Stuart Hall (ed.), *Representations. Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices,* Sage and the Open Society, London, 1997, pp. 223-279, p. 259.

ordination. Therefore, the main aim of this book is to explore the nature of difference in the discursively constructed EU identity, i.e. the different degrees of otherness in the relationship between the EU and its external others.

Although the poststructuralists primarily conceptualize difference as a threat, a danger to be contained, disciplined, negated or excluded[96], it is argued in this book that the EU self-representation in foreign policy discourse creates different degrees of Otherness over time, that are not exclusively represented as radical difference. In other words, the EU's other is not perceived exclusively as a monolithic and dangerous, but also as ambiguous other. Hence, the book is about transformation of representations over time, about their continuity and change. In other words, it is about the continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of the differences of the Other from the EU-Self. The other can be radically different in one discursive context, but also less radical other in another. Since identity is not fixed but changeable, in this book we try to demonstrate different forms of representations of the EU identity according to the different discourses in which it is constructed over the years. The book does not rely on the realist logic of explanation, but on the logic of interpretation. It starts from the assumption that it is not possible to specify "real causes" of some event, but instead is oriented towards political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over other.[97]

The book is divided into two parts. The first part of the book deals with the general question how the EU identity emerges in different forms according to the discourse in which it is constructed. It aims to analyse discursive changes over time. The first part is divided into three chapters. The first chapter analyses the discursively constructed identity of the European Communities (EC) in the European integration process until the end of the Cold War and the creation of the EU. As Bo Petersson and Anders Hellström rightly put it, "the past provided the foundation for most identity constructions".[98] Therefore, the first chapter is seen as a "discursive

96 Cf. David Campbell, *Writing Security*.

97 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

98 Bo Petersson, Anders Hellström, "The Return of the Kings. Temporality in the construction of EU identity", *European Societies*, vol. 5, n° 3, 2003, pp. 235-252, p. 238.

reservoir" from where statements on EU identity are drawn.[99] The main research question in this chapter is how was the EC identity framed in relation to its others in the European integration process. It is argued that the construction of an EC identity has been discursively associated with the concept of "Europe". The dominant discourse was "civilizational" discourse which constructed the EC identity in terms of the past ("inherited civilization"), followed by the re-mythologisation of old legends and historical facts. The "discovering" of the "European identity" through the official foreign policy documents, as discursively equated with the EC identity, was the expression of a new form of "European civilization" which necessarily imposed boundaries and classification of "outsiders", creating the EC identity on the basis of civilised/primitive dichotomy. The second and third chapters of the first part deal with the EU identity as discursively constructed in foreign policy discourse after its creation with the Maastricht Treaty. Two basic discourses are in this regard analysed: the EU as a "community of values" and the EU as a "global actor". The two discourses are positioned in the same period (after the end of the Cold War) and compared in relation to one main "event", to use Lene Hansen's terminology, i.e. the creation of the EU. In these two chapters, we interpret the EU enlargement policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as its complement, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as the main foreign policy tools that are constitutive of EU foreign policy. Following David Campbell's assertion that the foreign policy is the external representation of the state, we understand the foreign policy of the EU as the external representation of itself. We claim that the EU foreign policy identity requires an other *against* which it is constructed and at the same time, it constructs the other. We demonstrate how the EU-self representations as a "community of values" and as a "global actor" produce the "knowledge" about the superiority of the EU-self in relation to its external other enabling in this way the legitimacy of the representations practices. At the same time, we demonstrate that foreign policy is not pre-given, but a construction in a moment of representation. Through discourses of the EU foreign-policy representatives the meanings are produced constructing a particular "reality" which makes various foreign policy practices possible.

99 Jan Ifversen, Christoffer Kølvraa, "European Neighbourhood Policy as Identity Politics", *op. cit.,* p. 7.

EU self-representation in foreign policy discourse is not only the story about the EU but also about "imagined other". It is on the way that the EU conceptualises itself and its meanings as a "community of values" and as a "global actor" that the nature of the difference of the EU in relation to the other depends, i.e. whether it produces and practices state-like digital mode of differentiation or as a post-modern, post-Westphalian actor practices analog mode of differentiation.

The second part of the book addresses the issue of the Balkans and Western Balkans as the Other in the discursive construction of an EU identity. The aim is to demonstrate in what way and to what extent the Balkans and the Western Balkans have been constructed as EU's different Other. In other words, we focus on how certain representations of the Balkans and Western Balkans underlie the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. The analysis aims to demonstrate the nature of difference in the EU- Balkans/Western Balkans relationship in discourse. Through this case study, we show the different degrees of othernees. On the one hand, the Balkans as EU's Other become conceptualised as a threat, as a danger to be negated by the EU. In other words, the identity of the Balkans was constructed as primarily non-European, not as less EU-self, but as anti-EU-self, with no possibility to become part of the EU-self in the future. Therefore, the Balkans was represented as a radically different from the EU in the discourse. At the same time, with the "case of the Balkans", we show the importance of temporal representations which enable to locate a contemporary foreign policy question within a historical discourse. The analysis of the evolution of the discourse and identity over a series of historical moments, from the "discovery" of the Balkans onwards, together with the use of intertextuality, enables to show how deeply rooted were particular aspects of identities of the EU and the Balkans. In other words, it enables to show how certain representations, which were important in the past, have been changed or repeated over time in the discourse of the present. Historical discourse analysis is therefore important in the analysis of the representation of "the Balkans" as different. In the same vein, the "case of the Balkans" shows the importance of spatiality in self-other relations, having in mind that the exact scope of the Balkans in neutrally geographical

terms changed constantly in Western narratives. Although a specific geographic entity, the Balkans represents a historical construct, "a series of overlapping imaging spaces" and therefore, we regard the Balkans in this book as "the Balkans", i.e. not as region in neutral geographical terms, but as an expression of symbolic power. On the other side, the Western Balkans, although also the expression of the symbolic power, is geographically strictly bounded area, a region with clearly defined countries which belong to this region. The Western Balkans is represented as a less-radical other, an ambiguous other, as a "close and distant" at the same time, as a bridge between "Europe" and the "Balkans". The Western Balkans is represented as an ambiguous, but still as a threat, however, in the new form. Through the "case of the Western Balkans", we show the different forms of non-radical otherness, expressed through the security/development nexus introduced in order to enable the domination of the security of the "inside", i.e. EU and which represents the Western Balkans as a "victim of the past", as an underdeveloped version of the EU-self, but also through the internal/external security linkage, which enables to represent the Western Balkans as a "threat" to the stability and the security of the EU.

As Jenny Edkins notes, poststructuralist authors choose not to develop grand theories' methods but instead focus on the question how people were influenced in specific historical periods with a specific way of thinking, which was shaped by the relations of power and knowledge.[100] Methods adopted in this book are discourse-analytical. In line with poststructuralist standpoint, the material for analysis is textual. The corpus of analysis is dominated by the speeches delivered by the leading personnel in the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is at the same time the vice-president of the European Commission. According to Lene Hansen, official speeches carry high political authority, they can be widely read and attended to, and they score high in terms of articulating identity.[101] The dominantly texts of speeches are combined with the official declarations and other official documents concerning the foreign policy domain. Following Lene Hansen, these types of texts have "lower weight" in terms of articulation of identity then

100 Jenny Edkins, "Poststructuralism", *op. cit.,* p. 88.

101 Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice*, *op. cit.,* pp. 57-59.

the speeches because they are a product of negotiations of various actors. Therefore, in the book, this kind of texts is simultaneously combined with official speeches in order to give them a "higher weight" in terms of articulation of EU identity.

Intertextuality is important for discourse analysis of the foreign policy.[102] As Roxanne Doty notes, "individual texts do not exist in a vacuum", but "are interwined with other texts forming a complex web of intertextuality".[103] She argues that different texts situated in the same arena and texts from different arenas "may share the same logic according to which meaning is created and subjects constructed".[104] In a similar manner, Lene Hansen outlines that intertextuality means that "texts are situated within and against other texts, that they draw upon them in constructing their identities and policies, that they appropriate as well as revise the past, and that they build authority by reading and citing that of others".[105] In other words, intertextuality refers to official foreign policy texts not as located in a vacuum but within "a larger textual web" which "includes and goes beyond other policy texts".[106] Therefore, intertextuality also includes academic writings, travellers' reports, journalists' books, etc, which are all important tools in the analysis of power in discourse. This is particularly important for historical discourse analysis, i.e. the analysis of the construction of the identity of the Self and the Other through contemporary discourse in a historical and thereby comparative perspective.

Through discourse, *discursive spaces* are provided, i.e. "concepts, categories, metaphors, models, and analogies by which meanings are produced".[107] In this regard, the various linguistic formulations like metaphors, argumentation, as well as the reconstruction and/or recontextualisation of various historical myths are of significant importance. In these discursive spaces, certain traits, characteristics and qualities are attributed to subjects, as well as their justification, legitimization and naturalization, or classification

102 Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice, op. cit.,* p. 49.

103 Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines", *op. cit.,* p. 308.

104 *Ibid*.

105 Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice, op. cit.,* p. 49.

106 *Ibid*.

107 Roxanne Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines", *op. cit.,* p. 302.

by various linguistic means. Therefore, the use of nomination and referential strategies[108] in texts are particularly useful, such as the frequent expression of "we" that often figures in the EU official foreign policy texts, enabling to construct the EU identity by differentiating it in relation to "them", i.e. its external others. Also, personification, i.e. the attribution of the human qualities to the EU, is important for "imagining" the EU as a distinct collectivity, giving it meaning which enable to draw the boundaries between the EU and its others. Important to the process of boundary-drawing are also various metaphors, such as: "European family", "parent/child" or "model of attraction", etc. Argumentation strategies understood in terms of justifications of positive and negative attributions[109] are very powerful in creating boundary dichotomies like good/ bad, developed/underdeveloped, mature/immature, safe/unsafe, secure/ insecure, etc. in the discursive framing of the difference between the self and the other.

This book aims to contribute to the European integration studies by offering the poststructuralist view of identity. Since the 1990s, the study of the role of the EU in international politics has attracted growing interest among scholars in the framework of European integration studies. However, only few scholars have analysed the EU identity by using the self-other constructions, considering the difference between self and external other as pivotal in the making of an EU identity.[110] They analysed various forms of differentiation of the EU from its outside others. The EU identity has been regarded by these authors as a relational process, shaped with significant external others. Therefore, the aim of this research is to show the importance of the poststructuralist theory for the analysis of the discursive construction of the EU identity. Despite of its disregard for the "real", in our view, it enables to provide a viable framework for furthering our understanding of international rela-

108 Senem Aydin-Düzgit, "Critical discourse analysis in analysing European Union foreign policy: Prospects and challenges", *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 49, n° 3, 2014, pp. 354-367, p. 361.

109 *Ibid.,* p. 362.

110 Iver Neumann, *The Uses of the Other, op. cit.,* Iver Neumann, Jennifer Welsh, "The Other in European Self-Definition. An Addendum to the Literature on International Society", *op. cit*., Bahar Rumelili, *Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia, op. cit.,* Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", *op. cit*., Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics", *op. cit.,* Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'", *op. cit*.

tions.[111] Given the scarcity of research on how the EU identity was discursively constructed in relation to the Balkans and the Western Balkans as its external Other, this book also aims to analyse the discursive construction of the Balkans/Western Balkans as "Other" in the EU's foreign policy discourse.[112] This research seeks to fill this gap. Finally, the book aims to contribute to the debate about the question whether the EU constitutes a modern or a postmodern polity in its relations with its outside. It seeks to show that the digital. i.e. modern, nation-like mode of differentiation between self and other does not exclusively require the identity of the Other as radically different, with clear-cut boundaries between self and the other. The construction of fluid and ambiguous frontiers between the Self and its ambiguous, non-radical other can also lead to the nation-like, modern practices in relation to the other.

111 Cf. Richard Devetak, "Post-structuralism", in Scott Burchill *et all.,* (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013, pp. 187- 216, p. 187.

112 Mika Luoma-Aho, "Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism: A Pathology of the Balkans in European Security Discourse", *Geopolitics*, vol.7, n° 3, 2002, pp.117-142; Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice, op. cit.*

PART I

CONSTRUCTING A (EU)ROPEAN IDENTITY

"We Europeans"
(Francis Bacon)

1. THE EC AS A "COMMON EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION"

In 1950, Jean Monnet wrote: "Europe has never existed... we must genuinely create Europe".[113] Starting from these Monnet's words, we must ask ourselves: what is Europe? And to go a step further: what is a European identity? How and when did the concept of the European identity emerge? How was this concept associated with the images of Europe and the development of the European integration process? As Bo Stråth notes, "the history of a European identity is the history of a concept and a discourse. A European identity is an abstraction and a fiction without essential proportions".[114] In a similar vein, Hayden White writes that "Europe has never existed anywhere except in discourse".[115] And indeed, historically, there has been a variety of discourses about what it means to be "European", creating at the same time boundaries between "us" and "them".[116] Hence, the concept of "Europe" has never been a fixed geographical area with permanent and generally accepted boundaries.[117] In other words, "Europe" is a contested concept. A search for "Europe" is a search for its construction, for its "imagination".

The concept of "Europe" assumed its meaning in relation to its distinction from the "other". Thinking "Europe" implies thinking "non-Europe": the non-European "other" was fundamentally linked to the construction of the "European identity". During different periods in history, "Europe" has been opposed to barbarism, despotism, slavery, the "East" and at the same time identified with civilization, Christianity, democracy, freedom and the "West".

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113 Jean Monnet, "Memorandum to Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault", May 1950, in Trevor C. Salmon, William Nicoll (eds.), *Building European Union: A Documentary History and Analysis,* Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1997, pp. 41–44, p. 43-4.

114 Bo Stråth, "A European Identity. To the Historical Limits of the Concept", *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 5, no 4, 2002, pp. 387-401, p. 388.

115 Hayden White, "The Discourse of Europe and the Search for a European identity", in Bo Stråth (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, Oxford, P.I. E., Peter Lang, 2000, p. 67.

116 Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe*: *Idea, Identity, Reality*, MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, 1995; Klaus Eder, "Europe's Borders: The Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe", *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 9, n° 2, 2006, pp. 255-271.

117 Catherine Lee, Robert Bideleux, " 'Europe': What Kind of Idea?", *The European Legacy*, vol. 14, n° 2, 2009, pp. 163-176, p. 164.

According to Peter Burke, in ancient Greek texts the term "Europe" was occasionally used to denote the difference in relation to the Other, i.e. Persians.[118] This distinction laid the foundations to the later notion of oriental despotism.[119] In these narratives, the idea of "Europe" draws on the dichotomy between Greek city-states, supposedly characterized by freedom and the rule of law, and South-West Asia, characterized by despotism and servitude.[120] Anthony Pagden points out that "Europe, which will fashion itself for generations in opposition to Asia, has always owed to Asia its historical origins".[121] Pagden further argues that the "Europe" understood by Greeks as Hellas, i.e. the lands around the Aegean Sea, was represented as different in comparison to Asia or Africa not only in the sense of climate and disposition, but also in terms of race (ethnos).[122] While Aeschilus in *The Persians* portrayed the war between Greece and Persia as a conflict between Europe and Asia, Herodotus used the term "Europe" to describe the war as one between two "races", i.e. Europe and the Greek race on the one hand, and Asia on the other.[123]

For the Romans, during the Roman Empire, the principal trait of "Europe" was its distinction from the "barbarians". After the division of the Roman Empire in 395, the term "Europe" was increasingly used to refer to the western part of the Roman Empire, while the idea of "Empire" became associated with the eastern, Byzantine part. This gradually led to the emergence of its identity of western part as founded on Latin Christianity.[124] Thus, from the eleventh to the seventeenth century, "Europe" became progressively synonymous with Christendom (Christianitas).[125] Christianity provided "Europe" with a continuity from the Roman Empire to the

118 Peter Burke, "Did Europe exist before 1700?", *History of European Ideas*, vol. 1,1980, pp. 21-29, p. 22.

119 *Ibid.*

120 Catherine Lee, Robert Bideleux, " 'Europe': What Kind of Idea?", *op.cit.,* p. 164.

121 Anthony Pagden, "Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent", in Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity to the European Union,* Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 33-54, p. 35.

122 *Ibid.,* p. 36.

123 Peter Burke, "Did Europe exist before 1700?", *op.cit*.

124 Heikki Mikkeli, *Europe as an Idea and an Identity*, MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998, pp. 13-14.

125 Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe, op. cit.,* p. 23.

rise of nation states from the seventeenth century onward.[126] The role given to the Catholic Church was important in this regard, that of creating a community of independent states under the spiritual guidance of the Pope.[127] According to Léonce Bekemans,

> "In the 9th century the term "christianitas" stood for the whole territory inhabited by Christian people, however with a focal attention towards universalism. Pope Innocent III (1198-1216), one of the most powerful and influential popes of the Middle Ages, affirmed the existence of a Christian territory ("terrae Christianorum"), with specific borders ("fines Christianorum") and one single "populus christianus", though under different political communities, but with the need to defend its identity against non-believers".[128]

Therefore, the idea of "Europe" in the Middle Ages was primarily used as a geographical expression, covering the common cultural and religious heritage of Christianity and the Classical Roman Age.[129] From 16th century onwards, Christianity lost the central role in the conception of "Europe", mainly due to two events: first, the outbreak of religious conflicts with the Protestant Reformation challenging the role of the Catholic Church as a European cultural unifier, and second, the "discovery" of the New World with the colonisation of American territories. Progressively, a secularization of the concept of "Europe" occurred. This concept was followed by an identity of "Europe" that departs from Christianization on the way towards the economic and political "appropriation" of the rest of the world by exporting a "European way of life".[130] Tzvetan Todorov's analysis of the European encounter with the peoples of the Americas demonstrates this construction of differentiation as a synonym for inferiority, as well as the construction of the concept of "equal" as a synonym for "the same".[131] In other words, other peoples are not perceived as different subjects,

126 Gerard Delanty, *Formations of European Modernity. A Historical and Political Sociology of Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013, p. 69.

127 Léonce Bekemans, *Globalisation vs. Europeanisation. A Human-centric interaction*, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Brussels, 2013, p. 58.

128 *Ibid.*

129 *Ibid.*

130 Klaus Eder, "Europe's Borders: The Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe", *op. cit.,* p. 261.

131 Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America. The Question of the Other*, Harper&Row Publishers, New York, 1984, pp. 151-167.

but as objects, as inferior that needed to be converted in order to become the same.

The Enlightenment thought, as Gerard Delanty notes, was in many respects possible only by relation of otherness, seen as an expression of distance "that many Europeans had to their own culture, which they could view only through the eyes of the Other".[132] It was during the Enlightenment period, that the concept of a secular "European civilization" became crystallized, as defined in terms of civilization/barbarism distinction.[133] The concept of civilization was a secular substitute for Christendom as the unifying element of the continent. During the Enlightenment period, philosophers identified the concept of "Europe" with the process of modernity, rationality and the primacy of science. A highly idealised image of the "West" emerged during that period, equated with the positive virtues of rationality, progress, civilisation, humanity. French philosophers were particularly influential in providing the foundations for the secular idea of Europe based on the concept of civilization. In his *De l'Esprit des lois* and *Lettres persanes,* Montesquieu denoted Europe as a space of liberty and law which stood in opposition to Asian slavery and despotism, regarded as antithetical to Europe.[134] Voltaire, on the other hand, wrote that "Europe became the continent of the Enlightenment, although some parts are still shrouded in darkness".[135] According to Larry Wolff, it was Voltaire that, together with other philosophers, elaborated his own perspective of the European continent, "gazing from west to east, instead from south to north". According to Wolff,

> "Before the eighteenth century, the crucial conceptual division of Europe had been between the south and the north, according to the perspective of Renaissance Italy, which had validated itself with reference to the perspective of ancient Rome. The Enlightenment introduced a different perspective on Europe, no longer recognizing the supremacy of Rome

132 Gerard Delanty, *Formations of European Modernity. A Historical and Political Sociology of Europe, op. cit.,* p. 104.

133 *Ibid.,* p. 35.

134 Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des lois*, édition établie par Laurent Versini, Gallimard, Paris, 1995; Montesquieu, *Lettres Persanes*, édition de Jean Starobinski, Gallimard, Paris, 2003.

135 Voltaire, *Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations*, quoted in Kevin Wilson, Jan van der Dussen (eds.), *The History of the Idea of Europe,* Open University, Routledge, Milton Keynes, New York, 1995, p. 42.

> and Florence as fixed points of the cultural compass, and instead viewing the continent from Paris and London. This reorientation of the cultural geography of the continent was conceived by the philosophes with respect to themselves and their principal centers. At the same time, the map of Europe was put before the public, and the public sphere, reciprocally, received a geographical orientation".[136]

Hence, the concept of "Eastern Europe" was developed as a concept of demarcation, measuring at the same time the Western superiority.[137] Eastern Europe became one of the generalized "others" in the construction of "Europe's" self-image.[138] The demarcation line between "Western" and "Eastern" Europe was made possible by the construction of the concept of "civilization", separating "Western Europe" as a synonym for "European civilization" and others, i.e. "Eastern Europe" as culturally inferior. Inspired by Edward Said's work, Larry Wolff argued that the "idea of Eastern Europe was entangled with evolving Orientalism" and that, due to the geographical border between Europe and Asia which was not unanimously fixed, there was "uncertainty" which "encouraged the construction of Eastern Europe as a paradox of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, Europe but not Europe".[139] In that sense, concluded Wolff, "the invention of Eastern Europe might be described "as an intellectual project of demi-Orientalization".[140]

The East-West division, substituting the north-south divide that had dominated European mental maps for centuries, gave birth to the concept of the "West" as discursively equated with Western Europe. As Stuart Hall notes, "the West's sense of itself - its identity - was formed not only by the internal processes that gradually molded Western European countries into a distinct type of society, but also through Europe's sense of difference from other worlds - how it comes to represent itself in relation to these "others".[141] It

136 Larry Wolff, "Voltaire's Public and the Idea of Eastern Europe: Towards a Literary Sociology of Continental Division", *Slavic Review*, vol. 54, n° 4, 1995, pp. 932-942, p. 933.

137 Bo Stråth, "A European Identity. To the Historical Limits of the Concept", *op. cit.,* p. 393.

138 Iver Neumann, *Uses of the Other. "The East" in European Identity Formation*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999.

139 Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1994, p. 7.

140 *Ibid.*

141 Stuart Hall, "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power", in Stuart Hall, Bram Gieben (eds.), *Formations of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 275-331, p. 279.

was that difference of other societies and cultures from the "West" that served as a "benchmark" against which the "West's" achievements were measured. It was in the context of this relationship that the idea of the "West" gained its meaning. It was a concept that enabled to draw boundaries, establish hierarchies, and to reproduce the static and fixed images of the "West" and "the Rest".

Hence, for centuries, various forms of the concept of Europe were built up around oppositions ranging from orientalism to occidentalism. The promotion of "Europe's values" was at the same time the promotion of the opposite values. Moreover, the imagining of the Other was not foremost the result of observation or experience, but rather of psychological projections. It was perceived as primitive with an undeveloped civilization and at the same time as savage and consequently in need to be converted and "civilized". Through the account of travellers, missionaries and anthropologists, the imagination of Others was translated into the "European languages" and therefore took a form of assimilation.[142]

The two world wars changed the concept of "Europe". Whereas until the world wars Europe had been represented as having the centre stage in international relations, the loss of empires and the Cold War's political division of the European continent led to uncertainty about what represented European specificity and what it meant "to be European". Before the Second World War, the concept of "Europe" was represented as a continent plagued with conflict and war. With the beginning of the Cold War, an ideological and economic border dividing the continent into Western-capitalist and Eastern-Communist zones was created, which made clear the border and limits of "Europe".[143] At the same time, the concept of "Europe" was discursively equated with Western Europe. The Soviet Union became "Europe's" significant "other", i. e. the threatening "East". The identity of the "West" was thus framed in response to the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. The threatening "East" helped to create NATO, represented not only as a military alliance

142 Luisa Passerini, "Europe and Its Others: Is There a European Identity?", in Dan Stone (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 120-138, p. 120.

143 Brigitta Busch, Michał Krzyzanowski, "Inside/Outside the European Union. Enlargement, migration policy and the search for Europe's identity", in Warwick Armstrong, James Anderson (eds.), *Geopolitics of European Union Enlargement. The fortress empire*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, pp. 107-124, p. 108.

aimed to protect the "West" against Soviet Union, but also as an "asset to think with" that enabled to constitute the identity of the "West" as a community based on shared democratic values. As the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty from 1949 explains,

> "The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area".[144]

Hence, with the help of an antithetical "other", the "Western identity" was produced to project a particular image of the "West" as democratic, progressive and modern, in opposition to the totalitarian, regressive and non-modern "East". It was constructed as a community of like-minded states, and based on the concepts of democracy, human rights, freedom, rule of law, which, grouped together, symbolized the "commonness" of the "Western civilization". In this regard, the securitization of the Soviet Union was constitutive for the construction of the "West".

At the same time, as a part of the "West", Western Europe became "trapped" by the invented national security logics of the USA and Soviet Union. Therefore, the discourse of the "peaceful Europe" was an attempt to transcend traditional interstate security fixations and to become similar to a "security community" through reconciliation and integration. Winston Churchill was among the first to offer a perspective on post-war intra-European relations. In a speech delivered at the University of Zurich in 1946, he spoke about "the tragedy of Europe, this noble continent, the home of all great parent races of the Western world, the foundation of Christian faith and ethics, the origin of most of culture, arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern times".[145] And he stressed: "We must build a kind of United States of Europe (...) And why should there not be a European group which could give a sense of enlarged

144 The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, Washington, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

145 Winston Churchill, speech delivered at the University of Zurich, 19 September 1946, https://rm.coe.int/16806981f3

patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this mighty continent?"[146] This concept of Europe was followed by the Schuman Declaration in 1950 which included proposals for the establishment of a sui generis, supranational structure, as needed for international security and world peace. In the words of the Declaration, "the contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to *civilization* is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations".[147] It is further stated that

> "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries.
>
> It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims".[148]

The construction of the European Communities, as an institutional response to the European integration process, has been imagined as an appropriate answer to the uncertainty of the European specificity. The European integration project was conceived as a peace project, aiming to overcome the fragmentation and difference and starting from the premise that it was "Europe's diversity" that ultimately caused bloody and violent conflicts.[149] The "never-again" post-war narrative of Europe enabled the legitimation of

146 *Ibid*.

147 The Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en

148 *Ibid*.

149 Cf. Stefan Borg, "European integration and the problem of the state: universality, particularity, and exemplarity in the crafting of the European Union", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, vol. 17, n° 3, 2014, pp. 339-366, p. 351.

the European integration process.[150] The European Communities were perceived as a radical breakup with the violent European past, and an attempt to go beyond the nation-state, viewed as an emanation of nationalism and militarism. The "new discovery" of "Europe" was thus founded on an image of a "peaceful Europe". In this picture, the European Communities were portrayed as based on solidarity between states and nations and on peace and respect for democracy and human rights. Therefore, "common security" was represented as a "logical consequence" of cooperation and integration. The economically driven integration was thus conceived as a gradual strategy aiming to create a common economic space that would eventually lead, through the "spill-over" effect of the neo-functionalist logic, to political integration.

Thomas Diez and Ole Waever contend that "Europe's other" was Europe's own past that threatened to become its future.[151] Thomas Diez notes that "otherings between geographically defined political entities tend to be more exclusive and antagonistic against out-groups than otherings with a predominantly temporal dimension".[152] His argument is that temporal othering locates alterity in one's own history and therefore does not require externalized otherness. In other words, the logic of dominant othering in the process of European integration after the Second World War was for a long time not spatial but temporal. Similarly, Ole Waever observes that "after World War II, the European idea was to a large extent shaped as a revolt against Europe's own past".[153] In Waever's view, it was against the threat of possible "fragmentation" characteristic of the "Westphalian" system of nation-states that the process of European integration was able to identify itself as a "peace project".[154] Therefore, the EC would in this case be regarded as a "post-modern polity" with permeable and fluid internal

150 Christoffer Kølvraa, "European Fantasies: On the EU's Political Myths and the Affective Potential of Utopian Imaginaries for European Identity", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 54, n° 1, 2016, pp. 169-184, p. 172.

151 Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 17, n° 2, 2004, pp. 319-335; Ole Weaver, "Insecurity, security and asecurity in the West-European non-war community", in Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 69-118.

152 Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics", *op. cit.,* p. 320.

153 Ole Waever, "Insecurity, security and asecurity in the West-European non-war community", *op. cit.,* p. 90.

154 *Ibid.,* p. 100.

borders. On the other hand, according to Vincent Della Sala, the narrative of peace is very similar to political myths we can find in nation-states.[155] He argued that according to this narrative, which he named as foundational myth, the only way to understand the roots of European unity is to imagine that it would lead to European integration. In this regard, argues Della Sala, the search for an EC narrative aiming to "capture" its unique nature has frequently adopted those similar to national experiences.[156] The use of the myth of the EC/EU bringing peace, prosperity and democracy to "Europe" has become the cornerstone for creation of derivate myths, like the EU as an agent of economic liberalism, the basis for a "green Europe", a "democratic Europe", "social Europe".[157]

Thus, the representation of the European integration as a "peace project" was initially focused on developing cooperation and sustaining peace among the participating states. However, it was necessary to give this "peaceful Europe" a political meaning, i. e. to develop "Europe" as a cultural and political project. This is how the concept of "European identity" came about.

The concept of "European identity" was introduced on the political agenda in 1973. The Declaration on European Identity from 1973 marks "the beginning of the public career of "European identity" as the officially adopted legitimizing tool".[158] However, even before this summit, the idea of the European identity concept had been discussed among EC officials. During the Paris Summit in October 1972, the EC officials agreed that

> "(...) The time has come for Europe to recognize clearly the unity of its interests, the extent of its capacities and the magnitude of its duties; Europe must be able to make its voice heard in world affairs (...) it must affirm its own views in international relations, as befits its mission to be open to the world and for progress, peace and cooperation".[159]

155 Vincent Della Sala, "Political Myth, Mythology and the European Union", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 48, n° 1, 2010, pp. 1-19, p. 11.

156 Vincent Della Sala, "Narrating Europe: the EU's ontological security dilemma", *European Security*, vol. 27, n° 3, 2018, pp. 266-279, p. 268.

157 *Ibid*.

158 Monica Sassatelli, *Becoming Europeans. Cultural Identities and Cultural Policies*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, p. 39.

159 Statement from the Paris Summit, 19-21 October 1972, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/b1dd3d57-5f31-4796-85c3-cfd2210d6901/publishable_en.pdf

In the statement before the European Parliament in February 1973, the president of the European Commission at that time, François-Xavier Ortoli, declared that the "European identity needed to be completed of a "heartfelt desire, shared by all our peoples, to differentiate ourselves from the rest of the world".[160] In another speech, Ortoli gave his definition of the European identity:

> "Europeans are people who have a common cultural background, a history often divided, who react more or less the same way before events, who have more or less the same mode of life, the same level of development".[161]

This "vision" of the "European identity", pronounced by the president of the Commission Ortoli was incorporated in the Declaration on European Identity which was adopted at the 1973 European Summit in Copenhagen. According to Declaration, "the Nine member countries of the European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the *European Identity*. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of the relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs". Three axes of "European identity" have been identified by the Declaration. First, the European identity should represent an expression of the "common European civilization" and the principle of unity in diversity. In this regard, the Declaration states:

> "The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergences of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the constitution of a United Europe, all give the European identity its originality and its own dynamism. The construction of a United Europe, which the Nine Member Countries of the Community are undertaking, is open to other European nations who share the same ideals and objectives".[162]

160 Quoted in Bo Stråth, "The Idea of European identity as an Escape Forward: A Historical Perspective on the Present Euro Crisis", *The Review of International Affairs*, vol. LXIII, n° 1145, 2012, pp. 80-96, p. 86.

161 "Towards a European Identity", speech of Francois-Xavier Ortoli, 1973, quoted in Bo Stråth, "The Idea of European identity as an Escape Forward: A Historical Perspective on the Present Euro Crisis", *op. cit.*,p. 86.

162 European Communities, The Copenhagen European Summit, 14-15 December 1973, *Bulletin*

Second, the European identity should comprise the responsibility of the European Community of nine Member States towards the rest of the world. Stating that "European unification is not directed against anyone, nor it is inspired by a desire for power" and that the Union of Nine "will benefit the whole international community since it will constitute an element of equilibrium and a basis for cooperation with all countries, whatever their size, culture or social system", the Declaration expressed the responsibility of the EC towards others in a hierarchical way.[163] This "hierarchical otherization", to use Strath's terminology, firstly concerned the responsibility towards other European countries with whom "friendly" and closer cooperation already existed. Then, the EC had the responsibility to maintain and to strengthen its "long-standing links" with the Mediterranean, Africa and Middle East. Further, the Nine should develop "close ties" with the USA "on the basis of equality and in a spirit of friendship", because the USA is the country which shares the values and aspirations of a common heritage. Next, the members of the EC should develop a constructive dialogue with Japan and Canada, then to contribute to the policy of détente and cooperation with the USSR and the East European countries, and to intensify relations with China, to extend the already existing commercial relations with Asian countries and to develop "friendly links" with Latin American countries. Finally, the EC members have attached "very great importance to the struggle against under-development", and therefore, declared their resolution to intensify their efforts in the fields of trade and development aid.[164]

Third, the European identity was an expression of the dynamic nature of the European construction. According to the Declaration, "the European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe" and therefore will enable the strengthening of cohesion inside the EC and the framing of a "genuinely European foreign policy". Therefore, European identity was envisioned as a construct that will complement the economic and political dimensions of the European integration process, with

of the European Communities, n° 12, 1973, p.118.

163 Bo Stråth, "A European Identity. To the Historical Limits of the Concept", *op. cit.,* p. 389; Luisa Passerini, "Europe and Its Others: Is There a European Identity*?"*, *op. cit.,* p.122.

164 Declaration on European Identity, 14 December 1973, Copenhagen, par. 9-21, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf

the aim to transform "the whole complex" of relations between the Nine into a European Union.[165]

Some observations can be made about the concept of European identity forged in the Declaration. First, the Declaration makes an ambiguous reference to a "common cultural heritage" which should be shared among the Member States. According to Declaration, a new form of "civilization" should have been found through the exploration of the roots of a European cultural identity.[166] The construction of a "United Europe" would be based on this original identity which would be open to all who accept "European civilization". However, there was no clear pattern on which "European cultural identity" it should be based. The adopted measures such as the introduction of a standardized European passport, the European flag, the new European anthem representative of the "European idea", were intended to enable its citizens to "visualize" the presence of "European identity" in their everyday life.[167] At the same time, with its emphasis on the need for the "increasing convergence of attitudes to life", "common European civilization", "the attachment to common values and principles", the Declaration tended to homogenize and essentialize European identity, perceiving it as static category.[168] In this regard, the construction of the "European identity" by the 1973 Declaration could be seen as a "kind of stereotyped "occidentalism'".[169] It reflected an essentialist model of identity as something organic, historically given and bounded. Cris Shore argues that "European identity is portrayed as the end product of a progressive ascent through history, from the wisdom and scholarship of ancient Greece and the law and architecture of classical Rome throughout the spread of Christian civilisation to the scientific revolution, the Age of Reason and the triumph

165 Declaration on European Identity, *op. cit.,* par. 22.

166 Christiano Bee, "The 'Institutionally Constructed' European Identity: Citizenship and Public Sphere Narrated by the Commission", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, vol. 9, n° 4, 2008, pp. 431-450, p. 438.

167 Cf. Dejana Vukčević, "Banalni evropeizam i identitet u procesu evropske integracije", in Zoran Milošević, Živojin Djurić (eds.), *Nacionalni identitet i medjunarodne integracije*, Institut za političkle studije, Beograd, 2015, str. 177-195.

168 Sanja Ivić, *European Identity and Citizenship. Between Modernity and Postmodernity*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016, p. 213. See also Cris Shore, "Inventing the 'People's Europe': Critical Approaches to European Community 'Cultural Policy'", *Man, New Series*, vol. 28, n° 4, 1993, pp. 779-800.

169 Cris Shore, "Inventing the 'People's Europe': Critical Approaches to European Community 'Cultural Policy'", *op. cit.*, p. 792.

of modern liberal democracy".[170] And indeed, "shared cultural heritage" is defined as a type of "civilization" ("Western") which necessarily imposes boundaries and classification of "outsiders". This involves the creation of the "European identity" relying on the civilised/primitive dichotomy. It also involves the "Europe's" significant Other(s). European identity is defined in terms of the past ("inherited civilization"), followed by the re-mythologisation of old legends and historical facts presented as a legitimation tool and as a symbol of a European Community. As an example, when speaking of the "Founding Fathers", the Commissioner David Byrne said: "These men and their successors (...) managed to do what many great leaders-from as far back as the emperors of ancient Rome had tried to do without success, to lay the foundation of a united Europe".[171] Thus, the "founding fathers" were portrayed as the main characters of the newly constructed myth: they were represented as the ancestors and guardians of the EC/European identity. At the same time, they are related to the past: the future lies in the fulfillment of the visions articulated in the past.[172] The mythical narration of the past serves as a discursive resource for the present. Historical narratives have to be presented as "found" in the events rather than put there by narrative techniques, and they cannot "be closed" with the end of the events which should be narrated. "The demand for closure", argues Hayden White, is a demand for moral meaning".[173] In other words, moral judgment of the events is the principal force of the narratives in political myths.

Second, a hierarchical dimension was also present in the concept of European identity.[174] The European identity was presented as an expression of the "civilisational responsibility" of the Nine towards the rest of the world on the basis of the "civilisational" heritage, thus expressing the idea of superior "Europe's civilisational" mission. It thus entailed the collective "civilisational" identity,

170 Cris Shore, "Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe", *Journal of Historical Sociology*, vol. 9, n° 4, 1996, pp. 473-496, p. 484.

171 David Byrne, "Looking back, moving forward European Movement", 25 May 2001, Dublin, quoted in Bo Petersson, Anders Hellström, "The Return of the Kings.Temporality in the construction of EU identity", *op.cit.,* p.241.

172 Bo Petersson, Anders Hellström, "The Return of the Kings."Temporality in the construction of EU identity", *op.cit.,* p. 241.

173 Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality", *Critical Inquiry,* vol. 7, n° 1, 1980, pp. 5-27, p. 24.

174 Cf. Luisa Passerini, *op. cit.,* p. 122.

modeled on the national type and emphasizing an overarching unity over national, "cultural" differences.[175]

Third, the Declaration stresses the responsibility of the EC "towards other European countries with whom "friendly" and closer cooperation already existed". At the same time, the EC enlargement process was prescribed by the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. Although the spatial border of the EC was clear-cut during the Cold War, it was at the same time flexible and open to other countries wishing to join the EC. The Treaty states that

> "The European Communities remain the original nucleus from which European unity has been developed and intensified. The entry of other countries of this continent to the Communities – in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties of Rome – would undoubtedly help the Communities to *grow* to dimensions more in conformity with the present state of world economy and technology. The creation of a special relationship with other European States which have expressed a desire to that effect would also contribute to this end. A development such as this would enable Europe to remain faithful to its traditions of being open to the world and increase its efforts in behalf of developing countries".[176]

As already noted, the Declaration on European Identity emphasizes the evolving, dynamic character of the European identity which points to the postmodern, analog mode of differentiation, based on pluralism and difference.[177] Therefore, on the one hand, enlargement was presented as a key form of political action in the integration process. The openness of the application process, foreseen by Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, represented the EC as an *inclusive* community. On the other hand, however, the EC is presented as a *living organism*, which will "grow" with the entry of other countries. This metaphor represents the EC as an *exclusive* community. A living organism means that membership is a matter of exclusivity: you are or you are not part of this

175 Monica Sassatelli, *Becoming Europeans. Cultural Identities and Cultural Policies*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 40.

176 Communiqué of the meeting of Heads of State of Government of the Member States at The Hague (1 and 2 December 1969), point 4, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/33078789-8030-49c8-b4e0-15d053834507/publishable_en.pdf

177 Cf. Sanja Ivić, *European Identity and Citizenship. Between Modernity and Postmodernity op. cit.,* p. 214.

organism.[178] The border between self and other is clear-cut, there is nothing in-between. In other words, the "European identity" is based on a natural source: there are "natural Europeans" and "natural non-Europeans"[179]. Hence, the enlargement process is conceived as a process between similars, which happens within the EC organism, not between the EC and others. Difference is thus reduced to sameness.

The construction of the EC's "civilizing identity" is echoed by the language of the academic concept of "civilian power". It was François Duchêne who first wrote, in the 1970s, about the EC and its role as a "unique" international player through the concept of "Civilian Power Europe" (CPE). According to Duchêne, "Europe would be the first in the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen's notion of *civilized* politics. In such a context, Western Europe would be the first of the world's *civilian* centres of power".[180] Duchêne stressed that the European Community (EC) represents a "new stage in political civilisation", an entity that "would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political co-operative formed to exert essentially *civilian* forms of power".[181] In his view, the civilian power of the EC represents a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards, as well as the promotion of values such as "equality, justice and tolerance".[182] In this regard, as Duchêne argued, the development of the EC as a civilian power would "domesticate" and "civilise" relations between Members States of the EC, but also those on its immediate periphery, notably those under Soviet domination, and in that way would produce a lasting peace.[183]

178 Rainer Hülsse, "Imagine the EU: the metaphorical construction of a supra-nationalist identity", *op. cit.,* p. 410.

179 *Ibid*.

180 François Duchêne, "Europe's Role in the World Peace", in Richard Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, Fontana/Collins, London, 1972, pp. 32-47, p. 43.

181 François Duchêne, "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence", in Max Kohnstamm, Wolfgang Hager (eds.), *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community*, Macmillan, London, 1973, p. 19.

182 *Ibid.,* p. 20.

183 James Rogers, "From 'Civilian Power' to 'Global Power': Explicating the European Union's 'Grand Strategy' Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 47, n° 4, 2009, pp. 831-862, p. 841.

This academic/policy nexus paves the way for the "European self-understanding", i. e. the promotion of a positive EC identity and thus the legitimacy for the European integration project.[184] Both the 1973 Declaration on European Identity and Duchene's concept of civilian power Europe are rooted in the initial goal of the European integration, i.e. making war between member states unthinkable. Also, both concepts advocate "civilising power Europe" and the responsibility of the EC for the equilibrium in world affairs. The "civilising identity" of the EC is based on multilateralism, representative democracy, the rule of law and human rights. However, the concept of power itself is contested having in mind that it is inconsistent with the ideals of postmodern Europe, whose existence, as Nicolaïdis and Howse note, depends on the rejection of power politics.[185] In a similar vein, Jennifer Mitzen argues that the EC/EU civilizing identity "is a self-perception about its relationship to and treatment of "non-European" Other but historically, civilising missions have been colonialist projects, rooted in military power".[186] It was in this regard that in the 80th, Hedley Bull considered the concept of "civilian power Europe" as a contradiction in terms and argued that "'Europe' is not an actor in international affairs and does not seem likely to become one".[187] In line with his realist approach to Europe's world role similar to the De Gaulle's concept of *L'Europe puissance*, Bull's main argument was that the "civilian nature" of the EC in international affairs was a consequence of the "state of the art", i.e. its incapability to provide for its security out of its own resources and its dependency on the United States.[188] Therefore, he advocated the "military power of Europe", i.e. the necessity for the EC to take steps towards making itself more self-sufficient in the domain of security and defence.[189]

In parallel with the discursive construction of the EC as a "civilian power Europe", the development of the European Polit-

184 Cf. Ian Klinke, "European Integration Studies and the European Union's Eastern Gaze", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 43, n° 2, 2015, pp. 567-583, p. 573.

185 Kalipso Nicolaïdis, Robert Howse, "This is my EUtopia...': Narrative as Power", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* vol. 40, n° 4, 2002, pp. 767-792, p. 771.

186 Jennifer Mitzen, ""Anchoring Europe's civilizing identity: habits, capabilities and ontological security", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 13, n° 2, 2006, pp. 270-285, p. 280.

187 Hedley Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 21, n° 2, pp. 149-170, p. 151.

188 *Ibid.,* pp. 151-152.

189 *Ibid.,* p. 152.

ical Cooperation (EPC) was present in the EC official documents from the early 1970s, as an expression of the "dynamics" of the European integration project, prescribed by the Declaration on European Identity. The EPC was conceived to contribute to the construction of the "European identity". At the Paris Summit in 1972, it was stated that the European Political Cooperation should contribute to the ability of Europe "to make its voice heard in world affairs", and to "affirm its own view in international relations, as befits its mission to be open to the world and for progress, peace and cooperation".[190] The Tindemans report also made a connection between political integration and European identity by stating that "Europe cannot proceed to a greater degree of political integration without the underlying structure of a unifying European identity". According to the report, the unified foreign/external policy is a prerequisite for the creation of the European identity: "The European identity will not be accepted by the outside world so long as the European States appear sometimes united, sometimes disunited".[191] In the London Declaration on EPC from 1981, it was stated that the coordination of foreign policies of the Member States should be enhanced regularly in order to "shape events and not merely react to them".[192] The Solemn Declaration from 1983 stresses the resolution of the EC members "to continue the work begun on the basis of the Treaties of Paris and Rome and to create a united Europe, which is more than ever necessary in order to meet the dangers of the world situation, capable of assuming the responsibilities incumbent on it by virtue of its political role, its economic potential and its manifold links with other peoples".[193] It was with the Single European Act (SEA) that the instruments of political cooperation, although still separated from Community structures and procedures, were incorporated into a policy framework (art. 30). The aim of the EPC, established with the SEA, was to "formulate and jointly implement the European political cooperation". Hence, there was a difference between the term "European political

190 Meetings of the Heads of State or Government, 19-21 October 1972, Paris, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 10-1972, p. 15.

191 Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium to the European Council, *Bulletin of European Communities*, Supplement, 1/76, p. 15.

192 Report on European Political Cooperation, London, 13 October 1981, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2002/1/18/869a63a6-4c28-4e42-8c41-efd2415cd7dc/publishable_en.pdf

193 Solemn Declaration on the European Union, Stuttgart, 19 June 1983, Preamble, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, n° 6, 1983, pp. 24-29.

cooperation" included in the SEA and the Tindemans report which insisted on the gradual transformation of political cooperation into a "common foreign policy". With the SEA, only economic aspects of security were included in the framework of the EPC.

The EPC did not represent a break with the "civilian" power profile of the EC. On the contrary, it was overshadowed by the dominant "civilian" discourse on the role of the EC in international politics. The dominant discourse representing the EC as a "civilian power" gave a "meaning" to the EC. It was with the Maastricht Treaty that all aspects of security were included within the European Union, including defence, which was to be implemented through Western European Union (WEU), constructed as a "*sword arm*" of the EU. Therefore, it was with the Treaty of Maastricht that the discursive construction of the EU "packaged" with a foreign policy and military dimensions emerged. However, this discourse was overshadowed by a new dominant discourse on the EU as a "community of values".

2. THE EU AS A "COMMUNITY OF VALUES"

The creation of the European Community was the project of the post-second World War. It was constructed as an entity representing the "European values" that went beyond the Iron Curtain in time, as well as space. However, at the same time, both its political and economic orientation, together with the exclusively Western European membership, placed the EC within the "West".[194] The development of the European integration process and the EC's political self-image have been constructed in such a way as to project it as a bearer of human rights and democracy, in opposition to the Eastern European system.

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact led to the changes of existing discursive patterns of self/other relations and threat constructions. The London Declaration issued following the NATO summit in July 1990 stated:

> "Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked

194 Emma de Angelis, "The EU's Historical Narrative and Enlargement to Eastern Europe", The *Review of International Affairs*, vol. LXIII, n° 1145, 2012, pp. 24-53, p. 28.

> on the long journey toward a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt".[195]

In parallel with this symbolic proclamation of the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were discursively constructed as a "triumph of the West" and of the Western idea". In the words of Francis Fukuyama, the triumph of the West meant that the world was faced with the "end of history":

"What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the univerzalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government".[196]

Fukuyama's statement about the "triumph of the West" at the same time raised the question of how the self-description of the "West" might have transformed as its constitutive Other had ceased to exist. A clear distinction of the ideological and military alignment with the Soviet Union has disappeared, leaving the future of security relations between the "West" and the "East" uncertain. In this context, "Europe's" transformation has become a main referent object of security. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was followed by increasing political, strategic and foreign policy ambitions of the EU, as well as the ambition of the US, to affirm its "leadership" in Europe. Therefore, the invention of the category of Central and Eastern European countries (CEE)[197] was symbolically "used" as a concept to enable to the newly created EU and NATO to find a way to articulate their "raison d'être". Thus, the invention of the CEE identity offered "a way out of Soviet-type homogenization in emphasizing the European qualities of the local cultures, including above all those of pluralism and democracy", as well as "a viable way of the re-Europeanization of the area, of

195 Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council ("The London Declaration"), 5-6 July 1990, Brussels, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23693.htm?

196 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *The National Interest,* 16, 1989, pp. 3–18, p. 4.

197 Cf. Iver Neumann, *Uses of the Other, op. cit.*

recovering some of the values, ideals, aspirations, solutions and practices that were eliminated by Soviet-type systems".[198] The CEE identity enabled to conceive the CEE as being liberated from communism and on its way back to a "whole and free Europe". Accordingly, the ideological border between "freedom" and "communism" as replaced by invoking the CEE as a distinct political subject, helped to construct the EU identity. In the words of the former European Commission president Jacques Santer,

> "The collapse of the Iron Curtain ended the Cold War and presented us with a unique opportunity to unite Europe in peace and freedom almost after five hundred years. We have a historical and moral duty to seize this opportunity".[199]

In a similar vein, the former Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen summarizes the dynamics of the European integration process as a historical necessity:

> "The division of Europe has always been artificial. The failure of the liberal revolutions in the nineteenth century, the devastating wars Europe has witnessed in the twentieth century and the Communist regimes created two separate Europes, which must be joined".[200]

Hence, the "historic moment" has arrived to overcome the artificial division of "two Europes". It was therefore the EC/EU's "moral" obligation to reunite "Europe" and to "modernize" the "other Europe". Although a generalized "East" has remained a defining characteristic of the European identity construction[201], the image of the "Europe whole and free" has given way to a "multitier patchwork Europe with varying degrees of Europeanness and Eastness".[202] The foreign political discourse of the newly created EU was based on the spatio-temporal narrative - "Europe whole and free". In the words of Olli Rehn, the former European Commissioner,

198 George Schöpflin, "Central Definitions Old and New", in George Schöpflin, Nancy Wood (eds.), *In Search of Central Europe*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 7-29, p. 27, quoted in Iver Neumann, *Uses of the Other, op. cit.,* p. 147.

199 Jacques Santer, "Shaping Europe's Future", International Bertelsam Forum, 3 July 1998.

200 Günter Verheugen, "The Enlargement Process: Shaping A New Europe", 1 July 2000, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/816890

201 Cf. Iver Neumann, *Uses of the Other, op.cit*.

202 Merje Kuus, "Europe's eastern expansion and the reinscription of otherness in East-Central Europe", *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 28, n° 4, 2004, pp. 472-489, p. 475.

> "Freedom and democracy took great leaps forward both inside and outside Europe, although history did not quite end as some predicted. The dream of "Europe whole and free" suddenly seemed to be a realistic perspective".[203]

Therefore, the EU identity after the end of the Cold War was represented as having two kinds of responsibilities: one the one hand, it was represented as politically responsible for the eastern and southern parts of the European continent, and on the other hand, it was portrayed as an actor responsible for the peaceful integration of all countries of the European continent. Thus, making "Europe whole and free" through the enlargement process relied on cultural and moral arguments.[204] The EU has become the personification of "Europe", both as an idea and as an ideal. The new meaning of the concept of "Europe" opened up new possibilities to define new boundaries in Europe. As stated by the European Commission in 1992:

> "The term "European" has not been officially defined. It combines geographical, historical, and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity. The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values, and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each succeeding generation. The Commission believes that it is neither possible nor opportune to establish new frontiers of the European Union, whose contours will be shaped over many years to come".[205]

While denying the existence of any "official" definition of the concept of Europe, this statement renders the classification of "Europe" more opaque, with the emergence of "applied" definition including the construction of borders and boundaries of the "new Europe" whole and free.[206] As Meerje Kuus argues, the former

203 Olli Rehn, "Europe's smart power in its region and the world", Speech at the European Studies Centre, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, 1 May 2008, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_08_222

204 Merje Kuus, "Multiple Europes: Boundaries and Margins in European Union Enlargement", *Geopolitics*, vol. 10, 2005, pp. 567-571, p. 567.

205 Commission of the European Communities, "Europe and the challenge of enlargement", 24 June 1992, par. 7, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/commission_report_europe_and_the_challenge_of_enlargement_24_june_1992-en-8a3d4582-50b7-4722-b3eb-d7e7af0fb43d.html

206 Cris Shore, "Inventing the 'People's Europe': Critical Approaches to European Community 'Cultural Policy'", *op. cit.,* p. 786.

Cold War division of Europe into two spaces was replaced by the "threefold division of the continent into the European core, the Central European applicants not yet fully European but in tune with the European project, and an eastern periphery effectively excluded from membership".[207] The process of enlargement created spaces that are "more or less European, more or less close to the centre".[208] Thus, the discourse on "Europe whole and free" expressed "flexible othering", i.e. different degrees of otherness.[209]

At the same time, through the enlargement process, the EU has been undergoing a transitional process of becoming.[210] As David Campbell points out, "collectivities are always in need of reproduction, which implies that they "are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming".[211] Enlargement has been represented as one of the key forms of the integration process' foreign political action since the signing of the Rome Treaty. The openness of the application process, set forth by Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, represented the EC as an *including* community. The later treaties starting with the end of the Cold War confirmed its inclusiveness. Thus, Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Hence, the EU's foreign policy identity is articulated with liberal values. The main determinant of enlargement is the acceptance of "European values", as confirmed by Article 49 of TEU which states that acceding countries must accept the aforementioned values and promote them. The same article also stipulates that the European Union is open to all *European* countries. The Copenhagen criteria laid down in 1993 by the European Council provide a general framework of guidelines that identify the EU norms and values.[212]

207 Merje Kuus, "Europe's eastern expansion and the reinscription of otherness in East-Central Europe", *op. cit.,* p. 475.

208 Ole Waever, "The EU as a security actor: Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign security orders", in Morten Kelstrup, Michael C. Williams (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 250-294, p. 263.

209 Merje Kuus, "Europe's eastern expansion and the reinscription of otherness in East-Central Europe", *op. cit.,* p. 479.

210 Michelle Pace, Polly Pallister-Wilkins, "EU-Hamas actors in a state of permanent liminality", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, vol. 21, n° 1, 2016, pp. 223-246.

211 David Campbell, *Writing Security*, *op. cit.,* p. 12.

212 Kristi Raik, "The EU as a Regional Power: Extended Governance and Historical Responsibility", in Hartmut Mayer, Henri Voigt (eds.), *A Responsible Europe? Ethical Foundations of EU*

The vague criteria "leave plenty of space for interpretation and flexibility"[213], enabling the Commission to wield considerable power in the process of carrying out the regular monitoring of the applicant countries. Through the process of monitoring, the EU applies strict conditionality, i.e. the complete fulfillment by the applicant states of demanded criteria. In this process, the projection of these norms is one-sided and it enables the construction of the EU normative Self against non-normative others:

> "(...) Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union".[214]

Hence, liberal democracy represents the standard of legitimacy for the EU, referring to the constitutive norms of the "Western community" in the Copenhagen criteria.[215] The determination of the criteria for admission at the same time represented the building blocks of the EU boundaries and the construction of an EU identity. In the policy of enlargement, central to the construction of an EU identity is the demarcation of "Europe" from something that it is "not Europe", that is antagonistic to "Europe". The main question is how the difference is treated. The enlargement policy represents the difference either as an exclusion (non-European), or as assimilation. Hence, otherness is reduced to sameness:

> "I am often asked where Europe's ultimate borders lie. My answer is that the map of Europe is defined in the minds of Europeans. Geography sets the frame, but fundamentally it is values that make the borders of Europe".[216]

External Affairs, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006, pp. 76-97, p. 83.

213 *Ibid*.

214 European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, p. 13, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf

215 Michelle Pace, "The Construction of EU Normative Power", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 45, n° 5, 2007, pp. 1041-1064, p. 1045.

216 Olli Rehn, "Values define Europe, not borders", *Financial Times*, 3 January 2005, https://www.ft.com/content/c84dbbac-5dbc-11d9-ac01-00000e2511c8

Thus, "values define Europe"[217], i.e. the main determinant of enlargement is the embracement of "European values". Symbolic geography and mental mapping are based on the dividing line between "European" and "non-European countries": those countries that share the "European values" are considered as being "European" regardless of their geographical position, while those who are geographically European but do not share "European values" are excluded from the European Union, and thus represent the "non-European countries".[218] "Europeanness" makes possible the inclusion and exclusion on the basis of inside/outside dichotomy. In this regard, the EU self-representation in enlargement was from the beginning based on domination, i.e. binary exclusion/inclusion dichotomy. In other words, the EU "provided models and the applicant states were supposed to copy or to imitate them".[219] The "partners" engaged in the process of EU enlargement are obliged to be "transformed" according to "European values". Enlargement is thus about transformation, about making accession candidates "European" with the principle of conditionality, "which marks the core of the inherent asymmetry of enlargement with the bigger, more powerful side determining the conditions of entry for the other, weaker side".[220]

The EU is discursively constructed as a value community where commitment to shared, "core", liberal values steer the activities of its members and at the same time serve as a "role model" that encourages others to adopt the same values. The EU is represented as a hybrid, postmodern/post-Westphalian form of actor which has assured a sustainable peace among its Member States[221]:

> "I believe there is a core set of values, convictions and experiences that together form a composite European identity. And there are, by now, enough elements of a European model on how to organize our societies and interact with the wider

217 Olli Rehn, "Europe's smart power in its region and in the world", *op. cit*.

218 Cf. Sanja Ivić, *European Identity and Citizenship. Between Modernity and Postmodernity*, *op. cit*.

219 Jan Zielonka, "Europe's new civilizing missions: the EU's normative power discourse", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 18, n° 1, 2013, pp. 35-55, p. 43.

220 Cornelius Adebahr, Natasha Wunsch, "European ambitions", in Almut Möller (ed.), *Crossing Borders*. *Rethinking the European Union's Neighborhood Policies*, Berlin, DGAP, 2011, p. 23.

221 Owen Parker, Ben Rosamond, "'Normative power Europe' meets economic liberalism: Complicating cosmopolitanism inside/outside the EU", *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 48, n° 2, 2013, pp. 229-246, p. 230.

> world (...) what are the elements? I would say compassion with those who suffer, peace and reconciliation through integration; a strong attachment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law; a spirit of compromise, plus a commitment to promote in a pragmatic way rule-based international system. But also a sense that history and culture are central to how the world works and therefore how we should engage with it".[222]

The cosmopolitan and transformative approach of the EU in international affairs stated by Javier Solana, former High Representative for the CSFP relies on the definition of "European values as proper to "Europe" and on existence of identity as a pre-condition for community, i.e. "European community". The particularity of "European values", highlighted by the discourse on the difference of "Europe" from other communities, represents the intention to bound "Europe's" Self. The discursive construction of the EU as a space of "European values" is a bounded area with delimitations as to who is in and who is out. In this regard, differentiation facilitates to draw the boundaries of the "European community". The differentiation also helps to generate abstract principles upon which the "European community" is based. It enables the conceptualization of the community as an "objective" entity, independent of its constituent members. On the other hand, in order to construct an *inclusive* community, the EU's official discourse insists at the same time on the *universality* of values on which the "Europe" is based. Furthermore, the frequent use of the term "identity" in EU discourse aims to strengthen the EU self-image in international politics.

At the same time, the EU self-construction as a community of values echoes the academic concept of the EU as a "normative power". The concept of the EU as a normative power was introduced in academic circles by Ian Manners in 2002, but has gradually become one of the most widely used concepts in EU studies. Manners argued that the "normative difference" of the EU in international relations is due to its three basic features: EU's historical context, its hybrid form of polity and its political-legal constitution.[223] The historical context in which the EU was created

222 Annual Conference of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, Speech by Javier Solana, Paris, 6 October 2006, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep06973.51.pdf

223 Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common*

committed the Europeans to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty. Also, over time, the EU became a "hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance which transcended the Westphalian norms". Finally, the EU construction as a political entity occurred as an "elite driven, treaty based, legal order".[224] The combination of these features enabled, according to Manners, the constitution of the EU as a normative type of actor. According to Manners, the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says but what *it is*.[225] Manners argues that the EU is "predisposed" to act like a normative power because it is different from "pre-existing political forms".[226] In that sense, "the EU has been, is and will always be a normative power in world politics".[227] According to Manners, the EU gradually developed a normative framework based on the values it promotes in its foreign policy. He distinguishes five "core" norms within the *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique* which constitute the EU's normative identity: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights. In addition to these core norms, he also distinguishes four "minor" norms, i.e. social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.

Manners highlights the distinction between the normative power of the EU and traditional forms of power. Unlike civilian or military power, the normative form of power represents the ability to use normative justification rather than an ability to use material incentives or physical force, i.e. it is the "power over opinion".[228] Civilian power is about the "ability to use civilian instruments", while normative power is "the ability to shape conceptions of "*normal*" in international relations".[229] This ability to "define what passes for "normal" in world politics" is, according to Manners, "ultimately, the greatest power of all".[230] Thus, the ethics of the

Market Studies, vol. 40, n° 2, 2002, pp. 235-258, p. 240.

224 *Ibid.,* pp. 240-241.

225 *Ibid.,* p. 252.

226 *Ibid.,* p. 242.

227 Ian Manners, "The normative ethics of the European Union", *International Affairs*, vol. 84, no1, 2008, pp. 45-60, p. 45.

228 Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *op. cit.,* p. 239.

229 *Ibid*.

230 *Ibid.,* p. 253.

EU's normative power are located in the ability of the EU to normalize a more just, cosmopolitical world.[231]

The "intimate relationship" between "policy" and "academy" thus enables "European self-understanding", i.e. the promotion of positive EU identity and enables the legitimacy for the European integration project.[232] The EU as a community of values has become an umbrella for several additional elements that have been utilized to legitimize further integration efforts. According to Laclau and Mouffe, there are "chains of equivalence", which means that within discourses, elements are interconnected and mutually supportive, so one concept is presented as leading logically to the other.[233] Therefore, several sub-discourses are linked in chains of equivalence contributing to the construction of the EU identity as a "community of values".

First, the EU is constructed as an entity that successfully achieved peaceful regional integration.[234] In the EU official discourse, the EU is defined as a peace project. The construction of the EU as a peace project has been the *leitmotiv* of official Commission statements. As stated by Günter Verheugen, former European Commissioner for Enlargement, "during the last fifty years the European Union contributed decisively to transform a large part of our continent, previously ravaged by devastating wars and nationalist divisions, into an area of peace, freedom, integra-

231 Ian Manners, "The normative ethics of the European Union", *op. cit.,* p. 47.

232 Ian Klinke, "European Integration Studies and the European Union's Eastern Gaze", *op. cit.,* p. 573. Klinke argues that European space is crossed by the "policy-academy nexus", i. e. that the line between academic research and "professional" politics is largely blurred. Recalling Foucault's power/knowledge nexus and his viewpoint that the exercise of power "creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information", Klinke argues that academy/policy nexus promotes "European self-understanding", i.e. the positive EU identity and thus enables the legitimacy for the European integration project- *Ibid*. In a similar vein, Michelle Pace notes that "what is striking about this debate is that the concept of civilian/normative power has not been problematized or clearly defined, allowing for the impression that this form of EU power is *necessarily* a good thing- Michelle Pace, "The Construction of EU normative power", *op. cit.,* p. 1043.

233 Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony & Social Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, Verso, London, New York, 1985, pp. 127-134, according to Henrik Larsen, "Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign policy", in Ben Tonra, Thomas Christiansen (eds.), *Rethinking European Union foreign policy*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 2004. pp. 62- 80, p. 73.

234 Cf. Tobias Schumacher, "Uncertainty and the EU's borders: narratives of EU external relations in the revised European Neighbourhood Policy towards the southern borderlands", *European Security*, vol. 24, n° 3, 2015, pp. 381-401; Cristian Nitoiu, "The Narrative Construction of the European Union in External Relations", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, vol. 14, n° 2, 2013, pp. 240-255, p. 243.

tion and prosperity (...) this is why the EU is arguably the greatest success story in the second part of the 20th century".[235] Moreover, the success of the EU as a peace model is linked with the process of enlargement. In this regard, the former Commissioner Olli Rehn declared: "enlargement is *the essence* of the EU's soft power to gradually extend peace, democracy and prosperity in Europe".[236] Therefore, EU enlargement contributes to the extension of the zone of peace. The EU is therefore constructed as a primary contributor to the "European" peace through its successful policy of enlargement. The representation of the enlargement as a "success story" that brought peace throughout the European continent was reiterated by the European Council:

> "Enlargement has been a success story for the European Union and Europe as a whole. It has helped to overcome the division of Europe and contributed to peace and stability throughout the continent. It has inspired reforms and has consolidated common principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as well as the market economy".[237]

As already mentioned, the construction of the EC/EU as a peace project has its roots in the beginning of the European integration process. Over the years, the narrative of the EC as a "peace project" has been gradually developed into a discourse of the EU as a "promoter of peace". The promotion of peace at the regional level and the success of the EU as a "peace project" helping to overcome the division of Europe and contributing to peace and stability throughout the continent led to the representation of the EU as a promoter of peace, which provided the EU with both moral and identity prerogatives to organize the space beyond its borders and to spread "European values" outside. As affirmed by the former president of the European Commission Barroso, "(...) having stumbled across such a successful formula for spreading peace and stability on our own continent, it is only natural to offer

235 Günter Verheugen, "The Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union: An Opportunity for Tunisia", Institut Arabe des Chefs d'Entreprises, Tunis, 21 January 2004, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_04_33

236 "Commission proposes renewed consensus on enlargement", Brussels, 8 November 2006, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_06_1523

237 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 14-15 December 2006, p. 2, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf

our know-how and experience to encourage peace and stability elsewhere in the world".[238] So, the EU's successful "formula" for peace should be exported in order to promote peace elsewhere in the world. This ability of the EU is confirmed by the former president of European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker. According to him, the EU "has come very far in making Europe safer and more peaceful" and "thanks to our global influence, we have also helped to do the same around the world".[239] It is, according to the Commission's discourse, "natural" and "moral" that EU should spread peace around the world with its enlargement policy and other policies accompanied by appropriates measures. The EU's role as a "peace promoter/provider" was further publicly acknowledged in 2012, when the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, legitimating its acts as a "peace promoter" in world politics.

The EU is also constructed as a "democratizing force" and as a bearer of democratic values. More generally, the EU is positively self-represented as a norms provider. It is represented as a community of values, which is based on the principles of "liberty", democracy", "respect for human rights", "stability", "prosperity". Normative values are defined as *particular* to the EU vis-à-vis the others which implies practice of attempting to impose clear boundaries of differentiation around the EU. This discourse of the *particularism* of the EU defines values of the EU as uniquely "European", as a source of respect for "Europe" from other countries.[240]

There is a certain ambiguity when it comes to the values of the EU and its universal and at the same time particular character. On the one hand, the EU identified itself with "common values" that are perceived as laying the foundation of modern civilization and culture.[241] Hence, common values are characteristic of the

238 Speech by EU Commission President Barroso, "The EU and US: A declaration of interdependence", SPEECH05/417. Washington: School of Advanced International Studies, 18 October 2005, quoted in Cristian Nitoiu, "The Narrative Construction of the European Union in External Relations", *op. cit*., p. 243.

239 Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Defence and Security Conference Prague: In Defence of Europe, European Commission, Press Corner, 9 June 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_17_1581

240 Stefan Borg, "European integration and the problem of the state: universality, particularity, and exemplarity in the crafting of the European Union", *op. cit.,*p. 353-354.

241 Päivi Leino, Roman Petrov, "Between 'Common Values' and Competing Universals- The Promotion of the EU's Common Values through the European Neighbourhood Policy", *European*

EU and ultimately they lay down its borders. On the other hand, these values are considered as universal and therefore they should be shared beyond the EU's borders. Thus, the values of the EU cannot be imposed because they are universal. But, on the other hand, since the values are universal, it is difficult for the EU to construct its own identity on these values, because they belong to everyone. In this case, how can a line be drawn between "us" and "them"? In the EU official discourse, the pronoun "we" is defined as representative of "good" values while the pronoun "they" represents "bad" values. Therefore, the connection of "good" values to the identity of the EU creates the dichotomy between the EU and the countries which are outside of its borders.[242] Christoffer Kølvraa argues that it is precisely because of the universality of "European" values that their expansion can avoid the charge of "cultural imperialism".[243] By all means, the EU is portrayed as the subject that possesses the "knowledge" concerning the universality of values, and therefore is under the obligation to deliver these values to (non-European) Others.

In addition, the EU official discourse represents the *uniqueness* of the EU as a "community of values" as *imperial* in nature. Several scholars have underlined the hegemonic nature of the EU reflected in its power to shape the values of others[244], while other compared the EU with an empire.[245] The imperial nature of the EU is also presented in the EU official discourse. Speaking about *uniqueness* of the EU, the former president of the Commission Jose-Manuel Barroso stated that the EU is not a "super state" or

Law Journal, vol. 15, n° 5, 2009, pp. 654-671, p. 654. See also: Stefan Borg, "European Integration and the problem of the state: universality, particularity and exemplarity in the crafting of the European Union", *op, cit.,* pp. 353-359. Also Thomas Diez, "The Paradoxes of Europe's Borders", *Comparative European Politics*, vol. n° 4, 2006, pp. 235-252, p. 245.

242 Päivi Leino, Roman Petrov, "Between 'Common Values' and Competing Universals- The Promotion of the EU's Common Values through the European Neighbourhood Policy", *op. cit.,* p. 656.

243 Christoffer Kølvraa, "Limits of Attraction: The EU's Eastern Border and the European Neighbourhood Policy", *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, vol. 31, n° 1, 2017, pp. 11-25, p. 16.

244 Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'", *op.cit*; Hiski Haukkala, "The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 60, n° 9, 2008, pp. 1601-1622, pp. 1605-6; Münevver Cebeci, "Deconstructing the 'Ideal Power Europe' Meta-Narrative in the European Neighbourhood Policy", In Dimitris Bouris, Tobias Schumacher (eds.), *The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017, pp. 57-76.

245 Raffaella Del Sarto, "Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, its Borderlands, and the "Arab Spring", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 54, n° 2, 2016, pp. 215-232, p. 216; Jan Zielonka, "Europe's new civilizing missions: the EU's normative power discourse", *op. cit.,* p. 35.

"international organization", but a "unique construction" which he compared "to the organization of empire" of unique nature, "the first *non-imperial empire*", based on "27 countries that fully decided to work together and to pool their sovereignty".[246] Julian Pänke argues that "the paradox of a non-imperial empire indicates that the EU might indeed be a new type of empire, as historical empires rested more obviously on authoritarian leadership".[247] He suggests that the term "normative imperialism" is more suitable than normative hegemony for at least two reasons. First, hegemony describes a power condition rather than an active policy of "shaping the normal" which is implied by the notion of imperialism. Second, Panke suggests that the EU is not a kind of superpower that could be called as hegemon, but rather a weak actor "bound to defend its precarious identity against strong national competitors through an externalized "civilizing mission"".[248]

The EU as a norms provider is also linked with the image of the EU as an attractive model. Joseph Nye defines "attractiveness" as the "ability to get what you want without using coercion or payments".[249] According to Nicolaidis and Howse, the EU as a "model" "refers to the propensity of the EU to seek to reproduce itself by encouraging regional integration around the world".[250] The EU-as-a model discourse has often been reiterated by the Commission officials. According to the former Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, "history will show this to be the most successful example of long lasting regime change ever".[251] In a similar vein, Johannes Hahn, former Commissioner for enlargement stated that "the EU is by far the biggest beacon of hope and the most attractive model for the people in the region".[252] Hence,

246 Honor Mahony, "Barroso says EU is an 'empire'", *EUobserver*, 11 July 2007, https://euobserver.com/institutional/24458. Also, "Barroso: European Union is 'non-imperial empire', 10 July 2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-I8M1T-GgRU

247 Julian Pänke, "The Fallout of the EU's Normative Imperialism in the Eastern Neighbourhood", *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 62, 2015, pp. 350-363, p. 351.

248 *Ibid.,* p. 352.

249 Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York, 2004, p. x.

250 Kalipso Nicolaidis, Robert Howse, "This is my EUtopia...': Narrative as Power", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* vol. 40, n° 4, 2002, pp. 767-792, p. 768.

251 Olli Rehn, "Europe's smart power in its region and in the world", *op. cit*.

252 Johannes Hahn, "Europe in a volatile world - Exporting stability to its neighbourhood"- Speech by EU Commissioner Johannes Hahn, Princeton University, September 26, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/europe-volatile-world-export-

the EU is represented as a *positive* force in international politics, a different "player" on the international scene, a successful model of regional integration and promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, the EU is constructed as an "ideal power"[253], a superior, desirable model for others to follow, as a virtuous example.[254] The EU-as-a-model discourse empowers the Union, it becomes the example/model power by its very existence, which "points to the idea that the EU has power when it simply stands as a model for others to follow".[255] The construction of the EU contributes to its image as a power with "the ability to shape conceptions of "normal" in international relations".[256] This contributes to the expectation that the "others" are expected to imitate the EU as an ideal model. As Cebeci notes, such discourse is based on the binary dichotomy of the ideal/peaceful/civilized self against its imperfect/conflictual/uncivilized others.[257] At the same time, the EU-as-a-model discourse contributes not only to its relevance in world politics, but also grants legitimacy to the conditionality toward the countries that seek closer relations with the EU. In other words, it legitimates an asymmetrical approach in the process of enlargement, which does not take into account the political, economic, cultural and social specificities of the "others". Moreover, the attractiveness of the EU could be read as "colonial" discourse going beyond difference and exclusion and subjecting the neighbours to a position of imitating the "European" subject.[258]

The construction of the EU as able to foster the peace, democracy and the well-being of people goes hand in hand with the EU's self-representation as responsible for spreading its values outside

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253 Münevver Cebeci, "Constructing the EU as a Global Actor: A Critical Analysis of European Democracy Promotion", in Aylin Ünver Noi, Sasha Toperich (eds.), *Challenges of Democracy in the European Union and Its Neighbors*, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, 2016, pp. 165-182, p. 166, 175.

254 David Coombes, "Leading by Virtuous Example: European Policy for Overseas Development", in Bill McSweeney (ed.), *Moral Issues in International Affairs. Problems of European Integration,* MacMillan Press, London, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998, pp. 221-245.

255 Tuomas Forsberg, "Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 49, n° 6, 2011, pp. 1183-1204, p. 1197.

256 Cf. Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *op. cit.,* p. 239.

257 Münevver Cebeci, "Constructing the EU as a Global Actor: A Critical Analysis of European Democracy Promotion", *op. cit.,* p. 171.

258 Cf. Christoffer Kølvraa, "Limits of Attraction: The EU's Eastern Border and the European Neighbourhood Policy", *op. cit.,* p. 19.

its borders. This duty produces a link between uniqueness and responsibility with significant implications.[259] In other words, the EU self-representation as a successful community of values is linked with the global aspirations and responsibilities. In the words of Federica Mogherini:

> "So just imagine, for one moment, what if the European Union didn't exist. For the rest of the world, it would be a *disaster*. Our world that is already quite *chaotic* - to put it bluntly - would be definitely in a much worse situation (...) we can let things go the old way, paving the way for populism and irrational movement to grow, or we can seriously work for change (...) so we have to write the script ourselves and decide ourselves what happens next. That is a big responsibility. Sometimes the responsibility of freedom is heavy to carry, but I think it's a big luxury we have and we have to exercise it".[260]

Thus, the construction of the EU as "upholder of duty" is linked to the uniqueness of its history and experience, which gives it a "missionary" responsibility and a "moral" duty to be engaged in the development and prosperity of the people in world politics.[261] The EU is represented as best equipped for promoting the well-being not only of Europeans, but also of the whole world. Therefore, the ethics of the EU's normative power are located in the ability of the EU to "normalize" a more just, cosmopolitical world.[262] Thus, there is a particular mission at the centre of EU enlargement policy: the mission of defence of the "European values" at home, within the EU, but also the mission of advancing these values abroad, outside the EU.

However, although responsible for the rest of the world, the idea of the EU as dependent in various ways on the neighbourhood

259 Cf. Hartmut Meyer, Henri Voigt, *A Responsible Europe? Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006.

260 Federica Mogherini's speech at the Conference "Thinking Europe Forward" on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Maastricht, Maastricht, 28 September 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/33162/federica-mogherinis-speech-conference-thinking-europe-forward-occasion-25th-anniversary-treaty_ga

261 Dejana Vukasović, Petar Matić, "The Power of 'Normative Power Europe' Discourse", in Dejana Vukasović, Petar Matić (eds.), *Discourse and Politics*, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade, 2019, pp. 291-310, p. 302.

262 Ian Manners, "The normative ethics of the European Union", *op. cit.*, p. 47.

frequently figures in the EU and Commission official documents.[263] This particularly concerns "security" and stability" of the European Union which is represented as "dependent" on the outcomes in the EU neighbourhood. Therefore, the EU self-representation comprises the obligation to "assist", to "guide" the candidates in order to successfully accept the "European values", because "by investing in our neighbours and by helping to create prosperous, stable and secure conditions around us, we extend the prosperity, stability and security of our citizens", as stated by the former Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner.[264] The mutual dependence between the EU and candidate countries is thus constructed in the EU self-representation. At first sight, the EU is a committed partner, it helps and guides candidates in order to achieve mutual benefits for both sides. However, this "partnership" is asymmetrical: it represents the EU as "politically mature", while the candidates lack maturity and therefore need the guidance and assistance from the EU on their path towards the EU membership. The relationship is similar to the parent/child dichotomy[265], which posits the candidate in a situation of a child that should be disciplined, made responsible and able to demonstrate that it is a "good child" who obeys the EU guidance. In this relationship, it is the political will and the capacity of the candidates, i.e. their self-discipline that determines the quality of this relationship. If the child is "good", if it is fully committed to reforms with the aim of accepting the "European values" it will be offered assistance to reach these goals and opportunities to "expand" and "deepen" its relations with the EU. If a candidate is a "problem child"[266], it is characterised by the failure of discipline and therefore need to be controllable in order to accept a "European" model of "thinking". Therefore, these countries become objects of surveillance and the EU is charged with guaranteeing their acceptance of "rules":

> "It is good to have common rules. I see a growing tendency in the world to consider rules as a constraint for some, as

263 Cf. Rikard Bengtsson, "Constructing Interfaces: the Neighbourhood Discourse in EU External Policy", *European Integration*, vol. 30, n° 5, 2008, pp. 597-616.

264 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "Quo vadis Europa?", Strasbourg, 14 December 2005, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_05_797

265 Cf. Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters. The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations, op. cit.,* pp. 88-91.

266 *Ibid.,* p. 90.

> something to try to get around. Instead, I think it is a European value to affirm and reaffirm that rules are the guarantee for all. The basis for any community living together - without the rules it is the strongest who wins and not only wins, but also dictates the conditions for all. So the contrary of the rules - we always have to keep that in mind - is not freedom, it is arbitrary action. So the rules are the guarantee, the rules are needed. The rules are the basis for our communities to live in. There is no community, there is not solidarity and there is no equity without shared rules".[267]

This statement underlines the existence of "common rules" whose acceptance is necessary because it is synonymous for freedom. It is therefore the duty of the EU to spread and to guarantee common rules for all. Interference is therefore necessary and there is high dependence of candidate countries on the EU in attaining democratic changes. The parent/child dichotomy is reinforced by the need for the EU to be "fair" and "firm" in its relations with the candidate countries.

In addition to the duty/responsibility discourse, also important for the construction of the EU as a "community of values" is the concept of "good neighbourliness".[268] According to Tobias Schumacher, it enables, should the EU enlargement once come to an end, the legitimation of the EU's engagement towards those countries that would not be offered a membership perspective.[269] The European Nighbourhood Policy (ENP) is linked to the concept of "good neighbourliness". The specific legal basis for the development of the "special relationship" with EU's neighbours is provided by the insertion of Article 8 TEU in the Lisbon Treaty which stipulates that the special relationship is aimed at establishing "an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union, and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation". This discourse refers exclusively to the values of the

267 Federica Mogherini's speech at the Conference "Thinking Europe Forward" on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Maastricht, Maastricht, 28 September 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/33162/federica-mogherinis-speech-conference-thinking-europe-forward-occasion-25th-anniversary-treaty_ga

268 Cf. Tobias Schumacher, "Uncertainty and the EU's borders: narratives of EU external relations in the revised European Neighbourhood Policy towards the southern borderlands", *op. cit*; Cristian Nitoiu, "The Narrative Construction of the European Union in External Relations", *op. cit.*

269 Tobias Schumacher, "Uncertainty and the EU's borders: narratives of EU external relations in the revised European Neighbourhood Policy towards the southern borderlands", *op. cit.,* p. 386.

Union, neglecting the values of the other, and hence introduces boundaries of exclusion and inclusion, superiority and inferiority. At the same time, it legitimates the EU foreign policy towards these countries, and enables a *marge de manoeuvre* when it comes to defining and redefining this cooperation.[270] As stated by the former European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, "the closer you (neighbours) want to be to the EU, and the greater your commitment to reform, the more we will offer you in terms of both assistance to reach those goals, and opportunities to expand and deepen our relations".[271] Therefore, while the candidate countries constitute a group of "semi-insiders", the neghbourhood group is one of "semi-outsiders". The idea of neighbourhood functions a as a bordering practice that "keeps certain states in an indefinite waiting room, at a friendly but neighbourly distance".[272]

As previously mentioned, identity constructions are related to boundary-drawing, necessary for the production and reproduction of identities. Since the 1990s and the end of the Cold War, there was a construction of EU identity with no fixed geographical borders and explicit thematization of the territory.[273] According to Thomas Diez, the "increasingly widespread construction of "Europe" through practices of othering, in which identity, politics and geography are intimately linked with each other", can be called "geopolitical" otherings".[274] As we have seen, the EU defines itself as an open and inclusive "peace project" that does not require the spatial other in order to be a positive entity. In other words, the Other of the EU is its own past, i.e. the "Europe" of sovereign nation-states that are founded on the principle of territorial exclusivity. The EU is thus represented as a post-modern entity, because it abandoned the constitutive principle of modern sovereign statehood, enabling its temporal Other (its own past) to function as a spatial Other. Hence, the EU is a project of self-transcendence, i.e. the project that was able to relegate the sovereignty and geopolitics into the past. However, in this process of self-transcendence, the spatial

270 *Ibid.*

271 Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, "Shared challenges, shared futures: Taking the neighbourhood policy forward", European Neigbourhood Policy Conference, Brussels, 3 September 2007, http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/archive/ministerial/Barroso-ENP-Brussels0709.pdf

272 Ian Klinke, "European Integration Studies and the European Union's Eastern Gaze", *op.cit.,* p. 573.

273 Cf. Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics", *op. cit.,* p. 331.

274 *Ibid.*

Other emerges as a result of the successful EU's self-construction through temporal othering. In other words, as Sergei Prozorov aptly remarks, "having achieved an unprecedented level of peace and prosperity through a project of self-transcendence, contemporary Europe is able both to assume higher moral ground against other states that presumably remain stuck in the past that Europe has escaped and to legitimise its territorial othering of these representatives of its own past that threaten Europe in the same manner that its own past previously did".[275] Therefore, the EU's temporal othering paradoxically leads to its delimitation from Others and to the sharp distinction between inside and outside. The success of temporal othering creates an "ideal EU-self", that enables exclusionary practices in relation to the strictly defined others. Therefore, spatial othering could be seen as a direct result of the successful temporal othering.[276]

3. THE EU AS A "GLOBAL ACTOR"

The EU enlargement policy, which empowers the EU to spread its values outside its borders, has been portrayed as the Union's most successful foreign policy instrument. It has been presented as the "main vehicle" of the political and economic transformation that have taken place in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and at the same time as the key factor in stabilizing the EU's eastern periphery. Similarly, the enlargement process is seen as an extension of the successful "peace project" that has been achieved in the EU. Two approaches defining enlargement, i.e. "stabilization" and "integration", have been perceived as having significant security functions. At the same time, the EU identity was discursively constructed through the prism of normative power, with the ability to spread its values and norms across the globe, without the use of military means. In line with Manners' concept of normative power, the EU self-representation was based on its ability to use normative justification rather than an ability to use material incentives or physical force.[277] However, the new context

275 Sergei Prozorov, "The other as past and present: beyond the logic of "temporal othering" in IR theory", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 37, n° 3, 2011, pp. 1273-1293, p, 1278-9.

276 Cf. Pertti Joenniemi, "Re-Negotiating Europe's Identity: The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Form of Differentiation", *Journal of Borderlands Studies,* vol. 23, n° 3, 2008, pp. 83-94.

277 Cf. Ian Manners, "The European Union's Normative Power: Critical Perspectives and Perspectives on the Critical", in Richard Whitman (ed.), *Normative Power Europe. Empirical and*

demanded a new "reality" and a new concept of "Europe". The failure of the EU in resolving the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and in Kosovo in 1999 led to new initiatives which resulted the creation and development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), progressively becoming the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that was constructed as one of the main tools of the EU's international identity.

Speaking about the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), precedent of the CSDP, Javier Solana, the former EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), stated in June 2009 that the ESDP was "the missing link" in international peace and security, contributing to the "crucial role (of the EU) in bringing stability to different parts of the world". According to Solana,

> "We have come a long way in developing ESDP as a tool enabling Europe to project itself through action in response to crises. ESDP is no longer an aspiration; it is a reality. The EU is a *global actor* with an important role in the management of global challenges. *The world looks to us for this*. The demands on us are increasing".[278]

In Solana's view, the EU is already "a global actor" which has "an important role" to play in the management of global challenges. This role of the EU is indispensable because the EU is an actor that brings added-value to international security. Hence, the world is waiting to be "more secure" with the EU's engagement, which requires a special responsibility of the EU. The development of the EU's security and defence policy is seen as contributing to the representation of the EU beyond its image as the "community of values".

The Maastricht Treaty foresaw the creation of CFSP as an important element of the EU international identity. It stipulated that the "Union shall set itself the following objectives: (...) to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the imple-

Theoretical Perspectives, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011, pp. 226-247, p. 230.

278 Remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, "ESDP@10: what lessons for the future?", organised by the Swedish Presidency, the EU Institute for Security Studies and in collaboration with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Brussels, 28 July 2009, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/109453.pdf

mentation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence" (article B TEU). Although the Treaty lacked "concreteness" in this regard, it nevertheless represented the idea of a possible EU common defence which, at first reading, marked a radical departure from a past. The inclusion the "military dimension" on the EU agenda pronounced the discontinuity with the history of non-military European integration and set the possibility for the development of a newborn EU as a qualitatively different entity, with specific political weight. With the Amsterdam Treaty, the so-called Petersberg tasks[279] were introduced, as well as the post of the High Representative for EU foreign policy who, together with the presidents of the Council and of the European Commission, was tasked to make the EU "more visible" on the international stage. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was formally established by the Cologne European Council in June 1999, in order to give the EU the "necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defense".[280] The Declaration on strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence stated that:

> "In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives and the progressive framing of a common defence policy, we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the "Petersberg tasks". To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so".[281]

The Helsinki European Council from December 1999 outlined the necessity for the EU's responsibility in crisis management tasks: "recalling the guiding principles agreed at Cologne,

279 The Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, as well as tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

280 Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, Presidency Conclusions, Annexe III, Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, p. 1, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/cologne_european_council_declaration_on_the_common_policy_on_security_and_defence_4_june_1999-en-ee393bf3-d96f-46b8-8897-15546a0e1c0d.html

281 *Ibid*.

the European Union should be able to assume its responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the EU treaty, the Petersberg tasks".[282] In order for the EU to assume responsibility in conflict prevention and crisis management, it was decided to develop appropriate military and civilian capabilities for the realisation of the ESDP. The agreement over the so-called Headline goal 2003 was reached, with intent to develop military forces in order for the EU to respond successfully to crisis situations. An ambitious plan of 60 000 troops deployable by 2003 was agreed, followed by the discourse on the necessity of providing the EU with its own political and military structure within the framework of the ESDP.

The specificity of the new EU policy was presented as a combination of civilian and military means at the EU's disposal for the exercise of this responsibility. The Santa Maria De Feira European Council from June 2000 focused on the civilian aspects of ESDP. It stated that the civilian aspects of EU crisis management include "improving its potential for saving human lives in crisis situations, for maintaining basic public order, preventing further escalation, facilitating the return to a peaceful, stable and self-sustainable situation, for managing adverse effects on EU countries and for addressing relevant problems of coordination".[283]

Thus, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was portrayed as an integral part of the EU foreign policy, contributing to consolidating the Union's external role by developing its civilian and military capabilities aimed at crisis management challenges.[284] This policy should at the same time be a significant step towards the gradual definition of the common EU defence policy that would lead to a common defence if the European Council unanimously takes such a decision. At the same time, through the "writing" of its own specific approach to security, the EU portrayed itself as a unique postmodern collectivity that had a transformative and normative power as a "community of values", but also a certain

282 Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strenghtening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel2_en.htm

283 Santa Maria de Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000, Conclusions of the Presidency, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei2_en.htm#an1

284 Dejana Vukčević, "Vojni kapaciteti Evropske unije: teškoće i perspektive", *Vojno delo*, 2/2015, pp. 7-26, p. 8.

"security weight", notably *via* the development of the CSDP. In other words, the CSDP functions to differentiate the EU from "others players" in international politics. As Catherine Ashton pointed out, the added value of the civilian and military missions undertaken in the framework of the CSDP is in their "innovative, tailor-made solutions, mixing civil with military components. This is precisely what the EU's added value is - and what the complex security challenges of our world require".[285] In this representation, military means are conceived as part of the whole panoply of instruments at the EU's disposal in conflict resolution and crisis management. They are placed alongside the civilian means, without having a pivotal role.

In parallel with the construction of the ESDP/CSDP, the identity of the "West" as a "rhetorical commonplace"[286] was called into question in the new context occasioned by the "Iraqi question" in 2003. Thus, following the signature of "letter of eight" and then the letter of the "Vilnius ten", the former US Secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, proclaimed the emergence of a "new" Europe, shifting the meaning of "Europe" from Western to Central Europe. Following a similar logic, Robert Kagan's "vision" of the "Europeans and Americans" reveals the "fracture" in the monolithic representation of the "West". According to Kagan,

> "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all -important question of power - the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power - American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant's "Perpetual Peace". The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where

285 Catherine Ashton, Munich Security Conference, 6 February 2010, in *European Union security and defence. Core documents 2010*, compiled by Catherine Glière, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, July 2011, pp. 25-28, p. 26.

286 Cf. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy. German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West,* University of Michigen Press, Ann Arbor, 2009.

> true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less".[287]

Kagan's statement reflects the new way of imaging "the West", accompanied by a new "understanding" of the "Europeans" and "Americans" when it comes to their "place" in international politics. At the same time, the "need to define Europe", i.e. to represent the EU in world affairs has once again become a question of "European difference" in the construction of the "West". Conversely, Tzvetan Todorov "invented" the concept of "*puissance tranquille"* as a new way of reconceptualizing of the relationship between power and politics. According to Todorov, the EU should become a "*puissance tranquille*", i.e. a power capable to defend its own territory against any aggression, but also to intervene military elsewhere in the world at the request of governments. At the same time, the concept of *puissance tranquille* means the renouncement of "other claims, that are characteristic of imperial power". In other words, according to Todorov, the EU should act by means other than military, but this does not mean the renouncement of military force.[288]

The conclusions of the European Council of 17 February 2003 reflect the necessary flexibility of wording due to the uncertainty of the identity of the "West". It is stated that "we are committed to the United Nations remaining at the centre of the international order. We recognise that the primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament lies with the Security Council". At the same time, however, the European Council voiced its solidarity with the United States: "the unity of the international community is vital in dealing with these problems. We are committed to working with all our partners, *especially the United States*, for the disarmament of Iraq, for peace and stability in the region and for a decent future for all

287 Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review*, n° 113, June and July 2002, pp. 1-18, p. 1, https://www.ies.be/files/documents/JMCdepository/Robert%20Kagan,%20Power%20and%20Weakness,%20Policy%20Review,%20No.%20113.pdf

288 Tzvetan Todorov, *Le nouveau désordre mondial. Réflexions d'un Européen*, Robert Laffont, Paris, 2003, pp. 80-83.

its people".[289] At the same time, this new "context" demanded the "writing of security", i.e. the construction of the image of the EU as a distinctive polity in international relations, with a distinctive contribution to make in world politics. The specific approach to security and the *unique* nature of the EU as a security provider was evinced in the European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in 2003 by the European Council. The introduction captures it as follows:

> "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure or so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history. The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to cooperating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent".[290]

To conclude:

> (...) the European Union is "inevitably a global player" which "should be ready" to act and which should be "responsible" for guaranteeing the "secure Europe in a better world".

The ESS offers a new meaning of "Europe" in order to symbolically represent the EU as a "united and peaceful" and enjoying the "period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history" by virtue of the successful "integration" of its members states. At the same time, the ESS constructs the EU as "inevitably a global player" with a special responsibility to guarantee the "secure Europe in a better world". Consequently, the discourse on the EU as a global security provider includes the idea of the EU as a "force" and "guarantor" of security and stability that will make a "major contribution" to security and stability in the world. The construction

289 Extraordinary European Council, Brussels, 17 February 2003, Conclusions, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20895/extraordinary-european-council-brussels-17-february-2003.pdf

290 A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 2, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/10/11/1df262f2-260c-486f-b414-dbf8dc112b6b/publishable_en.pdf

of the EU as an "indispensable global actor" was progressively developed among EU officials and in EU documents. In a speech at the 7th ECSA (European Community Studies Association) Conference, the former European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso stated that, in the light of "multiples challenges" that make the distinction between "internal" and "external" "less relevant by the day", "Europe cannot be passive or - even worse - complacent (...) Europe cannot be an island of peace in a sea of insecurity. We have to take our responsibility in an interdependent world".[291] He stressed that the EU is "a global player" which "pursues a specific foreign policy philosophy" called "effective multilateralism".[292]

The Strategy states that "we live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known". Giovanna Bono pertinently notes the introduction of the term "threats" in the ESS vocabulary rather than "risks" that had been common in earlier EU official documents.[293] The difference in terms is important: the notion of threats focuses on the reaction to threats, and not on their causes. Therefore, threats are perceived in absolute terms and presented as an "anomaly", an "illness" that needs to be eliminated.[294] In other words, the term "threat" is closely linked to territorially bound subjects, as well as territorial defence.

Starting with the declaration that the large-scale aggression against any Member State "is now improbable", the Strategy deals with key threats with that "Europe" is confronted with and which are "more diverse, less visible and less predictable": terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. If interconnected, they could, according to the ESS, represent a "very radical threat". Faced with these threats, the EU should "defend its security and promote its values" by the way of three strategic objectives: readiness to act before a crisis occurs, building of a stable security environment and the development of the international order based on "effective

291 Speech by Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, "The European Union and the Emerging World Order", 7th ECSA (European Community Studies Association) World Conference, Brussels, 30 November 2004, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_04_499

292 *Ibid*.

293 Giovanna Bono, "The Perils of Conceiving EU Foreign Policy as a "Civilizing" Force", *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, 1/2006, pp. 150-163, p. 157.

294 *Ibid*.

multilateralism". When it comes to the first political objective, it is stated that "with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad", and that the EU response cannot be based solely on military means but on a "mixture of instruments". A stable security environment, as a second strategic objective of the EU, comprises the promotion of "a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations". Finally, the EU activity should be based on effective multilateralism which is broadly defined as "the development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order".[295] In this regard, "A European priority" is "strengthening the UN as primarily responsible for the international peace and security". Apart from the UN, transatlantic relationship is "one of the core elements of the international system", with NATO as an important expression of this relationship. Other regional organizations are also of importance for the "more orderly world", such as OSCE, the Council of Europe, the ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union. The means of strengthening the international order are "spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights". According to the ESS, the EU should take "greater responsibility" and be "more active", with "greater political weight", which includes the development of military capabilities "into more flexible, mobile forces", followed by increasing defence spending, "systematic use of pooled and shared assets" that would reduce duplications, as well as "improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners".

The EU's self-representation as a global security player deserves some considerations. First, the ESS stresses that the "post-cold war environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked".[296] Therefore, the ESS is "externally" oriented, with the aim to identify the threats and challenges within the international system which could affect security of the EU. At the same time, through internal/external security nexus, the ESS constructs

295 *A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

296 European Security Strategy, *op.cit*.

a spatial delimitation between "Europe" as a prosperous and secure space discursively equated with the EU, and the outside. There is, on the one hand, the EU as a personification of "Europe", and on the other, the outside. The inside/outside dichotomy and the delineation of borders separate the EU-self from the other(s). Outside the EU, there is a state of conflict, instability and insecurity, i.e. chaos, while inside the EU there is a space of security, stability, prosperity and peace, i.e. order. The outside is represented as a threat to the EU security and stability. The internal/external security nexus leads to a particular vision of what the EU "should be" that draws, as Christopher Browning aptly remarks, on the modern discourse of the EU as a state-like, territorially sovereign actor.[297] Therefore, the ESS entails the reconstruction of a negative self/other binary, which means that the main question becomes how to best manage the boundary and not how to transcend it.[298] The us/them dichotomy enables the legitimation of the further process and the adoption of all necessary measures to keep "the danger" outside its borders by developing policies aimed at extending the EU system of governance to others beyond its borders in order to bring "stability" and "security".[299]

Second, the ESS draws a distinction between "well governed" states and "weak" ones that engaged in violent conflicts and are captured in organized crime, "dysfunctional societies" characterized with an "exploding population growth". The expression "well governed countries" implies that there are "badly" governed countries that are identified with "weak states" and hence suggests the "well/badly" hierarchy. It also suggests that the EU is in position to define which countries are "well governed" and which countries are not. The ESS stresses that "well governed countries" are those who embraced the EU governing norms and standards:

> "The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power,

297 Christopher Browning, "The Internal/External Security Paradox and the Reconstruction of Boundaries in the Baltic: The Case of Kaliningrad", *Alternatives*, vol. 28, 2003, pp. 545-581, p. 547.

298 *Ibid*.

299 Christopher Browning, Pertti Joenniemi, "Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy", *op. cit.*, p. 524.

> establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order".[300]

In contrast to "well governed countries", "badly governed countries" or "weak states" are placed outside the "bounds of international society" based on effective multilateralism. Some of these countries are, according to the ESS, placed in isolation while others "persistently violate international norms". It is the duty of the EU to provide assistance to those countries in order to rejoin them to the international community. Otherwise, "there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union".[301] Richard Whitman argues that this rhetoric "is itself almost cold war in tone" and that the concept of effective multilateralism represents the "EU's equivalent of the US cold war notion of containment as the key objective of the EU internationally".[302]

Third, the EU is shown as a "global player" with an aspiration to become a "global power". This was also suggested by the High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana in the context of necessity for the EU as a "global actor" to become a "global power":

> "Where did we start? As a peace project among adversaries. What is our greatest accomplishment? The spread of stability and democracy across the continent. And what is our task for the future? To make *Europe* a *global power*, a *force for good* in the world".[303]

What is interesting in this statement is that it equates the concept of "global power" with the concept of "force for good". The Strategy constructs the EU as "doing good" in the international system through visible and active intervention but at the same time also as "being good", that is, its political values are based on a solidarist and cosmopolitan approach in international affairs, including the promotion of democracy, multilateralism and human rights[304],

300 European Security Strategy, *op. cit.,* p. 6.

301 European Security Strategy, *op. cit.,* p. 6.

302 Richard Whitman, "Road Map for a Route March? (De-)civilianizing through the EU's Security Strategy", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 11, n° 1, 2006, pp. 1-15, p. 10.

303 Speech by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, "The Sound of Europe Conference", Salzburg, 27 January 2006, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/88179.pdf

304 Cf. Esther Barbé, Pol Morillas, "The EU global strategy: the dynamics of a more politicized and politically integrated foreign policy", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 32, n° 6, 2019, pp. 753-770, p. 757.

and therefore representing something of existential value for the world. Hence, the EU portrays itself as a "civilizing power"[305] whose cosmopolitan nature is based on the export of its values to the outside world and the transformation of the international environment according to its own image.[306]

Accordingly, the ESS develops a conception of the EU as a security "player" of a particular kind, with particular self-identity responsibilities in the contemporary world. The ESS offers a specific "knowledge" about the functioning of the international system. In other words, it is "a way of writing security" with the aim of ordering the world in the context of insecurity, marked with the crisis of the EU identity over the war in Iraq.[307] Therefore, the ESS offers a picture of an EU based on "a holistic or comprehensive approach to security" which prioritizes the resolution of security issues in the framework of multilateral institutions.[308] The EU's cosmopolitan and transformative approach is communicated through the strategic objectives of the EU, such as building security and good governance in its neighbourhood, promotion of effective multilateralism and fostering of regionalism. Also, the "advantage" that marks the specificity of the EU is the CSDP, whose deployment of civilian and military missions is necessary in order to "stabilize" and "securitize" the conflictual and unstable regions. Hence, the added value of the EU as a security provider includes not only specific capabilities but also the specific approach to security.

In addition, the image of the EU as the "force for good" is linked with the effective multilateralism which has become an overwhelming objective of the ESS.[309] In the language of the EU officials, the effective multilateralism "seeks to preserve what is best about its members: their different cultures, languages, traditions, and historical identities, while overcoming what has been worst: nationalism, xenophobia, mutually destructive trade and monetary

305 Cf. Jennifer Mitzen, "Anchoring Europe's civilizing identity: habits, capabilities and ontological security", *op. cit.*

306 Esther Barbé, Pol Morillas, "The EU global strategy: the dynamics of a more politicized and politically integrated foreign policy", *op. cit.*

307 Maria Mälksoo, "From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: external policy, internal purpose", *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 37, n° 3, 2016, pp. 374-388, p. 375, 376.

308 *Ibid.,* p. 422.

309 Richard Whitman, "Road Map for a Route March? (De-) civilianizing through the EU's Security Strategy", *op. cit.,* p. 10.

policies, and (ultimately) their tendency to go to war with one another".[310] Thus, multilateralism is pictured as *a way of life*, rather than a question of power. In this context, the EU is portrayed as a specific, benign power, "which can transform its neighbourhood by the token of its mere existence and attractiveness".[311] However, at the same time, the EU is also placed in a position of a dominant power, by locating itself "at the top of a hierarchically structured cluster of actors" and by implying a superior identity.[312] The ESS states that "the threats described above are *common threats*, shared with all our closest partners" and that "acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable *force for good* in the world". This reading of the ESS implies, as Maria Stern aptly argues, morally superior exemplars of universalized human civilization, i.e. "Western" superiority[313], and recalls Robert Cox's statement that "the official discourse of multilateralism has been the Western, Euro-American, discourse".[314]

Fourth, the Strategy highlights the importance of the security-development nexus. It states that "security is the first condition for development". It associates poverty and economic problems with political ones, as well as with violent conflicts, thus enabling to take advantage of the EU's "proved" civilian means such as assistance programmes, conditionality and trade measures. According to Emil Kirchner, "the extent to which the EU can be deemed a security provider depends considerably on the definition of security or, more precisely, on the type of security threat that is envisaged".[315] The ESS stresses the non-military threats as key threats for the world, which enables the legitimation and justification of the (extended) scope of the EU response to such threats.

310 Christopher Patten, "What does Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy mean for Asia", Speech before the Japaneese Institute for International Affairs, Tokyo, 19 July 2000, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_00_276

311 Petr Kratochvil, "Discursive Constructions of the EU's Identity in the Neighbourhood: An Equal Among Equals or the Power Centre?", European Political Economy Review, n° 9, 2009, pp. 5-23, p. 6.

312 *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

313 *Ibid.*

314 Robert W. Cox, "An Alternative Approach to Multilateralism for the Twenty-first Century", *Global Governance*, vol. 3, n° 1, 1997, pp. 103-116, p. 110.

315 Emil Kirchner, "The Challenge of European Union Security Governance", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 44, n° 5, 2006, pp. 947-968, p. 952.

The connection between security and development is even more explicitly expressed in the Report of the Implementation of the ESS from 2008, which states that "there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace".[316] In sum:

> "Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. Long-term engagement is required for lasting stabilisation".[317]

The connection between security and development becomes important for the development of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Civilian and military missions undertaken in the framework of this policy were focused on developing countries, notably in Africa, with the aim to strengthen their ability to tackle their own security problems, especially through security sector reform (SSR) and capacity-building. The connection between crisis management and long-term sustainable development has been established, representing thus the "distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy".[318] At the same time, the "ESDP/ CSDP success story" does not represent "a process of militarization of European construction."[319] According to Javier Solana, the distinctiveness of the EU as a global security player" is reflected in its capability "of mobilising all the resources available - economic, commercial, humanitarian, diplomatic and, of course, military".[320] Through the "general philosophy" of the ESS, thus, the EU is portrayed as a postmodern actor, oriented towards issues related to

316 European Council, Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy—providing security in a changing world, Brussels, 11 December, 2008, p. 8, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf

317 *Ibid.,* p. 2.

318 European Council, Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy-providing security in a changing world, *op. cit*, p. 2.

319 Javier Solana, "Preface", in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), *EU Security and Defence Policy. The First Five Years (1999-2004)*, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004, p. 6.

320 *Ibid*.

overall global security and risk management. Thus, the ESS is, in Solana's words, the EU's "strategic identity card", which identifies the EU as a "global", "responsible" and "credible security player".[321] At the same time, however, the ESS' construction of the EU as a postmodern global security actor implies the presentation of the "outside" as unstable and potentially threatening to the security of the EU. This recalls the main spatial binaries of the "West and the Rest" and its expression order *vs*. chaos.[322] Hence, the outside borders are constructed in a modernist way, i.e. in securitized terms, "as a first line of defence".[323]

Thirteen years after the adoption of the ESS, a new European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) emerged as a new mode of "writing security". The discourse of a "new" and "dangerous" world surrounding the EU and its role in the international sphere appeared in the aftermath of international events that have taken place over the last few years. Russia's annexation of Crimea, destabilisation of Ukraine, the events in the Middle East followed by conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the terrorist attacks in France and Belgium, etc, led to the emergence of the discourse that the EU itself is "in danger" as a result of these events. At the same time, the "migration crisis" that found the EU unprepared, the rise of populism within the EU Member States, and the exit of the United Kingdom from the EU have challenged the EU's self-representation as the "most successful" model of integration, unity and attraction. Therefore, the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) from 2016 reflected the new EU-self image in the "new world". In the words of Federica Mogherini, "this strategy, this collective vision, can also help our Union to re-discover its *identity*, its *soul*".

321 *Ibid.,* pp. 6-7.

322 Cf. Maria Stern, "Gender and Race in the European Security Strategy: Europe as a force for good?", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, vol. 14, 2011, pp. 28-59, p. 34-35.

323 The ESS echoes Robert Cooper's views of the EU as a *unique* polity in international relations. According to Cooper, the EU has a distinctive contribution to make in international relations, especially to international peace and stability. He describes the EU as "the most developed example of a postmodern system", representing "security through transparency and transparency through interdependence". He was involved in writing of the first draft of the ESS. The threat assessment of the ESS is influenced by his ideas about the mix of dangers in the international "jungle" that, taken together, represent a "very radical threat" - Robert Cooper, *The Postmodern State and the World Order*, Demos, London, 2000, p. 24. About Cooper's standpoint in more detail see: Frank Foley, "Between Force and Legitimacy: The Worldview of Robert Cooper", EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2007/09, European University Institute, Rome, 2007.

The EUGS introduced a new meaning of the concept of "Europe". This "new Europe" is at risk and the Strategy includes the transformation and extension of threat discourses. New challenges have arisen for "Europe", including terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility and energy security.[324] At the same time, however, these new challenges are combined with the renewed focus on conventional threats, notably a "resurgent" Russia.

In contrast to the ESS which states that "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure and so free", the EUGS states:

> "We live in times of *existential crisis*, within and beyond the European Union. *Our Union is under threat*. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself".[325]

This sober and pessimistic vision of the world is accompanied by the vision that the today world is "more complex", "more connected" and "more contested". The word *more* links the present with the past, but also marks the difference in relation to the past. The "new" world is dangerous and threatens to jeopardize the security and stability of the EU. As a result of the EU's self-perception as being "under threat", the wording of the EUGS reflects the shift from the cosmopolitan and transformative image of the EU to a more securitized one. Instead of portraying the EU as a provider of values and a source of prosperity and security, the EUGS highlights the necessity for the EU "to promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory"[326], because the protection and security of "Europe" "starts at home".[327] Although the ESS also highlighted the linkage between internal and external security, the threats were not presented as immediate internal threats as the

324 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", Brussels, June 2016, pp. 18-19, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

325 *Ibid.,* p. 7.

326 *Ibid.,* p. 14.

327 *Ibid.,* p. 9.

ESS was more orientated "externally". In contrast, the EUGS states that "internal and external security are ever more intertwined" and that "our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions".[328] The EUGS is less focused on how the EU can project and reproduce itself as a model, i.e. in what way the EU can export its values, norms and standards. The focus of the EU Global Strategy is on the question how the EU can better protect itself. Unlike the ESS' presentation of the EU as a cosmopolitan and transformative power oriented towards the *outside* in order to preserve the security *inside* the EU, the EUGS' focus is clearly *internal*. The emerging attention on the vulnerability and insecurity within the EU's internal borders is accompanied with the downscaling of the transformative ambitions of the EU's foreign policy formerly focused on spreading good governance and democracy outside the EU borders *via* "well governed countries". Thus the EUGS states that "as Europeans we must take greater responsibility *for our security.* We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves *against external threats*".[329] In the same spirit, it is also stated that "the *politics of fear* challenges European values and the European way of life".[330]

Apart from the security of the EU itself, another four priority areas of external action identified in the EUGS are: neighbourhood, an integrated approach to conflicts, stable regional orders across the globe and effective global governance. As regards neighbourhood, the EUGS also marks a departure from the ESS. Instead of the "transformative ambitions" of the EU presented in the ESS, the EUGS introduces the concept of "resilience" as a central element, defined as "the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises". The EUGS states that "a resilient state is a secure state, and security is key to prosperity and democracy".[331] The EUGS narrative based on the concept of resilience states that the "EU will promote resilience in its surrounding regions". Furthermore, the "EU will support different paths to resilience to its east and south, focusing on the

328 *Ibid.,* p. 14.

329 *Ibid.,* p. 19.

330 *Ibid.*

331 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", *op. cit.,* p. 23.

most acute dimensions of fragility and targeting those where we can make a meaningful difference". The concept of resilience is also linked to the enlargement policy. According to the EUGS, "a credible enlargement policy grounded on strict and fair conditionality is an irreplaceable tool to enhance resilience".[332] Third priority presented in the EUGS is related to the "integrated approach" to conflicts and crises, which comprises the EU's engagement in a "practical" and "principled" way in "peacebuilding", while "concentrating" its "efforts in surrounding regions to the east and south". At the same time, this engagement will be done on a case by case basis.[333] Hence, the EU's engagement is geographically limited to the "surrounding regions" and at the same time selective. The "integrated approach" of the EUGS replaces the previous "comprehensive approach" and implies a "multi-dimensional", "multi-phased" and "multi-level" approach to the prevention, management, resolution and stabilisation of regions and countries affected by crises. When it comes to stable regional orders, the EUGS acknowledges the weakness of its model of regional integration and introduces the concept of "cooperative regional orders".[334] The EUGS states that "we will not strive to export our model, but rather seek reciprocal inspiration from different regional experiences".[335] Finally, "the effective global governance" recalls the concept of effective multilateralism from the ESS. The EUGS reflects an ambition "to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system", which is deemed necessary in order to prevent "the emergence of alternative groupings to the detriment of all". Also, the EUGS states that the EU "will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order".[336] In this regard, it states that "CSDP could assist further and complement UN peacekeeping through bridging, stabilisation or other operations".[337]

As a new EU-self narrative, the EUGS produces a new emerging EU identity. The ESS represented the EU as a trans-

332 *Ibid.,* p. 24.

333 *Ibid.,* p. 28.

334 Esther Barbé, Pol Morillas, "The EU global strategy: the dynamics of a more politicized and politically integrated foreign policy", *op. cit.* p.761.

335 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", *op. cit.,* p. 32.

336 *Ibid.,* p. 39.

337 *Ibid.,* p. 40.

formative power, with its ability to shape the values of others, i.e. to transform its "outside" by the virtue of its mere existence and attractiveness. In contrast, the EUGS moves "away from the outward looking idealism of the early 2000s, without swinging all the way to the opposite end of realpolitik".[338] According to Sven Biscop, the EUGS "charts a course between isolationism and interventionism, between 'dreamy idealism and unprincipled" pragmatism", which he calls "Realpolitik with European characteristics".[339] And indeed, the normative power no longer seems to represent the EU's self-image in the EUGS, while an alternative conception of power has not yet emerged.[340] Therefore, the concepts of "principled pragmatism" and "resilience" have been introduced as key concepts of the EU's foreign policy as a middle ground between the EU as a transformative power and the new identity in status of "anxiety". The EUGS states:

> "We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. In charting the way between the Scylla of isolationism and the Charybdis of rash interventionism, the EU will engage the world manifesting responsibility towards others and sensitivity to contingency".[341]

Hence, the EUGS marks a discursive shift in the EU's external action from building a space of "shared" stability and prosperity based on common values to security through pragmatic interconnection. It advances the concept of "principled pragmatism" as central to the EU's foreign policy, based on the principles of unity, engagement, responsibility and partnership. According to Nathalie Tocci, the former special advisor to HRVP Federical Mogherini in charge of writing the EUGS,

338 Nathalie Tocci, *Framing the EU Global Strategy. A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017, p. 55.

339 Sven Biscop, "The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics", *Security Policy Brief*, n° 75, EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations, June 2016, pp. 1-2, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/06/SPB75.pdf?type=pdf

340 Kateryna Pishchikova, Elisa Piras," The European Union Global Strategy: What kind of Foreign Policy Identity?", *International Spectator*, vol. 52, n° 3, 2017, pp. 103-120, p. 113.

341 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", *op. cit.,* p. 16.

> "The EU had to be pragmatic. It had to remove its rose-tinted lenses that depicted a world that simply wanted to look like the EU. Many countries to the EU's east and south have no such intention. At the same time, the EU could not simply abandon the transformational agenda in favour of a crude transactional one, in which even the most egregious violations of rights and law by states beyond the EU's borders would be ignored nonchalantly by the Union. Resilience sought to capture that middle way".[342]

Together with the concept of "principled pragmatism", the concept of resilience represented a "perfect middle ground between liberal peace-building and the under-ambitious objective of stability",[343] between the EU as a normative power and the stability understood as a post-normative foreign and security policy. Therefore, the concept of resilience is situated in-between the idea of the EU's power to spread its values outside its borders, and the stability which would be the result of the influence of the EU as a normative power.

However, the two terms are not without ambiguities. As regard the "principled pragmatism", it advocates, one the one hand, that the EU should "act in accordance with universal values", i.e. liberal ones, while, on the other, it follows a pragmatic approach that denies the moral imperatives of those universal categories.[344] In other words, the EUGS stresses the EU's role of the promotion of democracy and human rights while at the same time notes that the EU will do so on a case by case basis.[345] However, according to Tocci, the principled pragmatism should be read as echoing "a rediscovery of pragmatist philosophy that entails a rejection of universal truths, an emphasis on the practical consequences of acts, and a focus on local practices and dynamics".[346] When it comes to the concept of resilience, it remains vague and is used in order to

342 Nathalie Tocci, *Framing the EU Global Strategy. A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World, op. cit.,* pp. 70-71.

343 Wolfgang Wagner, Rosanne Anholt, "Resilience as the EU Global Strategy's new leitmotif: pragmatic, problematic or promising?", *op. cit.,* p. 417.

344 Ana Juncos, "Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a pragmatist turn?", *European Security*, vol. 26, n° 1, 2017, pp. 1-18, p. 2.

345 *Ibid*.

346 Nathalie Tocci, *Framing the EU Global Strategy. A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World, op. cit.,* p. 64-65.

address various measures that assume various meanings. However, the UEGS states that the EU will apply this concept selectively and pragmatically, while pursuing "tailor-made policies".[347]

An important difference brought by the EUGS concerns the EU's relations with its neighbours. Although the EU is, according to the EUGS, still represented as "making a positive difference in the world", its scope in geographical terms is modest and limited to "Europe and its surrounding regions". Therefore, according to Hylke Dijkstra, despite the adjective "global", the EUGS is more regional than global.[348] The emphasis is on the immediate neighbours in the East and South as well as the "surrounding regions". Instead of emphasizing the "export of European values" and the normative added-value of the EU, the enhanced resilience becomes the main statement of the EU's responsibility in the neighbourhood.[349] However, Nathalie Tocci argues that although "global" can be interpreted geographically, the ambition of the HRVP was to openly acknowledge the picture of the world that is globally connected "rather than resting comfortably on the EU's traditional mental maps such as the "neighbourhood".[350] The aim, as Tocci argues, was to have a strategy "that would be global by encompassing the full range of the EU's external action capacities".[351] Therefore, the term "neighbourhood" is, according to Tocci, "deliberately dropped" because it conveys a Eurocentric vision of a homogenous space beyond the EU's borders, a vision which is blatantly detached from realities on the ground".[352]

At first glance, the EUGS avoids "writing" about the uniqueness of the EU as a "global security actor", including the debate about "soft" and "hard" power, especially with regard to its "normative power" nature and the development of the CSDP. However, a second look reveals that the EUGS does not stay silent on this

347 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", *op. cit.,* p. 25.

348 Hylke Dijkstra, "The EU Global Strategy: Some Initial Reflections", CERIM, 29 June 2016, https://cerim.blogactiv.eu/2016/06/29/the-eu-global-strategy-some-initial-reflections/

349 Jolyon Howorth, "The EUGS: New Concepts for New Directions in Foreign and Security Policy", *The International Spectator*, vol. 51, n °3, 2016, pp. 24-26, p. 25.

350 Nathalie Tocci, *Framing the EU Global Strategy. A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World, op. cit.,* p. 57.

351 *Ibid.,* p. 58.

352 *Ibid.,* p. 72.

issue. It adopts a more "militarized" approach to foreign policy, which is reflected in two priorities. First, the EUGS advocates a necessity for an "appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy".[353] Second, it demands more investment in the EU's security and defence capabilities. It states that "investment in security and defence is a matter of urgency" and that "full spectrum of defence capabilities are necessary to respond to external crises, build our partners' capacities and to guarantee Europe's safety".[354] The EUGS's crisis narrative therefore calls for a more "realistic" CFSP which is presented as "principled pragmatism".[355] According to the former president of the Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, "even though Europe is proud to be a soft power of global importance", it "should not be naive", because, according to him, "soft power is not enough in our increasingly dangerous neighbourhood".[356] In a similar tone, Federica Mogherini stated:

> "(...) However, the idea that Europe as an exclusively "civilian power" does not do justice to an evolving reality. For instance, the European Union currently deploys seventeen military and civilian operations, with thousands of men and women serving under *the European flag* for peace and security- our own security, and our partners'. For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand".[357]

The discursive reference to the "European flag" "evokes highly traditional masculine ideas of militarism that imply men's bravery and loyalty to the homeland".[358] Hence, the CSDP can be seen as the expression of a "more militarized EU", i.e. as an element of the EU's image not only as a soft but also as a hard

353 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", *op. cit.,* p. 19.

354 *Ibid.,* pp. 10-11.

355 *Ibid.,* p. 9.

356 Jean-Claude Juncker, "State of the Union Address 2016: Towards a better Europe- a Europe that protects, empowers and defends", 14 September 2016, Strasbourg, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_16_3043

357 European Union Global Strategy, Foreword by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, *op. cit.,* p. 4.

358 Marijn Hoijtink, Hanna L Muehlenhoff, "The European Union as a Masculine Military Power: European Union Security and Defence Policy in 'Times of Crisis'", *Political Studies Review*, 2019, pp. 1-16, p. 8, DOI:10.1177/1478929919884876

power. However, this "militarized" image of the EU is faced with paradox. The development of the military capacities is conceived for the defense from an *outside* attack, bringing to the foreground the EU's concept of collective defence. As the EUGS states,

> "While NATO exists to defend its members – most of which are European – from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders".[359]

The EUGS notes that "NATO remains the primary framework" for collective defence "for most member states" while the EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO".[360] Hanns Maull pertinently remarks on the ambiguity of the concept of "strategic autonomy" which remains "an empty signifier": "what is an appropriate level of strategic autonomy? Are there, then, degrees of autonomy, could the EU be "more" or "less" autonomous?"[361]

The EUGS seeks recourse to a re-articulation of the EU-self in times of "existential crisis". The ESS narrative constituted the EU through the boundaries drawn between "us"- prosperous, secure and peaceful - and "others"- troubled, in chaos and violence. The EUGS security narrative changes the image of the "Fortress Europe", immune to the insecurity beyond its borders and introduces a narrative that also includes its "weaknesses". In the words of the EUGS, "we have learnt the lesson: my neighbour's and my partner's weaknesses are my own weaknesses". The EU-self representation is a representation of a more "vulnerable" EU, which is faced with ontological insecurity.[362] Therefore, a re-scripting of

359 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", *op. cit.,* p. 19.

360 *Ibid.,* p. 20.

361 Hanns W. Maull, "Sadly, the EUGS Reads More like a Symptom of the Problem than Part of a Solution for Europe's Deep Crisis", *The International Spectator*, vol. 51, n° 3, 2016, pp. 34-36, p. 35.

362 Cf. Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, "The EU's ontological (in)security: stabilising the ENP

an EU-self narrative by the EUGS is focused on the re-establishment of the ontological security of the EU, which might involve a radicalisation of the self-other difference (securitization) or the articulation of alternative narratives with an aim to establish new self-other routines.[363]

area.... and the EU-self?", *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 53, n° 4, 2018, pp. 1-17.

363 *Ibid*.

PART II

THE BALKANS AND THE WESTERN BALKANS AS THE OTHER

"Even though the Balkans do exist,
they must be invented anyway"
(K.E. Fleming)

1. "THE BALKANS" AS EU'S OTHER

In this part of the book, we deal with the Balkans and the Western Balkans as the Other in the discursive construction of an EU identity. We focus on questions in what way and to what extent the Balkans and the Western Balkans have been constructed as the EU's different Other, i.e. on analysing of the nature of the difference in the EU- Balkans/Western Balkans relationship in discourse. The first chapter deals with the issue of "the Balkans" as EU's Other. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section (a) focuses on the importance of temporal representations which enable to locate a contemporary foreign policy question within a historical discourse. The interpretation of the evolution of discourse and identity over a series of historical moments, from the "discovery" of the "Balkans" onwards, enables to show how deeply rooted were particular aspects of identities of the EU and the Balkans. Therefore, we aim to show how certain representations, which were important in the past, have changed or recurred over time in the EU's discourse of the present. At the same time, the Balkans as EU's Other is an example of importance of the temporality/spatiality nexus in the self-other relations. The "use" of the Balkans transcends a neutral geographic description of the region, transforming it into the category of "symbolic geography", i.e. into "a series of overlapping imaging spaces". The second section (b) deals specifically with "the Balkans" as EU's Other. It is argued that "the Balkans" has been produced as an existential threat to the EU, i.e. in radical opposition to "Europe" proper as identified with the EU.

a. The "Western" construction of "the Balkans"

"A specter is haunting Western culture - the specter of the Balkans".[364] This "threatening" sentence of Maria Todorova, paraphrasing the opening line of the *Communist Manifesto,* anticipates that the Balkans is the expression of one of the most powerful representational traditions in Western European culture.[365] Todorova continues:

364 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 3.

365 Andrew Hammond, "Balkanism in Political Context: From the Ottoman Empire to the EU", *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, vol. 3, n° 3, 2006, pp. 6-26, p. 8.

> "All the powers have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this specter: politicians and journalists, conservative academics and radical intellectuals, moralists of all kind, gender, and fashion. Where is the adversarial group that has not been decried as "Balkan" and "balkanizing" by its opponents? Where have the accused not hurled back the branding reproach of "balkanism"?"[366]

The statement opens many questions. What is the Balkans? And more generally, what is balkanism and balkanization? How did the Balkans emerge as a specter, a threat and to whom? And to what extent was the Balkans significant as an EU external Other in the process of constructing the EU identity?

The specificity of the Balkan region was foremost in its geographical position: successor of the Byzantine Empire and part of the European continent that had for centuries been under the rule of an oriental power. Divided between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, the region was usually associated with the name of the "European part of Turkey" or "Turkey in Europe".[367] It was nameless for centuries. Its name - "the Balkans", was sporadically used until the late 19th century, when it became widely accepted, mostly in relation to the newly created states within the region. At the same time, the image of the Balkans as a place that does not belong to Europe, as some sort of a place of "aliens" emerged.[368] As Vesna Goldsworthy argues, "trying to catch up with a Europe which is itself progressing, the Balkans always seem to remain at the same distance away from it – always at the point of "beginning to be civilised", always about to join Europe, always in its backyard, or at best on its doorstep".[369]

According to Gerard Delanty, the loss of Constantinople (1453) was one of the decisive events in the formation of European modernity.[370] The fall of Constantinople and the arrival of

366 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans, op. cit*.

367 Predrag Simić, "Balkans and Balkanization: Western Perceptions of the Balkans in the Carnegie Commission's Reports on the Balkan Wars from 1914 to 1996", *Perceptions*, vol. 18, n° 2, 2013, pp. 113-134, p. 113.

368 Dejana Vukasović, "The EU and Otherness: The Case of Balkans", *Sprawy Narodowosciowe,* vol. 50, 2018, pp. 1-12.

369 Vesna Goldsworthy, "The Last Stop on the Orient Express: The Balkans and the Politics of British In(ter)vention", *Balkanologie*, vol. III, n 2, 1999, p. 4.

370 Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, op. cit.,* p. 36.

Turks led to the change of the way the "Europeans" imagined their continent, with the creation of a new border dividing the Christian from the non-Christian world.[371] At the same time, the spread of the Ottoman Empire into the Balkans and its sustained presence for nearly 500 years also led to various descriptions of the Balkans. The Balkans progressively began to be identified in terms of its geostrategic position, as a "zone of transition between two civilizations"[372], as a place where the "West" meets the "East", as a place not fully belonging to either world. It is, according to David Norris, the geographical position of the Balkans that marked the beginning of the narrative which progressively produced the images of extreme negativity.[373]

The name "the Balkans" was gradually adopted in the Western discourse. The "discovering" of the Balkans consisted mainly of travelogues, journalist accounts and occasional historical books.[374] At first, different names were used to denote the region. According to Maria Todorova, the earliest mention of the name "Balkan" originates from the 15th century and was related to the use of the name "Balkan" to denote the mountain range that divided Bulgaria from east to west and ran parallel to the Danube.[375] During the 18th century, the name "Balkan" was sporadically used by travellers for the mountain, alongside the ancient term "Haemus". Both terms continued to be used during the XIXth century.[376] Yet, none of the travellers used the term "Balkan" to denote the peninsula, but solely as a synonym for the mountain Haemus. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Balkans was still little known in the West, while during the nineteenth century various travel reports and books were published about the Balkans, describing it, however, as the "least-known corner of Europe".[377] It is common knowledge

371 David A. Norris, *In the Wake of the Balkan Myth. Questions of Identity and Modernity*, MacMillan Press, St. Martin's Press, London, New York, 1999, p. 5.

372 Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, op. cit.*

373 David A. Norris, *In the Wake of the Balkan Myth. Questions of Identity and Modernity, op. cit.,* p. 5.

374 Dušan Bjelić, "Introduction: Blowing Up the "Bridge", in Dušan Bjelić, Obrad Savić (eds.), *Balkan as Metaphor*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002, pp. 1-22, p. 7; Sanja Lazarević- Radak, *Otkrivanje Balkana*, Mali Nemo, Pančevo, 2013, p. 11.

375 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans, op. cit.,* p. 22.

376 *Ibid.,* p. 24.

377 Božidar Jezernik, "Europeanization of the Balkans and the Cause of its Balkanization", in Božidar Jezernik, Rajko Muršič, Alenka Bartulović (eds.), *Europe and its Other. Notes on the Balkans*, Oddelek za etnologijo in kulturno antropologijo, Filozofska fakulteta, Ljubljana, 2007,

that the German geographer Johann August Zeune was the first to put the name of the"Balkan peninsula" in official use in 1808 in his work "Goea", to identify the entire region with the Turkish word for Old Mountain (Stara Planina) in Bulgaria, while the British traveler Robert Walsh first used the term "Balkans" to denote the whole peninsula in 1827.[378] At the same time, the exact scope of the Balkans in neutrally geographical terms changed constantly in Western narratives. As an example, the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1911 defined the Balkans as encompassing Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia, Dobrudja, Greece, Illyria, Macedonia, Montenegro, Novibazar, Servia and Turkey, while the 1995 edition included also Vojvodina and Romania, as well as Moldova and Slovenia, but excluded Greece among the Balkan states.[379] Although a specific geographic entity, the Balkans represented a historical construct, "a series of overlapping imaging spaces in which whole countries are defined as "Balkan" in some accounts, but excluded from others".[380]

Together with the changeable boundaries of the Balkans in neutral geographical terms, an ideological boundary that separated the "West" and "the Balkans" was gradually introduced. In the nineteenth century, a tradition of depreciation in the representation of the Balkans was developed by Western travellers. The "Balkans" was described as "wild", "primitive", "strange", "backward", characterised by "diabolical mountains" and inhabited by "inferior nationalities".[381] It was characterised by "filth", "passivity", "untrustworthiness", "disregard for women", "opportunism", "indolence", "superstition".[382] Its population was represented as "primitive" and "belligerent", i.e. represented in terms of cultural inferiority.[383] As a place of savagery, unpredictability, lawless-

pp. 11-27, p. 13.

378 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans, op. cit.,* p. 25.

379 Božidar Jezernik, "Europeanization of the Balkans and the Cause of its Balkanization", *op. cit.,* p. 12.

380 Vesna Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania. The Imperialism of the Imagination*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1998, p. 3.

381 Andrew Hammond, "Balkanism in Political Context: From the Ottoman Empire to the EU", *op. cit.,* p. 8.

382 Božidar Jezernik, "Europeanization of the Balkans and the Cause of its Balkanization", *op. cit.,* p. 12.

383 Sanja Lazarević-Radak, "Post-Structuralism and Politics: Towards Postmodern Balkan Studies", *Postmodern Openings*, vol. 6, n° 2, 2015, pp. 15-31, p. 27.

ness, moral turpitude and mystery, "the Balkans" contained a set of evaluations that resembled those of colonial discourse.[384] This "ugliness" of the Balkans gradually became the conceptual force in the presentation of the region vis-à-vis the "self-beautification" of Western Europe.[385] As an "empty signifier", it was injected with a set of meanings and characteristics aimed at defining the "West" and "Europe".[386] It represented a fictional and political construction, whose features, identity and even geographic boundaries were imagined and defined by the Western Europe's representation of the region. The "West" provided criteria of evaluation around which positive and negative feelings cluster, producing in this way a knowledge that enabled the domination over non-Western cultures.[387] These criteria were linked to the concept of "civilisation", self-attributed by the "West" during the Enlightenment, and defined itself in opposition to its Others. The concept of "civilisation" had a tendency to essentialise, i.e. to isolate features of a group or of a society's thought and practice as unchanging.[388] As such, the discursively constructed Balkans could be displaced to the periphery, marginalized and stigmatized.

In this regard, some similarities could be traced between the discursive construction of "the Balkans" and Orientalism. Edward Said's *Orientalism* set up the conceptual foundations for the understanding of the Western discourse of Self and Other. In Said's words, Orientalism has become a synonym for a "style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and... the Occident, a set of discursive practices through which the "Occident" was able to dominate, structure and exercise authority over the "Orient".[389] Through the process of imagining and representation of the Other as inferior, the identity of the "West" and "Europe" has been constructed as a superior, "civilized" Self. In that sense, the Others have "helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality,

384 Cf. Vesna Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania, op. cit.*

385 Dušan Bjelić, "Introduction: Blowing Up the "Bridge", *op. cit.*

386 Andreja Vezovnik, Ljiljana Šarić, "Constructing Balkan Identity in Recent Media Discourse", *Slavic Review*, vol. 74, n° 2, 2015, pp. 237-243, p. 237.

387 Stuart Hall, "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power", *op. cit.,* p. 277.

388 Milica Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia", *Slavic Review*, vol. 54, n° 4, 1995, pp. 917- 931, p. 918.

389 Edward Said, *Orientalism*, Pantheon Books, New York, 1978, pp. 2-3.

experience".[390] At the core of orientalist discourse is the assumption that the West, East, Europe, the Balkans, etc. are known to us only through the symbols of "the West", "the Balkans", "Europe", "East", where the difference between the sign and what it represents is lost.[391] Thus, the West emerges as the "West", the civilised, democratic and modern, while the Balkans become "the Balkans" as uncivilised, barbarous and pre-modern. In this regard, the specific rhetoric on the Balkans could be regarded as a "variation on the orientalist theme"[392] or as a "sub-theme to Said's study".[393] By power of discourse, even in the absence of a literal colonial presence in the Balkans, the region could be seen as unconventionally colonised with the "imperialism of imagination."[394] The creation of "the Balkan myth" could be regarded as a form of cultural colonialism similar to Orientalism: "Western European identity" demands Balkan inferiority, and therefore the people of the region have to accept their inferiority, otherwise, "to deny the negative image strikes at the heart of the meaning of European civilization".[395]

At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, "the Balkans" came into the Western attention, especially after the first and second Balkan wars that challenged the peace movements which were gaining strength and becoming institutionalized.[396] During that period, the "civilisational discourse" of the West, to use Lene Hansen's terminology, became dominant in politically oriented documents.[397] In this regard, it was the "Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars", issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace issued in 1914 that was of particular importance

390 *Ibid.,* pp. 1-2.

391 Dejan Guzina, "Inside/Outside Imaginings of the Balkans: The Case of the Former Yugoslavia", *Political Science Faculty Publications,* Paper 15, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1999, p. 42.

392 Cf. Milica Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia", *op. cit.,* p. 920.

393 John Allcock, "Constructing "the Balkans", in John Allcock, Antonia Young (eds.), *Black Lambs and Grey Falcons: Woman Travelling in the Balkans*, Bradford UP, Bradford, 1991, pp. 170-191, p. 178-9.

394 Vesna Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania. The imperialism of imagination, op. cit.,* pp. 2-3.

395 David A. Norris, *In the Wake of the Balkan Myth. Questions of Identity and Modernity, op. cit.,* p. 13.

396 Maria Todorova, "The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention", *Slavic Review*, vol. 53, n° 2, 1994, pp. 453-482, p. 456.

397 Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice, op. cit.,* p. 89.

regarding the identity of the "West" and "the Balkans".[398] The Report aimed to analyse the historical roots of the Balkan wars and the consequences of these wars. In the introduction, it is stated that:

> "All these countries not far from us were then and are still, unlike Europe, more widely separated from her than Europe from America; no one knew anything of them, no one said anything about them (...)"
>
> "These peoples, mingled in an inextricable confusion of languages and religions, of antagonistic race and nationality Turks, Bulgarians, Servians, Serbo-Croatians, Servian speaking Albanians, Koutzo-Valacks, Greeks, Albanians, Tziganes, Jews, Roumanians, Hungarians, Italians, *are not less good or less gifted* than other people in Europe and America. Those who seem the worst among them have simply lived longer in slavery or destitution. *They are martyrs rather than culprits*. The spectacle of destitute childhood in a *civilized country* is beginning to rouse the hardest hearts".[399]

The Report portrayed the "Balkans" as inferior and backward in comparison to "Europe". Hence, through the spatial binary of the "West and the Rest" and the temporally situated binary civilisation vs. primitivism the boundaries are drawn between the "West" and "the Balkans". The "civilisational discourse" presented "Europe" and the "West" as a place of civilised, developed, human, modern world in contrast to the underdeveloped, uncivilised and pre-modern world including "the Balkans". As stated in the Report, people in the Balkans had not "obtained the stability of character found in older civilizations", which is characterized by "a synthesis of moral and social forces embodied in laws and institutions giving stability of character, forming public sentiment and making for security", and "this is largely wanting in the Balkan States".[400] However, the construction of difference between "Europe/West" and "the Balkans" was not based on radical difference, but on the inferiority which resulted from the Ottoman rule and a long sepa-

398 *Report of the International Commission To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1914, http://www.pollitecon.com/html/ebooks/Carnegie-Report-on-the-Balkan-Wars.pdf

399 Baron d'Estournelle de Constant, "Introduction", in *Report of the International Commission To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, op. cit.,* p. 3.

400 *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, op. cit.,* p, 267, 271.

ration of "the Balkans" from "Europe" and therefore required the responsibility of "Europe" to civilise it. According to the Report, "these unhappy Balkan states have been up to the present, *the victims of European division much more than of their own faults*".[401] Due to the European "abstention", i.e. its inactivity, "the Balkans" remained underdeveloped and divided, because "Europe has chosen to make them ruined belligerents". At the same time, the distinction between the First and the Second Balkan War was made. The former was defensive and represented a war of independence, it was "the supreme protest against violence, and generally the protest of the weak against the strong". It was also "glorious and popular throughout the civilized world". In contrast, the latter Balkan War was a predatory war, in which "both the victor and the vanquished lose morally and materially". However, both wars "sacrificed treasures of riches, lives and heroism". This representation of the Balkan wars also reveals the Western discourse about the "heroic Balkans", represented as a "guardian at the gate", the "liberators" that protected Europe from the Ottoman Empire invasion.[402] At the same time, the Western "pacifist" agenda aimed to provide "Europe" with an opportunity to recover its leading role in the world.[403]

The Report's writing about the Balkan wars articulates the Western discourse on the Balkans based on the civilisational mission and the Western responsibility for assisting the Balkans in its civilisational development. Thus, referring to the reasons of the writing the Report, the president of the Commission De Constant wondered: "must we allow these two Balkan wars to pass, without at least to trying to draw some lesson from them, without knowing whether they have been a benefit of an evil, if they should begin again tomorrow and go on for ever extending"?[404] Hence, the backwardness and civilisational underdevelopment of the "Balkans" were not unchangeable, they were represented as a step on the road to progress, with the help of the civilised "West".

401 *Ibid.,* p. 8.

402 Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice, op. cit*., p. 88, 92.

403 Enika Abazi, Albert Doja, "International representations of Balkan wars: a socio-anthropological approach in international relations perspective", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs,* vol. 29, n° 2, 2016, pp. 581-610, p. 592.

404 Baron d'Estournelle de Constant, "Introduction", in *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, op. cit.,* p. 5.

At the same time, the Report "understood" civilisation as a state of moral, economic and political culture accessible to the Balkans, whose spread would lead to the reorganisation of economic and political standards in accordance with the "Western" modernity, i.e. its vision of a progressing and non-conflictual world.[405]

The Report echoes "balkanism"[406] as a discursively framed set of ideas that reflect the construction of knowledge about the Balkans influenced by the power relations. For Todorova, "balkanism" is a discourse about the Balkans as an ambiguous Europe's semi-Other, which is reflected in its "historical and geographical concreteness" in opposition to the "intangible nature of the Orient".[407] Due to its peripheral location and cultural, social and spatial behaviour, the Balkans was neither "Western" nor "Oriental" enough. "Caught between Catholicism and Byzantium, Christendom and Islam, the Western powers and Russia, the peninsula has been conceived as an unruly borderland where the structured identity of the imperial centre dissolves and alien, antithetic peripheries begin".[408] It was constructed by the West as a "borderline", "gate", "bridge", "crossroad", "frontier". Therefore, its role as an object of alterity was more complex that the one of the Orient.[409] It was mostly presented as an unstable and unsettling, as an "obscure boundary where categories, oppositions and essentialized groupings are cast into confusion".[410] The Balkans between "Europe" and "the Orient" is a discourse about an imputed *ambiguity*" in the process of othering in comparison to Orientalism, which represents a "discourse about an imputed *opposition*".[411] It has not been conceived as an absolute difference from the West, but as an "outsider within", an entity whose European location and similarity to Western European culture lead to the production of a certain form of

405 Lene Hansen, "Past as Preface: Civilizational Politics and the 'Third' Balkan War", *Journal of Peace Research,* vol. 37, n° 3, 2000, pp. 345-362, p. 354.

406 The term "balkanism" was coined by Maria Todorova - *Imaging the Balkans, op. cit.,* p. 11. In this book, it is used as a synonym for a Balkanist discourse.

407 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans, op. cit.,* p. 11.

408 Andrew Hammond, "Balkanism in Political Context: From the Ottoman Empire to the EU", *op. cit.,* p. 7.

409 Dejana Vukasović, "The EU and Otherness: The Case of Balkans", *op. cit*, p. 5.

410 Andrew Hammond, "Typologies of the East: On Distinguishing Balkanism and Orientalism", *Nineteenth-Century Contexts*, vol. 29, n° 2-3, 2007, pp. 201-218, p. 204.

411 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans, op. cit.,* p. 17.

anxiety.[412] The Balkans is a part of, rather than opposed to, Europe proper.[413] It represents a paradox of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, of "Europe" but not "Europe", an ambiguous Europe's semi-Other, a liminal Other, the Europe's internal Other within, the dark side of Europe, where all the unacceptable characteristics of the "civilised" West have to be pushed down.[414] This Balkanist discourse is thus articulated around the Balkans as a part of the West, albeit as an incomplete, not fully "matured" part that had remained in a semi-civilized state.[415]

After the end of World War I, there was a discursive shift in the Western construction of the Balkans. According to Todorova, in that period, the discursively constructed differences between Europe and the Balkans become crystallised in the Western European consciousness".[416] This "crystallization" was linked with the introduction of the term "Balkanization", which gained official linguistic recognition after the First World War.[417] In its original use, the term Balkanization had negative connotation of hostility towards neighbours and a threat to the existing international order.[418] Although without any concrete meaning, the term was used as "something widely recognizable as menacing".[419] Todorova connected the entry of the term "Balkanization" in the vocabulary of journalists and politicians with the disintegration of the Habsburg and Romanov Empires into a proliferation of small states which, she argues, "reminded them of the succession of the Balkan coun-

412 K.E. Fleming, "*Orientalism*, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography", *American Historical Review*, vol. 105, n° 4, 2000, pp. 1218-1233, p. 1229, 1220.

413 Cf. Dušan Bjelić, *op. cit.,* Sanja Lazarević-Radak, "Dekontruisanje Srbije: od postkolonijalizma do poluperiferije", *Српска политичка мисао/Serbian Political Thought*, n° 3, special edition, 2016, pp. 105-118.

414 Sanja Lazarević-Radak, "Dekonstruisanje Srbije: od postkolonijalizma do poluperiferije", *op. cit.*, p. 108.

415 Ivan Čolović, "Balkanist discourse and its critics", *Hungarian Review*, vol. IV, n° 2, 2013, http://www.hungarianreview.com/article/balkanist_discourse_and_its_critics

416 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans, op. cit.,* p. 7.

417 James Der Derian, "S/N International Theory, Balkanization and the New World Order", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 20, n° 3, 1991, pp. 485-506, p. 489. According to Der Derian, it first appeared in two magazines in the 1920, namely the *19th Century Magazine* and *Public Opinion*. The *19th Century Magazine* wrote that "Great Britain has been accused by French observers of pursuing a policy aimed at the *Balkanization* of the Baltic provinces", while the *Public Opinion* stated that "in this unhappy *Balkanized* world... every state is at issue with its neighbors"- *Ibid*.

418 James Der Derian, *op. cit*.

419 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans, op. cit.,* p. 34.

tries from the Ottoman polity that had begun much earlier".[420] She outlined that the first "extensive treatment" of this term came in 1921 from Paul Scott Mowrer, the European correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*, who used this term to denote "the creation, in a region of hopelessly mixed races, of a medley of small states with more or less backward populations, economically and financially weak, covetous, intriguing, afraid, a continual prey to the machinations of the great powers, and to the violent promptings of their own passions".[421] Hence, as a concept that signifies the breaking up of empires into smaller and mutually hostile states, the term "balkanization" could be exploited or manipulated by more powerful neighbours and "pulled out" of the local context in order to justify political choices as legitimate.[422]

Balkanization discourse differentiated from Balkanist discourse in various ways. First, there was a shift with regard to the connection of "the Balkans" with the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the earlier discourse that presented the Balkans as influenced but separated from Ottoman Empire, with its "liminal" position between the "West and "East", this new discourse constructed "the Balkans" identity as a product of Ottomans, pushing it towards "orientalism".[423] Therefore, the inferiority of "the Balkans" gradually became radically different from the "West". Second, the identity of "the Balkans" was no longer linked to the identity of the "West", in a sense that the "West" presented the Balkans as a "barrier" against the "East" and therefore beneficial for the "West". Third, this new representation of "the Balkans" reflected a tendency to "essentialize, to isolate features of a group or of a society's thought and practices, which leads to the image of those features as unchangeable, as typical for that particular group in contrast to other groups".[424] In Balkanization discourse, the negative charac-

420 *Ibid*.

421 *Ibid*.

422 Cf. James Der Derian, "S/N International Theory, Balkanization and the New World Order", *op. cit.,* p. 488. In order to demonstrate the power of the concept of "balkanization", Der Derian gives an example of its use during the period between the two World Wars for the purpose of describing the two ideas of international order of that period: a Wilsonian and a Marxist one. He notes that for the Marxists, balkanization was opposed to federation, barbarism to socialism and nationalism to internationalism, while for the Wilsonians, balkanization was opposed to confederation, despotism to liberal constitutionalism and nationalism to cosmopolitanism - *Ibid.,* p. 491.

423 Cf. Vesna Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania. The imperialism of imagination, op. cit.,* p. 5.

424 Milica Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia", *op. cit.,* p. 918.

teristics of the Balkans are presented as inherent to the region and therefore have a tendency to be essentialized.[425] The conflict was thus represented as an essential feature of the Balkans, reflected in "ancient roots". In this regard, the region was represented not only as conflictual, but also as having the "capacity to entrap "the West" by drawing it into larger war".[426]

During the era of the Cold War, "the Balkans" was constructed as part of the communist and "Eastern" Other. Using the dichotomy inside/outside, we could argue that the "true" identity of the Balkans was frozen by communism on the "inside" and by the bipolar division of "Europe" on the "outside".[427] The dominant dichotomy was coined between the democratic, capitalist West and the totalitarian, communist East.[428] The Soviet bloc became a precondition for the Western self-identity. With the breakdown of communism and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Balkanization discourse has revived, putting "the Balkans" at the center of the Western foreign policy discourse.[429]

In the new circumstances followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the Western representations of "the Balkans" were revived. The criticism that addresses Western representation of "the Balkans" was especially productive in the 1990s, when "the Balkans" became, via media articles, memoirs, films and travel reports, one of the "West's" most significant Others.[430] The dominant discourse in the Western media, political and academic speeches has been a Balkanization discourse explaining the fragmentation of Yugoslavia as a consequence of the revival of "ancient hatreds" in "the Balkans". The negative characteristics of "the Balkans" were represented as inherent to the region and therefore have had a tendency to be essentialized.[431] People of "the Balkans" were constructed as his-

425 *Ibid.*

426 Lene Hansen, "Past as Preface: Civilizational Politics and the 'Third' Balkan War", *op. cit.,* p. 350.

427 Cf. Lene Hansen, *Security as practice*, *op. cit.,* p. 95.

428 Milica Bakić-Hayden, Robert Hayden, "Orientalist Variations on the Theme "Balkans": Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics", *Slavic Review*, vol. 51, n° 1, 1992, pp. 1-15, p. 3.

429 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, *op. cit.,* p. 136.

430 Andrew Hammond, "Typologies of the East: On Distinguishing Balkanism and Orientalism", *op. cit.,* p. 202.

431 Milica Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia", *op. cit.,* p. 918.

torically and culturally predisposed for mutual hatred and violence. In one of the most read books in the early 1990s, *Balkans Ghosts: A Journey Through History*, American journalist Robert Kaplan writes that the "Balkan peninsula", is "like chaos at the beginning of time".[432] This "chaos" in "the Balkans" was represented in the form of savagery and destruction threatening to attack the "order", i.e. the core values and practices of "western societies" (that is, the Enlightenment project). Kaplan stresses that "whatever has happened in Beirut or elsewhere happened first, long ago, in the Balkans"[433], claiming that the twentieth-century's major evils come from "the Balkans":

> "Twentieth-century history came from the Balkans. Here men have been isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate. Here politics has been reduced to a level of near anarchy that from time to time in history has flowed up the Danube into Central Europe".[434]

Thus, "the Balkans" became the "dangerous evil" that "produced the century's first terrorists" as well as nazism that "can claim Balkan origins".[435] The Balkans is a space that is a historically determined "time-capsule world", ruled by "passions" and "ethnic hatreds".[436]

At the same time, the reprint of the report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace of 1914, followed by the introduction written by American diplomat and former US ambassador to Yugoslavia (1961-1963) George Kennan was published.[437] The reprint of the Report was issued in order to establish the connection between the Balkan Wars in 1912-13 and the breakup of Yugoslavia. In the words of the president of the Carnegie Endowment, Morton Abramowitz, the reprint of the 1914 report was necessary, because it is a document "with many stories to tell us in this twilight decade of the twentieth century, when yet again a conflict in the

432 Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*, Vintage Books, New York, 1994, p. 51.

433 *Ibid.,* p. xxvii.

434 *Ibid.*

435 *Ibid.*

436 *Ibid.,* p. xxv, 59, 51.

437 *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George Kennan*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1993.

Balkans torments Europe and the conscience of the international community".[438] The writer of the introduction, George Kennan, stressed that in order to understand the causes of the wars of the 1990s, it is necessary to examine the civilisational roots of the conflict which go back even to the Byzantine Empire. According to Kennan, the breakup of Yugoslavia is the result of the "ancient hatreds" in "the Balkans" which were deeply rooted not only in the present but also in the past: "those roots reach back, not only into centuries of Turkish domination, but also into the Byzantine penetration of the Balkans even before that time".[439] The separation of the Balkans from Europe, in Kennan's view, had as a consequence its disconnection with the "three centuries of immensely significant development in the civilization of the remainder of the European continent".[440]

The main feature of this "new Balkan war" was "aggressive nationalism" that "drew on deeper traits of character inherited, presumably, from a distant tribal past: a tendency to view the outsider, generally, with dark suspicion, and to see the political-military opponent, in particular, as a fearful and implacable enemy to be rendered harmless only by total and unpitying destruction".[441] The "obvious" and "inescapable" similarities between Balkan wars at the beginning of the 20th century and the new "Balkan war" are, thus, according to Kennan, the result of the "Turkish domination", but also "of earlier ones as well", which continue to be present in today's "Balkans." The "ancient hatreds" are inherent to the Balkans' kind of civilisation and therefore do not require the "moral responsibility" of the "West" to intervene. In the words of Kennan, "it is clear that no one - no particular country and no group of countries - wants, or should be expected, to occupy the distracted Balkan region, to subdue its excited peoples and to bold them in order until they can calm down and begin to look at their problems in a more orderly way".[442] This portrayal of "the Balkans" evokes the echo of the Balkanization discourse, with the inferiority of "the Balkans" as radically different from the "West" and unable to change.

438 *Ibid.,* p. 1.
439 *Ibid.,* p. 9.
440 *Ibid.,* p. 13.
441 *Ibid.,* p. 11.
442 *Ibid.,* p. 14.

After the NATO intervention in 1995, the war is Bosnia and Herzegovina was stopped and followed by the Peace Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina the same year. The new context demanded an appropriate framework of future arrangements for "the Balkans". Therefore, in 1996 the second report was issued by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, with Leo Tindemans as the president of the Commission. In comparison to the previous reprint of the report with Kennan's introduction, this second report differs in some important aspects. First, it rejects "the ancient hatreds" and well as a "clash of civilizations" as the causes of the war and sees the legacy of communism and nationalism as well as the failed transition towards democracy as the main causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia. In other words, it rejects the cultural or religious differences in favor of non-ancient, modern political-nationalist differences.[443] Second, although the classical "understanding" of "the Balkans" in terms of violence and instability has been maintained, with a "thin veneer" of civilisation, the "moral duty" of the West is recognized, in order to transform chaotic and unpredictable Balkans of the past into a stable, peaceful, and dependable Southeastern Europe of the future".[444] Third, the Report identified the Bosnian War as the first serious debate concerning US and EU foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.[445] The Report underscores the tensions not only within the EU, but also between the US interests to preserve NATO and the EU's ambition to build its own security system. It states that "the first six months on the Yugoslav crisis coincided with the final stages of the negotiations of the Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union, involving complicated trade-offs on other sovereignty issues, as an ambivalent spirit of rivalry and common interest". According to the Report, "there were those who felt that precedents might be created by the way in which Europe acted in Yugoslavia that could affect the future institutional pattern".[446] Although "the West had the means to carry out its threat", the main reason why this had not been done

443 Lene Hansen, "Past as Preface: Civilizational Politics and the 'Third' Balkan War", *op. cit.,* p. 358.

444 Leo Tindemans, *Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans*, Aspen Institute&Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Berlin&Washington, 1996, p. 9.

445 Predrag Simić, "Balkans and Balkanization: Western Perceptions of the Balkans in the Carnegie Commission's Reports on the Balkan Wars from 1914 to 1996", *op. cit.,* p. 125.

446 Leo Tindemans, *Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans*, *op. cit.,* p. 58.

before 1995 was the "refusal of the leading international power to exert a credible threat of force much earlier in order to impose a settlement".[447] The Report stressed that the breakup of Yugoslavia was "nourished by the inability - some would say – unwillingness - of the major Western powers to prevent, mitigate, or terminate the bloodshed and destruction in its initial phases" and that "no state, statesman, or international institution responded with honour to this challenge".[448] Finally, the Report proposed some policy recommendations that will be implemented in the following years. It highlighted the necessity to encourage economic cooperation in the entire Balkan region, to support reconstruction and development, to remove obstacles to democratisation and to civil society building, but also to the control of arms and armed forces in the region.[449]

b. "The Balkans" as a threat to the EU

Bo Stråth stresses that "identity becomes a problem when there is no identity, particularly in situations of crisis and turbulence, when established ties of social cohesion are eroding or breaking down".[450] In the same vein, Ole Waever points out that "secure identity is a contradiction in terms".[451] A variety of others are present in the constitution of the identity of the self.[452] In what situation the others play a significant role in the identity formation? Identity is not a stable, unchangeable category, but a dynamic, contextual, flexible one. Consequently, the sameness and difference, as integral parts of identity, are also subject of change. The importance of the Other in the identity formation is thus not constant, but also variable. The significance of other in the identity formation is particularly strong in the early stages of identity formation, as well as in the time of social, political or economic crises

447 *Ibid.,* p. 74.

448 *Ibid.,* pp. 2-3.

449 Predrag Simić, "Balkans and Balkanization: Western Perceptions of the Balkans in the Carnegie Commission's Reports on the Balkan Wars from 1914 to 1996", *op. cit.,* p. 126.

450 Bo Stråth, "A European Identity. To the Historical Limits of a Concept", *op. cit.*, p. 387.

451 Ole Waever, "European Security Identities", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* vol. 34, n° 1, 1996, pp. 103-132, p. 115.

452 Pille Petersoo, "Reconsidering otherness: constructing Estonian identity", *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 13, n° 1, 2007, pp. 117-133; Anna Triandafyllidou, "National identity and the 'other'", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 21, n° 4, 1998, pp. 593-612; Charlotte Epstein, "Who speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in international politics", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 17, n° 2, 2011, pp. 327-350.

during which the identity is put in question.[453] The Other becomes a powerful tool for the transition towards a new identity, because the Uses of the Other underline the uniqueness of the group and transform its identity in "ways that make it relevant under a new set of circumstances".[454]

After the end of the Cold War and the creation of the European Union, defining "European identity" has become the challenging task in the context of new developments of the international security. The newly signed EU Maastricht Treaty made a reference to the goal of "reinforcing European identity and its independence in order to promote security and progress in Europe and in the world". The quest for the EU-self also went hand in hand with a redefinition of its Others. The process of EU enlargement has been accompanied by an explosion of "uses" of the term "Europe" and "anxiety" for the parts of different regions over their belonging. A new foreign policy discourse emerged in terms of the spatio-temporal narrative of "Europe whole and free", i.e. on the double responsibility of the EU on the European continent, as politically responsible for the eastern and southern parts of the continent but also as an entity responsible for the peaceful integration of all its countries. Within this image of the EU, "the Balkans" occupied a particular "position" as the EU's external Other. "The Balkans" was the incarnation of the violent fragmentation of the past *versus* the EU which represented the peaceful integration of the future. Hence, "the Balkans" became a "powder keg", i.e. a source of instability, a threat to the outside world and to "Europe" as a whole, a "danger zone of Europe.[455] "The Balkans" as the EU's Other was not only qualified as inferior vis-à-vis the superiority of the EU, but also as radically different from the EU. It became an "existential threat". How did the discourse on the EU as a "community of values" render "the Balkans" as a "danger", as "an existential threat"?

Not long after the breakup of the Soviet Union, in his address before the European Parliament, Jacques Poos, who held presidency of the Council of the EU, declared that "Europe has at last

453 Göran Therborn, *European modernity and beyond: The trajectory of European societies 1945–2000*, SAGE, London, 1995.

454 Anna Triandafyllidou, "National identity and the 'other'", *op. cit.,* p. 603.

455 Andrew Hammond, "'The danger zone of Europe': the balkanism between the Cold War and 9/11", *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, vol. 8, n° 2, 2005, pp. 135-154.

been restored to its *natural* unity".[456] This statement was soon followed by various statements by other EC/EU representatives who portrayed the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia and the civil war which ensued as a threat affecting the stability of Europe as a whole. "This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of Americans", declared Jacques Poos. He further stated that "the Community, like a *living organism*, will continue to develop over the years, meeting the new challenges awaiting it".[457]

Initially, the Community was in favour of maintaining Yugoslav unity, asserting that "a united and democratic Yugoslavia has the best chance of integrating harmoniously into the *new Europe*".[458] However, the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia ended any hope of comprehensive negotiations and a peaceful settlement of the crisis. The EC Twelve intended to manage the breakup of Yugoslavia through diplomatic mediation with the aim of restoring conditions for a peaceful coexistence between the conflicting components of the Yugoslav Federation. These first steps taken by the Twelve in the framework of the European political cooperation (EPC) were aimed at achieving a ceasefire and a moratorium, as well as the deployment of a group of observers, under the name of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM).[459] The EC Declaration on Yugoslavia released in August 1991 expressed a strong interest in the peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav conflict, "not only for the sake of Yugoslavia itself and its constituent peoples, but *for Europe as a whole*".[460]. The Troika system went to Belgrade to obtain a ceasefire and a three-month moratorium on the independence issue. Its activity culminated with the conclusion of the Brioni agreements, followed by an annexed agreement to

456 Pierre Bourdieu pointed out that "every established order tends to produce (...) the *naturalization* of its own arbitrariness" - quoted in Milica Bakić-Hayden, Robert Hayden, "Orientalist Variations on the Theme "Balkans": Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics", *op. cit.*, p. 3.

457 Jacques Poos, Statement Concerning the Programme of the Luxembourg Presidency, 1991, quoted in Mika Luoma-Aho, "Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism: A Pathology of the Balkans in European Security Discourse", *Geopolitics*, vol.7, n° 3, 2002, pp.117-142, p. 126.

458 La déclaration adoptée le 26 mars 1991 dans le cadre de la coopération politique européenne, *Bulletin des Communautés européennes*, n° 3, 1991, p. 78.

459 It was a verification mission whose objective was to monitor tensions between the parties in the conflict. It gradually became regular practice of the European Union in the framework of the CSDP. For example, in 2003 the European Union carried out an observer mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

460 Declaration on Yugoslavia, European Political Cooperation Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 27 August 1991.

set up a mission of 40 observers to monitor the implementation of the Brioni agreements. However, the beginning of the conflict in Croatia marked the failure of the mediation efforts. The European Community retained its mediation tasks during 1991 and 1992, mainly by convening a peace conference (Carrington Conference). At the outset of hostilities in Bosnia, the European Union's activity was marked by close cooperation with the UN in the framework of the Peace Conference (Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg). From the beginning of 1994, the European Union handed over the baton to the Contact Group and NATO.[461] In the words of Hans van den Broek, the former European Commissioner,

> "The Yugoslav crisis caught us all well and truly on the hop, and what means we did have at our disposal remained for a large part unused. One of the reasons for this was that, after forty-five years of relative stability, governments no longer *believed that armed conflict was possible on the continent* (...) Changing circumstances have created a need for new political and strategic thinking. This is a tall order, especially as the Community is already preoccupied with giving real meaning to the "deepening" of European integration".[462]

Van Den Broek's statement confirms the power of the narrative representing the EC/EU as a peace project. The image of the EC "born from ashes" as a "Community of Equals" providing the long-standing peace among yesterday's enemies proved to be an efficient instrument of generation of a "European" collective identity. The EC was the reincarnation of an area of peace, harmony and the disappearance of historical divisions and cooperation between nation-states. At the same time, the EC foundational narrative[463] represented the birth of the union in opposition to the nation-states in the international system, as a radical break with the past based on war and nationalism which was seen as a basis for governing and for relations between the states. The EC/EU was constructed as a place of "order" after "chaos" represented in terms of hyper nationalism of the interwar period and World War II. It was por-

461 Dejana Vukčević, "Les faiblesses de l'Union européenne en tant qu'acteur international dans la guerre en ex-Yougoslavie", *Kultura Polisa*, n° 19, 2012, pp. 111-125.

462 Speech by Hans Van Den Broek at the Opening of the Academic Year at the Royal Higher Defence Institute: 'Security in Uncertain Times', Brussels, 16 September 1993, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_93_93

463 Cf. Vincent Della Sala, "Narrating Europe: the EU's ontological security dilemma", *op. cit.*

trayed as a project aiming to overcome the fragmentation and difference that ultimately caused bloody and violent conflicts.[464] The post-war EC was discursively constructed as opposed to the vision of political power entrusted in the sovereign nation-state, with hard borders defining its territory and its population. Hence, destructive nationalism, aggression and war become unthinkable, and nobody, as Van Den Broek stated, "believed that armed conflict was possible on the continent". The EC as a "peace project" was transformed after the Cold War into the EU as a "peace promoter" which would help to overcome the division of "Europe" and to contribute to peace and stability throughout the continent, having moral prerogatives to organise the space beyond its borders and to spread "European values" outside.

As David Campbell argues, construction of the other can be seen as a means to contain an ontological need for a secure self-concept.[465] Ontological security "refers to the efforts of an actor to safeguard the survival or persistence of a sense of self in contexts of recurrent uncertainty".[466] As outlined in the first part of the book, references to European peace and security were gradually embedded in the self-representation of the EU as a "community of values". On this basis, concrete policy steps for enlargement were undertaken, but also at the same time security-based justifications become discursively connected with enlargement. In other words, the enlargement process gradually became securitized in the discourse.[467] Enlargement was portrayed as a means to contribute to peace, security and stability on the European continent. Hence, "security arguments" became a powerful tool in justifying the enlargement process. The post-Cold War discourse strongly advocated and promoted integration as a means to prevent the dangerous return to a "fragmented Europe". However, the process of integration gradually became an aim in itself and an explicit connection between security and integration was constructed.

464 Cf. Stefan Borg, "European integration and the problem of the state: universality, particularity, and exemplarity in the crafting of the European Union", *op. cit.,* p. 351.

465 David Campbell, *National Deconstruction. Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998, p. 6.

466 Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, "The EU's ontological (in)security: Stabilizing the ENP area... and the EU-self?", *op. cit.*, p. 2.

467 Cf. Henrik Larsen, "Concepts of Security in the European Union After the Cold War", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 54, n° 3, 2000, pp. 337-355, p. 342.

Wars and conflicts in the past and in present were presented as an "existential threat" for the entire European continent and the EU enlargement was a means to avoid this "threat".

"The Balkans" represented the antithesis of peace and the obstacle to European integration and more specifically to the EU enlargement process. With its political instability, warlike, irrational nature and generally, its "culture of violence", it contrasted the idea of the "peaceful" and "rational" EU. The civil war in Yugoslavia was the reincarnation of a "specific sort" of nationalism, conceptualised in more or less explicitly pathological terms (malignant, aggressive, ugly hypernationalism, extreme, xenophobic, blind, etc) and identified in terms of a "disease" that can threaten the "life" of the "whole Europe".[468] At the same time, the imaginary dividing line between "the progressive west" and the "reactionary east" was revived: "the distinction between the two kinds of nationalism seemed vindicated by the violent explosion of extreme nationalist energies in the Balkans: the former Yugoslavia became everyone's 'eastern Europe'".[469] This dividing line echoes the distinction of nationalism in its "Western" and "Eastern" form, widely used in the nationalism studies.[470] It recalls the distinction between the political and cultural forms of nationalism. Western nationalism is a product of Enlightenment, of the age of reason, ideas of liberty and equality, it is political, civic, rational, progressive and modern, based on the concept of a civic nation that is constituted by a rational association of people and therefore benign in nature. In contrast, Eastern nationalism emerged as a reaction to the Enlightenment and is defined as cultural, i.e. as based on ethnicity and culture and therefore tends to be more xenophobic,

468 Mika Luoma-Aho, "Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism: A Pathology of the Balkans in European Security Discourse", *op. cit.,* p. 128.

469 Stefan Auer, "'New Europe': Between Cosmopolitan Dream and Nationalist Nightmares", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 48, n° 5, 2010, pp. 1163-1184, p. 1166.

470 Cf. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism. A Study in its Origins and Background*, Macmillan Company, New York, 1944; Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*. Princeton University, Princeton Press, 1970; George Schöpflin, "Nationalism and Ethinicy in Europe, East and West", in Charles Kupchan, (ed.), *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1995, pp. 37-65; John Plamenatz, "Two Types of Nationalism", in E. Kamenka (ed.), *Nationalism. The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, Edward Arnold, London, 1973, pp. 24-36; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Blackwell, London, 1983; Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging. Journey into the New Nationalism*, BBC Books, Chatto & Windus, London, 1993, Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

illiberal, emotional and aggressive. In other words, unlike "western nationalism", the "eastern" form of nationalism looked "elsewhere for its justification, finding it not in reason but in emotion, not in the present but in the past, turning inwards, to the imagination, to tradition, to history and to nature".[471] The distinction is not merely geographical: it recalls the discourse of the "West and the Rest" with value-laden assumptions that support the use of the concepts of inferiority and backwardness.

After the Cold War, the "western/eastern" dichotomy in nationalism was revived by Zbigniew Brzezinski through his identification of "Europe's" "vulnerability" to nationalism.[472] Brzezinski discussed the potential dangers related to the collapse of communism and the rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe. According to him, the problem of nationalism also exists in the West, but the nationalisms in the East "tend to be more volatile, more emotional and more intense than those in the west".[473] Being "qualitatively different" from the nationalism in Western Europe, the nationalism emerging in Eastern Europe in general was qualified as "radical and dangerously irrational", with the capability to "transform benign ethnicity to a belligerent political ideology" connected with totalitarianism and xenophobia.[474] The nationalism in Eastern Europe is, according to Brzezinski, "historically immature", and linked with "unsatisfied territorial desires", "national antagonisms", and the lack of tempering experience of genuine regional cooperation that in recent decades has emerged in Western Europe.[475] In a similar vein, John Mearsheimer wrote about the danger of "ugly hyper nationalism" which could invoke a conflict that could escalate to include the whole Europe after the end of the bipolar balance of power and its replacement by multipolar instability.[476] He distinguished a "benevolent" nationalism contrasting the "malevolent" nationalism. According to Mearsheimer, "nationalists often believe

471 Philip Spencer, Howard Wollman, "Good and bad nationalisms: a critique of dualism", *Journal of Political Ideology*, vol. 3, n° 3, 1998, pp. 255-274, 260.

472 Mika Luoma-Aho, "Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism: A Pathology of the Balkans in European Security Discourse", *op. cit.,* p. 128.

473 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, n° 5, 1989, pp. 1-25, p. 4.

474 *Ibid.,* p. 16.

475 *Ibid.,* p. 4.

476 John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, vol. 15, n° 1, 1990, pp, 5-56, p. 21.

that their nation is unique or special, this conclusion does not necessarily mean that they think they are superior to other peoples, merely they take pride in their own nation".[477] This form of benevolent nationalism can easily turn into the malevolent nationalism that arises from the belief that the other nation-states are both inferior and threatening. This kind of nationalism is most likely to develop under military systems that require reliance on mass armies.[478]

The "specter" of nationalism was haunting "the Balkans": it was the incarnation of the violent fragmentation of the past versus the EC/EU which represented the peaceful integration of the future. The EU was constructed as a "rescuer" that will "heal" the "aggressive" nationalism in the Balkans with the "integration therapy". Therefore, the EU had a "historical" and "moral" obligation to present the opportunity to consolidate peace and create the basis for progress across the entire continent. Wars and conflicts in the past and in present become "existential threats" for the entire continent and they could only be avoided by the advancement of the process of enlargement. Therefore, the "securitizing moves" provided justifications and legitimations for the enlargement-related decisions concerning "the Balkans". In the words of the former Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn:

> "The EU has progressively extended its zone of peace and democracy across the European continent (...) Enlargement is a matter of *extending the zone of European values*, the most fundamental of which are liberty and solidarity, tolerance and human rights, democracy and the rule of law".[479]

According to Bahar Rumelili, resistance of the Other makes the identity of the self more insecure.[480] In this situation, the behavioral relationship between the self and other is marked by representations of threat and danger, and the self tries to secure its identity.[481] The initial resistance, i.e. non-recognition of the EU-self by the Balkans-Other led to the insecurity of the EU-self as a "community of values". Instead of the "Europeanization" of the Balkans, ethnic

477 *Ibid*.

478 *Ibid*.

479 Olli Rehn, "Values define Europe, not borders", *op. cit*.

480 Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding EU's Mode of Differentiation", *op. cit.,* p. 38.

481 *Ibid*.

and territorial conflicts in the region threatened to "balkanize" Europe and brought NATO back on the European stage.[482]

Hence, the failure of the EU to "Europeanize" the Balkans led to the segregation of the region. The malignant "blind" and "destructive" nationalism in "the Balkans"[483], being "bad", "irrational" and "uncivilized" became a threat to the world of reason, represented by the EU. As a "*living organism*", in the words of Jacques Poos, the EU was represented as a "healthy" entity which stands for liberal values, democracy, free trade, particularism of European culture and civilisation. Therefore, the civil war in Yugoslavia was represented in terms of a "disease" that threatens the "life" of the EU as a personification of the "whole Europe". The health/disease dichotomy involves the normal/pathological dichotomy.[484] As David Campbell suggests, bipolarity normal/pathological presenting a clear distinction between health and disease, although represented in medical terms, is largely animated by moral concerns.[485] Therefore, "by constituting the disease as the 'barbarian' within, and by producing a discourse which is taken in some contexts to impute guilt, prescribe punishment, and incite violence, the figurative nature of medical discourse has consequences for clinical practice".[486] In this context, notes Campbell, the so-called "ethical power of segregation" is linked to the foreign policy discourse, "whereby moral distinctions can be made through spatial and temporal delineations, such that a "geography of evil" is constituted, so that dangers can be calculated as originating from distinct and distant places".[487] In other words, as Michael Shapiro points out, the medical discourse has had a historical role in creating what human body is, and these creations "have been complicit with social-control mechanisms linked to power and authority".[488]

482 Predrag Simić, "Do the Balkans Exist?", in Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (ed.), *The Southern Balkans: Perspectives from the Region, Chaillot Paper*, 46, 2001, pp. 17-33, p. 22.

483 Olli Rehn, "The Balkans, Europe and Reconciliation", Debate in Sarajevo University, Sarajevo, 11 July 2005, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_05_434

484 Mika Luoma-Aho, "Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism: A Pathology of the Balkans in European Security Discourse", *op. cit.,* p. 123, 131.

485 David Campbell, *Writing Security, op. cit*., p. 96.

486 *Ibid*.

487 *Ibid.,* p. 99.

488 Michael J Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation. Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis, op. cit.,* p. 10.

Hence, two spaces have been discursively constructed, one that was democratic, peaceful and secure and the other that was dangerous, threatening and authoritarian. By the inclusion/exclusion binary, the cohesion within the EU ("inside") and at the same time the differentiation from the opposite Balkans ("outside") was rendered possible. The symbolic spatial bordering enabled the constitution of the EU's normative order ("domestic") as a place of governance and upholding of the EU values, in opposition to the "threatening stranger" that violated these values ("foreign"). As stated by the Commissioner Olli Rehn:

> "*Inside the borders* of the European Union we have achieved an era of deep peace, based on law and institutions. In its domestic life, the European Union is a very concrete application of the idea of a peaceful system of international relations outlined in the classic essay of Immanuel Kant on perpetual peace, which imagined a brotherhood of republican democracies which never go to war against one other. But *outside the EU's borders*, even in our immediate neighborhood to the South-East and East, there is no such perpetual peace. It may not be an outright Hobbesian world where the law of the jungle and the survival of the fittest prevail-at least if we bypass the *Balkan wars of the 1990s*".[489]

Rehn's statement is a good example of complexity and contradiction in temporal/spatial othering relation. It shows that, paradoxically, the successful temporal othering created an ideal EU self, that enabled exclusionary practices in relation to strictly defined others. The EU, portrayed as an entity which stands for liberal values, democracy, free trade, "particularism" of European culture and civilisation, was constructed as a successful peace project, which gave it "higher moral ground" against others that remained stuck in the past that the EU has escaped.[490] The construction of an ideal EU-self enabled the EU to legitimise its spatial othering, i.e. the sharp distinction between inside and outside. Accordingly, the spatial othering was a direct result of the successful temporal othering. By the process of integration, the EU gradually became

489 Olli Rehn, "Europe's smart power in its region and the world", *op. cit.,* pp. 4-5.

490 Cf. Sergei Prozorov, "What is the Other of Europe?", in Susanna Lindberg, Mika Ojakangas, Sergei Prozorov (eds.), *Europe Beyond Universalism and Particularism*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, New York, 2014, pp. 135-161.

the personification of "Europe" and the framing of the *European identity* became the framing of the *EU identity* through the power of inclusion and exclusion, i.e. by the inscription of boundaries in order to demarcate an "inside" from an "outside", or "domestic" from "foreign":

> "*Borders* limit our minds and reduce our influence. *Frontiers* open new avenues and increase our influence. Frontiers are much more substantive, functional and innovative – even mental – than geographical (...) EU is defined by its values more than by sheer geography, especially in the East and Southeast".[491]

Inside/outside dichotomy thus served to legitimate EU standards as world/universal standards, enabling to establish the membership rules for entry into "EU club" but also to justifying the choice of who to keep out (outside). An ideal EU Self enabled representing the difference of the Other in terms of discourses focusing on perceptions of "fear" and "danger" followed by exclusionary practices in relation to others. According to the former EU foreign policy official Carl Bildt:

> "To achieve any progress toward self-sustaining stability in the Balkans, regional leaders must abandon their preoccupations with *nineteenth-century concepts of nation-states and borders* and embrace the concept of transnational integration that will shape Europe in the twenty-first century. Today the region's fundamental choice is between integration and disintegration - which, over time, might well mean a choice between peace and war".[492]

This statement reflects the "or/or" model in EU foreign policy discourse towards "the Balkans", which is embodied in the peace/war, integration/disintegration, unity/disunity, Balkanization/Europeanization binary. To be "Europeanized" means to move closer to the EU, to adopt its political and legal standards with the goal to become EU member. To "Balkanize" means to be "non-European". Europeanization/Balkanization binary enables the EU to be

491 Olli Rehn, "Europe's Next Frontiers", Lecture at the Foreign Affairs Association, Munich, 20 October 2006, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_06_626

492 Carl Bildt, "A Second Chance in the Balkans", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, n° 1, 2001, pp. 148-158, p. 155.

presented as a sole bearer of the standards of "Europeanness".[493] As stated by Bildt, "now the region's fundamental choice is between becoming *even more Balkan*, in the worst sense of the word, and *becoming more European*, in the best sense of the word".[494] According to him, "the "*endemic conflict*" in the Balkans", is "now held in check by a quarter of a million NATO-led soldiers committed to the region. If the troops were withdrawn today, however, a *new war would break out tomorrow*".[495] Hence, the conflict in the Balkans is "endemic", i.e. inherent to the "character of the Balkans". In other words, if someone is "Balkan", they are characterised by violence, aggressivity and vice versa.[496] Hence, the difference is constructed as deriving from inherent characteristics, i.e. the other is constructed as non-self, with no possibility to change.[497]

"The Balkans" thus became the "*frontier* region", a symbolic feature that transcended its immediately visible features and represented an instrument of power of the EU which created a space of exclusion and inclusion.[498] In spatial terms, "the Balkans" was located outside the "European" space. In temporal terms, "the Balkans" was essentialised: it was barbaric and backward, and therefore unable to transform. Thus, the EU securitised its external borders and positioned "the Balkans" as non-European and therefore as a threat to its inside. A paradox is therefore present in the EU foreign policy discourse. On the one hand, the EU's internal borders have progressively become "soft". On the other, its external borders became "hard" with the aim to differentiate "the Europeanness" from the "Rest" and to securitize external borders because "the first line of defence is abroad".[499]

493 Cf. Dimitar Bechev, *Constructing South East Europe: The Politics of Balkan Regional Cooperation*, Palgrave Macmillan, Besingstoke, 2011, p. 75.

494 Carl Bildt, "A Second Chance in the Balkans", *op. cit.,* p. 158.

495 *Ibid.,* p. 149.

496 Cf. Pål Kolstø, "'Western Balkans as the New Balkans: Regional Names as Tools for Stigmatization and Exclusion", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1219979, p. 6.

497 Cf. Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding EU's Mode of Differentiation", *op. cit.,* p. 37.

498 Cf. Emilio Cocco, "Where is the European frontier? The Balkan migration crisis and its impact on relations between the EU and the Western Balkans", *European View*, vol. 16, 2017, pp. 293-302, p. 294.

499 Cf. European Security Strategy, *A Secure Europe for a better World, op.cit*.

2. THE WESTERN BALKANS AS EU'S OTHER

In this chapter, we analyse how the Western Balkans was "discovered" (a) and how the Western Balkans was constructed in two basic discourses, the EU as a "community of values" and the EU as a "global actor" (b, c). We argue that, as opposed to the Balkans, the Western Balkans has been constructed as an ambiguous, liminal EU's Other, less-anti-Self, i.e. non-radical Other. At the same time, this relationship between the EU-Self and Western Balkans-Other reveals the different forms of non-radical otherness. On the one hand, though the introduction of the security/development linkage, the Western Balkans is represented as a "victim of the past", an underdeveloped version of the EU-Self. On the other, through internal/external security linkage, the Western Balkans is represented as potentially "threatening" to the stability and security of the EU.

a. The "discovery" of the Western Balkans

> "As much as anywhere in Europe, the recent history of the *western* Balkans has been written in blood. From its role in igniting the First World War, via the occupation and resistance of World War II, and to the battles and *barbarity* that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia, the people of the region have suffered enough".
>
> "Today's Europe — indeed, much of today's world — is untidy. We have multiple identities that do not always fit easily into simple 19th-century notions of the nation state. One of the great challenges in so many of today's disputes is to acknowledge the untidiness and ***help*** people with ***different identities*** to find ways to share the same space in a spirit of mutual respect. Then we have a chance to grasp the real prize: the celebration of our glorious diversity".
>
> "For the past hundred years the western Balkans have been known as a cradle of war. From now on, may it be known as a cradle of peace".[500]

500 Catherine Ashton, "A different Balkan Story", *The New York Times*, 25 April 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/opinion/global/Ashton-Normalizing-Relations-Between-Kosovo-and-Serbia.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0

This quote from Catherine Ashton's article in *The New York Times*, named "A different Balkan story", deserves some considerations. First, it introduces the adjective "western" before "the Balkans". A history of the *western* Balkans emerges while the history of the Balkans seems to "vanish". Second, the history of the Western Balkans "for the past hundred years" has been "written in blood", and is described in terms of "battles and barbarity". Third, "Europe" is ready to help people "with different identities" in a "spirit of mutual respect". Therefore, "today's Europe" is ready to accept difference, not to negate it. Today's Europe will be characterized by its "glorious diversity".

At the same time, however, Catherine Ashton's words raise some questions. What is the Western Balkans? Is there a correlation between the Balkans and the Western Balkans? And how do we know all that we know about the Western Balkans? As we have seen in the previous chapter, "the Balkans" has been discursively constructed as a threat, i.e. as the radically different Other. It threatened the process of integration with fragmentation. It threatened to revive the EU's own past. Therefore, the Balkans was primarily constructed not as less of an EU-self, but as an anti EU-self. It represented a reincarnation of the "bad past" that the EU overcame. At the same time, the narrative identities balance between a sense of continuity, i.e. as to be recognizable through time and a sense of change, i.e. to acknowledge change.[501] Thus, they include breaks and beginnings. A break with the past also means a new beginning in the present that can reach into the future.

Roxanne Doty argues that classification is an important rhetorical strategy which serves to naturalize by placing human beings into the categories in which they "naturally" belong.[502] Classification creates hierarchies and stereotypes, "quick and easy image without the responsibility".[503] Therefore, "the Balkans" has been classified as "naturally" conflictual and barbaric. The "brutal conflicts" in "the Balkans" have shown that lasting peace in Europe would come only through the unification of "Europe".

501 Jan Ifversen, Christoffer Kølvraa, "European Neighbourhood Policy as Identity Politics", *op. cit.,* p. 9.

502 Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters. The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations, op. cit.,* p. 11.

503 *Ibid.*

Wars and conflicts can only be overcome by the progress of the enlargement process. This discourse provided justifications and legitimations for enlargement-related decisions concerning "the Balkans". As Bahar Rumelili stresses, while resistance makes the identity of the self more insecure, the recognition by the other takes the form of acknowledging self's superiority and aspiring to become like self.[504] In the case of "the Balkans", its incapacity to conceive of itself in other terms than from the point of view of the dominating other[505] progressively led to the internalisation of the negative representations in the process of self-identification. This was followed by the acceptance of the idea of inferiority while denying at the same time being part of it. This process, which Milica Bakić-Hayden called "nesting orientalisms"[506], emerged at first as an expression of discursively constructed differences among the former Yugoslav countries but also spread to other countries of the region. Therefore, "the Balkans" became a "repository" of discursive patterns available to the countries of the region marked with the EU stigma to produce the discourse of otherness through the dichotomy Europeanness/Balkanness.[507] Thus, "nesting orientalisms" led not only to "orientalization" of the "other", but also to "occidentalization" of the countries of the Balkans, presenting themselves as the "West" of the "other".

Hence, the new context of the post-Dayton era demanded the new representation of "the Balkans" in a new "reality". The deconstruction of "the Balkans" was followed by its transformation into a regional formation. From 1996 onwards, by inclusion of "the Balkans" in the Regional approach, the EU aimed to transform the Balkans in a "European" manner" within the framework of regional cooperation and integration. Comprising five states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM and Yugoslavia), the Regional approach's aim was to ensure peace and stability in the region and to stimulate the economic reconstruction of the region *via* the approval of autonomous trade preferences, the granting of

504 Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU's mode of differentiation", *op. cit.,* p. 38.

505 Cf. Rastko Močnik, "The Balkans as an Element in Ideological Mechanisms", in Dušan Bjelić, Obrad Savić (eds.), *Balkan as Metaphor. Between Globalization and Fragmentation,* The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002, pp. 79-116, p. 95.

506 Milica Bakić- Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The case of former Yugoslavia", *op. cit.*

507 Tanja Petrović, "Europe's New Colonialisms", *Belgrade Journal of Media and Communications,* vol. , n° 4, 2013, pp. 111-128, p. 115.

financial assistance and the conclusion of various forms of bilateral agreements.[508] In this new representation, "the Balkans" ceased to be portrayed as a space with a negative and threatening connotation, an antipode to "European values", associated with violence, chaos and authoritarian regimes. Accordingly, the term "the Balkans" has been replaced by the term "South-Eastern Europe", invented in order to denote countries affected by ethnic conflicts in a neutral, non-political and non-ideological manner.[509] The EU's Regional Approach was constructed to regulate relations with "South-Eastern Europe" differently in comparison to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The emphasis was placed on "negative conditionality", i.e. limited contractual relations and the absence of association agreements.[510]

The "Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe" was the next step in EU-identity building towards the region of "South-Eastern Europe". It replaced the Regional Approach in 1998 and, together with the five abovementioned countries, also included Romania and Bulgaria. According to the Council Common Position on Stability Pact, the objective of the Pact was to ensure "cooperation among its participants towards comprehensive measures for the long-term stabilisation, security, democratisation, and economic reconstruction and development of the region", and to establish "durable good-neighbourly relations among and between them and with the international community".[511] However, the Stability Pact did not establish any link between the political and economic progress of the countries and their future association with the EU. Moreover, this process involved not only countries from the former Yugoslavia, but also Bulgaria and Romania, which had already signed accession treaties and started negotiation processes. Although formally initiated by the European Union, under the framework of the CFSP, the implementation and further development of the Stability

508 Dejana Vukčević, "Srbija i pridruživanje Evropskoj uniji: značaj političkog dijaloga", in Momčilo Subotić, Živojin Đurić (eds.), *Srbija- politički i insitutcionalni izazovi*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2008, pp. 235-246.

509 Tanja Petrović, *A Long Way Home. Representations of the Western Balkans in Political and Media Discourses*, Mirovni Inštitut, Ljubljana, 2009, pp. 28-29.

510 Arolda Elbasani, "EU enlargement in the Western Balkans: strategies of borrowing and inventing", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online*, vol. 10, n° 3, 2008, pp. 293-307, p. 296.

511 Common Position of 17 May 1999 adopted by the Council on the basis of the Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning a Stability Pact for South- Eastern Europe (1999/345/CFSP), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L133/1, 28.5.1999, article 1.2.

Pact took place within the OSCE.[512] However, at the same time, the Common Position 1999/345/CFSP made a reference to the "new kind of contractual relationship", "perspective of EU integration" that will mark the future of EU-Southeastern Europe relations:

> "The European Union will draw the region closer to the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures through *a new kind of contractual relationship*, taking into account the individual situation of each country, with a *perspective of European Union membership* on the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam and once the Copenhagen criteria have been met".[513]

However, while promoting regionalism, the EU had at the same time differentiated Romania and Bulgaria from other Balkan countries within the Regional Approach and Stability Pact by granting them associated status and promising membership in 1993.[514] Hence, with the power of exclusion and inclusion, the EU has drawn and redrawn the new boundaries, simultaneously excluding and including the countries from the region of "South-East Europe". Romania and Bulgaria became "Balkan fugitives" with their discursive exit from the label "South-East Europe". At the same time, the EU construction of the new region needed a redefinition and renegotiation of the EU-self. In other words, it was not only a necessity for South Eastern Europe to change/reform in order to become like the EU-self, but also for the EU to change/enlarge its perception of "we" in order to incorporate the particularity of "the Balkans".[515] As Iver Neumann states, "any identity is "ultimately" doomed to give up the ghost".[516] The narratives that uphold a certain identity must be credible and constantly reformulated to fit new situations affecting the Self.[517] New contexts demand the redefinition of the Self-Other constructions and relations. In other words, ontological security is not simply "a

512 Dejana Vukčević, "Srbija i pridruživanje Evropskoj uniji: značaj političkog dijaloga", *op. cit.*

513 Common Position 1999/345/CFSP, point 7.

514 Dimitar Bechev, "Contested borders, contested identity: the case of regionalism in Southeast Europe", *op. cit.,* p. 91.

515 Nikolaos Tzifakis, "EU's region-building and boundary-drawing policies: the European approach to the Southern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online*, vol. 9, n° 1, 2007, pp. 47-64, p. 59.

516 Iver Neumann, *Uses of the Other. The 'East' in European Identity Formation, op. cit.,* p. 213.

517 *Ibid.,* pp. 218-219.

question of stability, but also adaptability, i.e. "openness towards and the ability to cope with change".[518]

It is the EU's new approach, called the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), that signified the beginning of a way in which the EU constructed the Western Balkans.[519] This construction was followed by the invention of the label "Western Balkans" by the EU official foreign policy discourse. In the presidency conclusions from the Vienna European Council from 11-12 December 1998, the term "Western Balkans" was introduced to cover the countries of the ex-Yugoslavia without Slovenia, and including Albania, but without mentioning the "specificity" of the "region".[520] The Cologne European Council from June 1999 mentions for the first time the term "the Western Balkans" in order to designate it as a region. The Cologne Presidency conclusions, stating that

> "The European Council looks forward to adopting a Common Strategy on the *Western Balkans*, in accordance with the conclusions of the Vienna European Council, and invites the Council to continue to press ahead with the necessary preparations (...) Conscious of the exceptional effort that will have to be made to reconstruct *the region* following the end of the crisis and of the necessity to put in place rapidly the most appropriate measures, the European Council invites the Commission to elaborate proposals..."[521]

The terms "stabilisation" and "association" pointed to the twofold nature of the SAP. The stability of the entire region, which should be achieved through closer cooperation and strengthening good neighborly relations between countries, was a necessary condition for including these countries in the European integration process. In other words, the SAP is both bilateral and regional in nature, as its goal was not only to improve relations between the European Union and each country individually, but also to encourage regional cooperation between the countries of the region themselves.

518 Christopher S Browning, Pertti Joenniemi, "Ontological security, self-articulation and the securitization of identity", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 2016, pp. 1-17, DOI: 10.1177/0010836716653161, p. 2.

519 *Ibid.,* p. 58.

520 Vienna European Council, 11-12 December 1998, Presidency Conclusions, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/wie1_en.htm#13

521 Cologne European Council 3-4 June 1999, Presidency conclusions, *op. cit.,* point 69.

The SAP was represented as an improved and modified version of the previous regional approach and as a means to portray the foreign policy objectives towards the Western Balkans.[522] It comprised at the same time a "double conditionality" for the Western Balkans. In addition to the obligation to fulfill the general criteria, known as "Copenhagen criteria", laid down for the Central and Eastern European countries, specific criteria were foreseen for the Western Balkans that resulted from the legacy of wars ("political conditionality") and which were related to the full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, respect of human rights, the return of refugees and regional cooperation.[523] In order to fulfill this double obligation of the countries of the Western Balkans, the European Union devised three basic mechanisms within the SAP: the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), as well as their implementation; the introduction of autonomous trade measures and the financial assistance program. The "missing link" in the new EU approach was the question of future membership in the EU. The ambiguity of the potential membership was at first glance "resolved" by the European Council in Santa Maria de Feira in June 2000 which stated that the countries of the Western Balkans become "potential candidates for EU membership".[524] The "European perspective" of the Western Balkans was reaffirmed by the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003 which stated that "the EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the *European perspective* of the Western Balkan countries, which will become an *integral part of the EU*, once they meet the established criteria".[525]

Hence, since the 2003 Thessaloniki summit, the Western Balkans has had an irrevocable accession perspective with candidate status to be awarded once a certain number of conditions were met. The Western Balkans became a region in "transition", a region with a "European perspective" and with the opportunity to detach itself from "the Balkans". By virtue of symbolic power,

522 Irina Žarin, "EU Regional Approach to the Western Balkans- The Human Security Dimension", *Međunarodni problemi,* vol. LIX, n° 4, 2007, pp. 513-545, p. 518.

523 Duško Lopandić, *Regionalne inicijative u jugoistočnoj Evropi*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Evropski pokret u Srbiji, Beograd, 2001, p. 172.

524 European Council, Santa Maria de Feira, 19-20 June 2000, Presidency Conclusions, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/conclusions_of_the_santa_maria_da_feira_european_council_19_20_june_2000-en-042a8da3-def7-44ac-9011-130fed885052.html

525 European Council, Thessaloniki, 19-20 June 2003, Presidency Conclusions, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_03_3

a new region has been "mentally mapped". "The Balkans" has been reconstructed in a "western" manner which symbolized the possibility for the region to be transformed according to "Western" norms and to enter the "European club". However, in contrast to the label "South-Eastern Europe" which was associated with the term "Europe", the Western Balkans reflects the correlation between "the Balkans" and the "West". Accordingly, the Western Balkans was discursively constructed as being simultaneously close to and distant from the EU. Unlike "the Balkans", constructed as "chronically underdeveloped, politically fragmented, entangled in long-lasting tribal feuds and alien to European identity"[526], the Western Balkans was portrayed as the Other that had the potential to change and thus to become like the EU-self. In opposition to the "the Balkans", constructed on the "inherent" and "permanent" difference in relation to the EU-Self and therefore incapable of change, the Western Balkans was constructed on the "acquired difference", to use Bahar Rumelili's terminology[527], i.e. on the possibility to change and to become similar to the EU. The region represented the Other not as anti-EU Self or non-EU Self, but as a less-EU Self.

As Bahar Rumelili aptly notes, the EU enlargement continuously produces "sites of liminality around it".[528] The CEE countries found themselves in a liminal position between the "East" and "Europe", i.e. the EU. The Western Balkans is placed in a liminal position between "the Balkans" and the EU. Hence, a new form of Balkanist discourse emerges: the Western Balkans are placed in the situation "in-between", neither here (EU) nor there (Balkans), not excluded but not included either, as a region with a "European perspective" which has the opportunity to detach itself from the "traditionally barbaric region", but also region that is not yet "European". Its only alternative is the acceptance of "European values", while any other alternative would lead to the "retrograde politics of the past", to a "non-civilized", i.e. to the "barbaric Balkans".[529]

526 Nikolaos Tzifakis, "EU's region-building and boundary-drawing policies: the European approach to the Southern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans", *op. cit.,* pp. 58-59.

527 Cf. Bahar Rumelili, *Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia, op. cit*.

528 Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", *op. cit.,* p. 30.

529 Aleksandar Brkić, *Cultural policy frameworks. (Re)constructing national and supranational identities: The Balkans and the European Union,* European Cultural Foundation, Amsterdam, 2011,

Thus, the Western Balkans was constructed as a space "in between the opposites", "the third possibility, the transition between inside and outside, the "neither...nor" or the "as well as".[530] In spatial terms, the Western Balkans becomes a part of "Europe". Moreover, it becomes *the frontier* of today's "Europe". As the former High Representative for the CFSP and vice-president of the Commission Federica Mogherini stated:

> "Today, *this line* of the Maastricht treaty - ending the division of the European continent - has a name, and that is the *Western Balkans*. Europe will not be united as long as part of the Balkans will be out of our Union".[531]

In temporal terms, the Western Balkans is represented as inferior, but this inferiority is not based on radical difference, but rather on an "acquired" one, i.e. on the possibility to change. At the same time, the discursive construction of the EU as a space of "European values" is a bounded area with delimitations as to who is in and who is out, i.e. on the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy. Hence, the EU identity towards the "Western Balkans" has an inclusive aspect, i.e. the necessity to assimilate it in the EU. One the other hand, any country from the region that becomes member of the EU was no longer designated as "the Balkans".[532]

b. The EU as a "community of values" and the Western Balkans as the Other

The EU enlargement policy is important for the construction of the EU as a "community of values" for two reasons: first, the compliance of other actors with the norms promoted and spread by the EU is conditional upon a successful exercise of the EU as a "community of values" and second, it enables the construction of a particular identity of the EU.[533] The recognition by others enables

p. 71.

530 Bernhard Giesen, "Inbetweenness and Ambivalence", *The Oxford Handbook of Cultural Sociology*, 2012, pp. 788-804, p. 788.

531 Federica Mogherini's speech at the Conference "Thinking Europe Forward" on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Maastricht, Maastricht, 28 September 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/33162/federica-mogherinis-speech-conference-thinking-europe-forward-occasion-25th-anniversary-treaty_ga

532 Pål Kolstø, "'Western Balkans' as the New Balkans: Regional Names as Tools for Stigmatization and Exclusion", *op. cit.,* p. 2.

533 Thomas Diez, Ian Manners, "Reflecting on normative-power Europe", in F. Berenskoetter, MJ

the recognition of the discursive self-construction of the EU and legitimates its actions. Therefore, the discursive construction of the EU identity has an *inclusive* aspect, i.e. the necessity to assimilate others. On the other hand, the EU self-construction as a "community of values" is also *exclusive* in nature. This exclusive identity comprises distinctiveness of the EU in comparison to others and thus implies the creation of boundaries between the EU-Self and Other. It is the Other that delineates and defines the EU- Self. Therefore, the necessary difference is constructed through a variety of boundary drawing practices.[534]

By constructing the EU-Western Balkans relationship through the process of enlargement, with the aim of bringing the perspective of EU membership even closer, the EU has been portrayed as a successful transformative power, as a unique community of values, proved as effective in the case of "troubled" Western Balkans. By spreading its values through the process of enlargement, the EU constructed itself as a "role model" that encourages the Western Balkans to adopt the same values. The EU is represented as a hybrid, postmodern/post-Westphalian entity which has assured a sustainable peace inside its borders. In this representation, the Western Balkans has become part of "Europe" and part of the EU enlargement process. As stated by Federica Mogherini,

> "The Western Balkans is *part of Europe*: we share the same history, the same geography, the same cultural heritage and the *same* opportunities and challenges today and in the future. We have a *common* interest in working more and more closely together to guarantee to our people economic and social development, and security. This strategy shows the path that we have ahead of us: for all our six partners to overcome once and for all the past, for all of us together to make the process of the Western Balkans towards the European Union irreversible and keep reuniting the Continent".[535]

Williams (eds.), *Power in World Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2007, pp. 173-188.

534 Elisabeth De Zutter, "Normative power spotting: an ontological and methodological appraisal", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 17, n° 8, 2010, pp. 1106-1127, p.1112.

535 Comments of the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini, "Strategy for the Western Balkans: EU sets out new flagship initiatives and support for the reform-driven region", 6 February 2018, Strasbourg, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_561

In a similar vein, the former president of European Commission Barroso emphasizes the goal of the EU in the process of enlargement:

> "Our common goal is clear: We want to see the Western Balkan countries *to ultimately join* the European Union (...) This is the *right way* to defend the long term prosperity of all the citizens in *our European family* and also to *defend European stability*".[536]

These statements reveal some important features of the discursive construction of the EU-Western Balkans relationship. Primarily, they reveal how the difference in EU-Western Balkans relations has been constructed. It is stated that the EU-Western Balkans relations are characterised by the "same" history, geography and cultural heritage. At the same time, the Western Balkans is part of "Europe". Therefore, in the EU foreign policy discourse, the difference is treated either as exclusion (non-European), or as assimilation. Hence, otherness is reduced to sameness. The Western Balkans is "almost the same" as "we", i.e. the EU, but burdened with the "past". The "past" of the Western Balkans is often reiterated in the EU foreign policy discourse. It is about a part of Europe "where conflict and hatred continue to simmer".[537] The new region is represented as "troubled" and therefore potentially conflictual and instable. It was "high time", according to former Commissioner Olli Rehn, to leave "blind nationalism" behind and to choose "a European future".[538] There is no alternative for the Western Balkans but to comply with the values of the EU because "this is the right way". The irrevocable accession perspective as the "right way" is related to the successful self-transcendence of the EU from chaos, i.e. wars and conflicts, to an ideal of peace in the form of a community of values. As such, it has a "higher moral

536 European Commission, Press Release Database, Remarks by President Barroso following the Western Balkans Summit, Berlin, 28 August, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-574_en.htm

537 Speech by dr Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, "The Development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Role of the High Representative", Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, 30 March 2000, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/30.03.dublin.iea.doc.html

538 Speech by Mr. Olli Rehn, Member of the European Commission, responsible for enlargement, "The Balkans, Europe and Reconciliation", Debate in Sarajevo University, Sarajevo, 11 July 2005, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_05_434

ground" in relation to others, i.e. Western Balkans that remain(s) stuck in the violent and conflictual past. This discourse grants legitimacy to the process of conditionality towards the Western Balkans countries that seek closer relations with the EU. As already mentioned in the first part of the book, the mutual dependence between the EU and candidate countries is constructed in the EU self-representation. Thus, the EU is represented as a committed partner; it helps and guides candidates in order to achieve mutual benefits for both sides. In the case of the Western Balkans, it is stated that the two sides have *the same* opportunities and challenges "today and in the future" as well as "common interests". However, although the EU official discourse contains expressions like "joint commitment", "common interest in working more and more closely together", the conditionality in the EU enlargement policy represents an unequal relationship that impositions, pressures, controls and threatens.[539] It thus enables the superiority of the EU, an asymmetrical approach in the process of enlargement, which does not take into account the political, economic, cultural and social specificities of the "others", i.e. the Western Balkans. The EU places political criteria at the core of conditionality with their underlying non-negotiatiable status. In that sense, it subjects the candidates to a position of imitating the "European" subject. Thus, the EU-Western Balkans relationship in enlargement could be seen as subject-object rather than subject-subject relationship.

This superiority of the EU in enlargement is linked to the EU as "politically mature", and therefore in a position to define political conditionality, while the candidates lack maturity and therefore need the guidance and assistance from the EU on their path towards the EU membership. This is also the case with the Western Balkans. The mature/immature asymmetry in the EU-Western Balkans relationship refers to the representation of enlargement as reuniting the European family. The "European family" metaphor is frequently used in the EU enlargement discourse for the construction of the EU identity. On the one hand, this metaphor constructs the EU as a natural entity, with clear-cut boundaries and nothing in-between. Hence, it evokes the hierarchy between the

539 Oton Anastasakis, "The EU's political conditionality in the Western Balkans: towards a more pragmatic approach", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 8, n° 4, 2008, pp. 365-377, p. 366.

countries that are "naturally" "European" and those that are not originally part of "Europe". On the other hand, however, families are not merely natural but also social entities where the source of identification is not only the shared origin, but also the interaction within the social institution of family. In this case, boundaries are more open (adopted child, spouses marry), but still constructed in a restricted way.[540] In both cases, however, the family metaphor represents the EU enlargement in a hierarchical way and constructs the EU as a "community of values" as an exclusive project. This metaphor is often used in the case of CEE countries, constructed as part of the family to which they should *return*, and therefore these countries have claimed their "natural" right. In other words, only countries that are constructed as "naturally" European are part of the European family, while the others are denied that right. Therefore, the metaphor of the European family creates hierarchization of European states and at the same time enables the "paternalistic" approach of the EU, i.e. the parent/child dichotomy.[541]

Having a "European perspective", but not represented as "naturally" "European", the Western Balkans is positioned as an *adopted* child, and therefore needs the guidance from the parent (the EU) in order to one day become a member of the *European family*, i.e. not *return to* but *join* the European family. The Western Balkans-*adopted child* should behave responsibly and demonstrate that it obeys the guidance of the EU. Thus, self-discipline determines the quality of this relationship. The full commitment of the Western Balkans – the *adopted* child to reform and acceptance of the "European values" will be awarded by the opportunity to "deepen" its relations with the EU and to progress on its way towards joining the "European family". Conversely, the failure of "discipline", i.e. disobedience needs to be controllable in order to embrace the values on which the EU is based. This self-discipline of the Western Balkans is a recurrent item in the EU foreign policy discourse. It is thus stated that "the enlargement perspective of the Western Balkans is first and foremost in the hands of the countries

540 Rainer Hülsse, "Imagine the EU: the metaphorical construction of a supra-nationalist identity", *op. cit.*, pp. 406-407.

541 Cf. Tanja Petrović, *A Long Way Home. Representations of the Western Balkans in Political and Media Discourses, op. cit.*, pp. 39-40; Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters. The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-91.

themselves".[542] As for the EU, it "must remain credible, firm and fair, while upgrading its policies to better support the transformation process in the region". Hence, the parent/child dichotomy is even more reinforced by the "necessity" for the EU to be "fair" and "firm" in its relations with the Western Balkans.

In addition, as the Western Balkans is perceived as part of Europe, on its way to becoming a member of the European family, the EU has a special responsibility for spreading the EU values in the region. The Western Balkans should be given the prospect of accession due to the changes that the EU assistance will bring on this path. In this regard, the EU's responsibility towards the Western Balkans is crucial, because, according to Federica Mogherini, "it is the part of the world where *only us* really make a difference."[543] This "difference" resulting from the EU's involvement in the Western Balkans is also frequently highlighted by other Commission officials. The prospect of the Western Balkans' accession to the EU is viewed as the only solution for avoiding instability and the "retrograde politics of the past". It is the right, if not the "duty" of the EU to make this "troubled" region "European". As the former Commissioner for Enlargement Johannes Hahn put it, "it would be unwise and almost negligent to leave behind a vacuum that other international actors, whose values do not agree with ours, make use of".[544] Much in the same manner, the former Commission President Juncker noted the responsibility of the EU towards the Western Balkans by saying that "we must find unity when it comes to the Western Balkans and their future membership. Should we not, our immediate neighbourhood will be shaped by others".[545]

542 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans, COM (2018) 65 final, Strasbourg, 6.2.2018, p. 9, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf.

543 Federica Mogherini's speech at the Conference "Thinking Europe Forward" on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Maastricht, Maastricht, 28 September 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/33162/federica-mogherinis-speech-conference-thinking-europe-forward-occasion-25th-anniversary-treaty_ga

544 Johannes Hahn, "Europe in a volatile world - Exporting stability to its neighbourhood", Princeton University, 26 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/europe-volatile-world-exporting-stability-its-neighbourhood-speech-eu-commissioner-johannes-hahn_en

545 Jean-Claude Juncker, "State of the Union Address 2018", Strasbourg, 12 September 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-5808_en.htm.

David Campbell highlights the need for "rethinking the question of responsibility" because, he maintains, "there are no circumstances under which we could declare that it was not our concern".[546] In a similar manner, David Chandler notes that Other-regarding ethics in the following decade have recast the relations of Self and Other.[547] In Chandler's words, "it is 'fear *for* the Other' as much as 'fear *of* the Other' that is alleged to drive the foreign policy of ethics rather than interests".[548] In other words, the prevalent approach is that all problems are interrelated. Hence, poverty is related to human rights, vulnerability to instability, insecurity from conflicts to economic development and recovery, good governance to conflict prevention and development, etc. Chandler further notes:

"Rather that coercively highlighting particular examples, ethical projections of Western power have shifted to highlighting much more general problems, such as 'failed' and 'failing' states, poverty and exclusion. The Other has become generalized, less as a Schmittian threat, more as a generalized Lévinasian need; a need that is so great that no country can alone take the responsibility for acting upon this ethical imperative.[549]

Hence, Chandler concludes that "the Other-regarding ethics" appears to be increasingly influential in shaping "Western foreign policy", i.e. it represents an effective means to justify and legitimize the "power of regulation", especially where the power relations are clearly unequal.[550]

The ethical aims articulated in the merger of security, stability, development, human rights, rule of law, are also visible in the relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans. As a "community of values", the EU is constructed as having the ability to shape conceptions of "normal" in international relations. Therefore, the EU has been constructed as having a "mission civilisatrice/normalisatrice" towards the Western Balkans, i.e. the duty to help

546 David Campbell, *National Deconstruction. Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia*, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

547 David Chandler, "The Other-regarding ethics of the 'empire of denial'", in Volker Heins, David Chandler (eds.), *Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy*. *Pitfalls, possibilities and paradoxes*, Routledge, Abingdon, p.167.

548 *Ibid.,* p. 168.

549 *Ibid.,* p. 169.

550 *Ibid.,* p. 180.

the region to accept the "normal" norms of the EU and to protect the region from other international players with "uncivilised/ abnormal" norms. The EU is constructed as a bearer of democratic values which is followed by the particular mission of the EU as a "community of values": the mission of defence of the "European values" at home, inside the EU, but also mission of advancing theses values abroad, outside the EU.

The prominent discourse on the EU's responsibility towards the Western Balkans is related to a specific position that the region occupied in the EU's self-representation as a community of values. Although the EU reproduced many of the patterns from its previous enlargement experience encompassing Central and East Europe, some new aspects have been added to the political conditionality. As already mentioned, with the Copenhagen criteria, a new set of criteria was introduced for the Western Balkans to include post-conflict regional reconstruction, stabilisation and reform.[551] Apart from these criteria, the same model was applied as in the CEE countries, i.e. the EU transformative action model, with the perspective of membership at its centre.[552] However, when it comes to the Western Balkans, the conditionality is not linked to a clear and credible process of accession. As outlined by the SAP, priority is given to the stability of the region over integration. In the case of the CEE countries, the EU accession conditionality led to a process of transformation of the countries because "it made clear and explicit that it would lead to the successful conclusion of the accession negotiations for membership into the European Union".[553] Despite the difficulties in implementation of some criteria, the CEE countries undertook major reforms in all areas, because they had a "guaranteed" final destination during the accession process. In the case of the Western Balkans, this journey was not clear from the start of the accession process. It has been accompanied by uncertainty. The terms used in the EU's approach, like "integration", "association", "accession" neighbourhood", confirm this uncertainty. The region

551 Oton Anastasakis, "The EU's political conditionality in the Western Balkans: towards a more pragmatic approach", *op. cit.,* p. 368.

552 Cf. Maja Kovačević, "In the Bermuda Triangle? The European Union's Enlargement Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy and Unfinished States in the Western Balkans", *Serbian Political Thought*, vol. 3, n° 1, 2011, pp. 21-38, p. 28.

553 Oton Anastasakis, "The EU's political conditionality in the Western Balkans: towards a more pragmatic approach", *op. cit.,* p. 368.

has been officially acknowledged as part of "Europe" but at the same time, the "European path" of the countries will depend on "the dynamics within the region" and the EU itself. The Western Balkans has been given "the perspective of becoming EU members once they fulfil the necessary conditions". Although at first glance benevolent, given that all candidate countries were required to meet accession conditions, this wording represents a break with previous enlargements, bringing the need for more rigorous conditionality and greater emphasis on the EU's absorption capacity.[554] This approach was reinforced by the invention of the principle "fundamentals first" which articulates the "rigorous" conditionality vis-à-vis the Western Balkans. According to the wording of the European Commission's Enlargement Strategy from 2013, "the accession process today is more rigorous and comprehensive than in the past" and "reflects the evolution of EU policies as well as lessons learned from previous enlargements". In this regard, for the EU, "a *key lesson from the past* is the importance of addressing the fundamentals first", i.e. rule of law, respect for fundamental rights, the importance of strengthening democratic institutions, including public administration reform, economic governance, and early resolution of bilateral issues.[555] The "fundamentals first" principle marks a discursive shift in the EU enlargement policy. In the previous enlargement negotiations processes, the political criteria were opened in the later phase of the process", having as a consequence their premature closure "within the context of the political pressure to finalize the negotiation process".[556] For the Western Balkans, the "fundamental first" signified that the reform in these areas must be handled from the beginning of the negotiations. Therefore, the discursive shift in the process was accompanied by a new meaning of the enlargement in the EU vocabulary: enlargement is "a strict but fair process built on established criteria and lessons learned from the past".[557] A new meaning of

554 Tanja Miščević, Mojmir Mrak, "The EU Accession Process: Western Balkans vs EU-10", *Croatian Political Science Review*, vol. 54, n° 4, 2017, pp. 185-204, p. 194.

555 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, COM (2013) 700 final, 16.10.2013, p. 2, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/strategy_paper_2013_en.pdf

556 Tanja Miščević, Mojmir Mrak, "The EU Accession Process: Western Balkans vs EU-10", *op. cit.,* p. 196.

557 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,

enlargement also meant a new uncertainty concerning the future membership of the Western Balkans. The 2015 EU Enlargement Strategy thus states that "while there has been important progress by many countries in many areas over the past year, the challenges faced by these countries are such that none will be ready to join the EU during the mandate of the current Commission, which will expire towards the end of 2019".[558] At the same time, the Strategy highlights the importance of "time" for joining the EU: "enlargement needs to be understood as a process which supports reform and the fundamental changes needed to meet the obligations of EU membership. Such changes inevitably require time (...) if the prospect of moving forward on the road to the EU is seen as real and credible, the risk of countries turning away from the EU will be mitigated, as will the risk of disillusionment with the process or even failing in or backsliding on reforms".[559] At the same time, the Strategy underscores "the legacy of the past" in the Western Balkans by noting that "despite much progress, the wounds of recent conflicts still need time to fully heal".[560] The journey of the Western Balkans to the EU accession is once again postponed by the new Commission's Enlargement Strategy from 2018, which states that the EU "must be stronger and more solid before it can be bigger", because "the EU's enlargement policy must be part and parcel of the larger strategy to strengthen the Union by 2025".[561] On the other hand, "the Western Balkan countries *now* have a historic window of opportunity to firmly and unequivocally bind their future to the European Union". In this regard, "they will have to act with determination", and to "urgently redouble their efforts" in order to complete "their political, economic and social transfor-

EU Enlargement Strategy, COM (2015) 611 final, 10.11.2015, p. 2, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf

558 *Ibid.,* p. 2.

559 *Ibid.,* p. 3.

560 *Ibid.,* p. 4.

561 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans, COM (2018) 65 final, Strasbourg, 6.2.2018, pp. 1-2, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf. The wording of the Strategy thus points to the direct connection between future enlargement and the possible process of EU reforms until 2025. Dejana Vukasović, "The actorness of the EU and the Western Balkans: towards permanent liminality?", in Juliane House, Themis Kaniklidou (eds.), *Europe in Discourse: Agendas of Reform*, Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference, Athens, 21-23 September 2018, Hellenic American University, St., Nashua, 2020, pp. 216-226.

mation".[562] According to the Commission, "much remains to be done across the board to align with the EU's acquis", because the Western Balkans shows "clear elements of state capture" and lacks the "capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces in the Union".[563]

Hence, the "Europeanness" of the Western Balkans is a "vast" and "long term undertaking" and the countries of the region still "have a long road ahead before they reach EU levels of democratic stability and socio-economic development".[564] The slowness in the process of reaching the adequate level of Europeanness is attended by many obstacles on the "road" to the EU, as well as new, additional measures and steps. This also includes the introduction of a new enlargement methodology in February 2020 in order to enhance the accession process and provide "a credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans".[565] The slow pace of reform in the Western Balkans demands the enhancement of the accession process in order to make it "more effective", "more predictable", "more credible" and "more dynamic".[566] The new methodology underlines the importance of the "fundamentals first" principle by stating that "negotiations on the fundamentals will be opened first and closed last and progress on these will determine the overall pace of negotiations." In addition, the roadmaps for the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions are introduced, as well as a stronger link with the economic reform programme process.[567] Apart from fundamentals first, the second pillar of the new methodology concerns "a stronger political steer and engagement at the highest levels", through regular EU-Western Balkans summits, but also including the Member States' involvement in the monitoring and reviewing the process, as well as bodies of SAA and

562 European Commission, A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans, *op. cit.,* p. 2.

563 *Ibid.,* p. 3.

564 Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission, The Stabilization and Association process for South East Europe, First Annual Report, COM (2002) 163 final, Brussels, 03. 04. 2002, p. 5, 6, http://aei.pitt.edu/50618/1/COM_(2002)_163_final.pdf

565 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Enhancing the accession process- A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans, COM (2020) 57 final, Brussels, 5.2.2020, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/enlargement-methodology_en.pdf

566 *Ibid.,* p. 1.

567 *Ibid.,* p. 3.

Inter-Governmental Conferences. Finally, the third pillar is related to the strengthening of the dynamics of the process, by grouping of negotiations chapters in six clusters (fundamentals, internal market, competitiveness and inclusive growth, green agenda and sustainable connectivity, resources, agriculture and cohesion and external relations). Therefore, the negotiation on each cluster will be open as a whole, rather than on an individual chapter basis.

This EU's "disciplinary practice" is even more reinforced by the introduction of reward/sanction mechanisms, called "positive" and "negative" conditionalies in the EU vocabulary. The reward is possible for the countries fulfilling all the requirements. They include closer integration of the country with the EU, including the work for accelerated integration and increased funding support. In contrast, *sanctions* are for the countries that are in the state of "serious or prolonged stagnation or even backsliding in reform implementation".[568] The sanctions may include negotiations to be put "on hold" in certain areas, or "in the most serious cases" completely suspended, including the re-opening of the closed chapters. In this case, the "punished" countries are denied a further closer integration with the EU. Also, the EU funding in that case could be adjusted downward, and the benefits of closer integration (access to EU programmes, unilateral concession for market access) could be paused or withdrawn.[569]

The construction of the EU-Western Balkans relation in enlargement evokes Foucault's concept of "surveillance".[570] As an integral element in disciplinary practices, surveillance renders subjects knowable, visible objects of disciplinary power. [571] The EU-Western Balkans relationship in enlargement is constructed in a way that enables the continuous observation of the region and this kind of power echoes the Foucault's "power of the gaze", i.e. "power over", "power as repression". The Western Balkans is positioned as object of surveillance whereas the EU is charged for guaranteeing "the rules" of conduct for it. The EU gathers "facts" *via* annual reports, defines and monitors situations and problems in the countries of the Western Balkans, and authorises "appro-

568 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

569 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

570 Cf. Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir*, Gallimard, Paris, 1975.

571 Cf. Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, op. cit., p. 11.

priate" policies resulting from the facts, problems and definitions. More generally, the EU creates the "truth" about "normality" and "abnormality", i.e. "universal reign of the normative". The power/knowledge nexus thus enables the EU to create a structure in which the Western Balkans, without coercion, becomes self-disciplined and self-restrained. This power, as discipline and domination, "compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes". i.e. "normalizes".[572] Therefore, *"la sanction normalisatrice"*[573] for the Western Balkans is related to the dynamics of European membership which could be slowed down or positioned in the state of prolonged liminality, leading even to permanent liminality, comprising a constant state of social limbo, and involving a deep-rooted sense of ambivalence.[574]

The "power of the gaze" over the Western Balkans is even more reinforced by the so-called "merit-based" approach to enlargement towards the Western Balkans, reaffirmed by the latest Enlargement Strategy from 2018. Contrary to the Europe Agreements as a type of arrangements signed between the EU and the CEE countries, Stabilisation and Association Agreements of the Western Balkans were from the start based on strengthening of the "regional dimension", i.e. stabilisation and regional cooperation, including the improvement of neighborly relations among the countries of the Western Balkans. Hence, the accession process of the Western Balkans was based on a strong security dimension. At the same time, the EU rhetorically advocated the "wholeness" of the region and insisted on the enhancement of regional cooperation between the countries of the region from the start of the enlargement process. In parallel with this rhetoric, bilateral approach foreseen by the SAP paradoxically encourages differentiation along the lines of each country's capacity for reform. This situation reinforces the power of the EU over these countries, that aspire to be more self-disciplined and self-restrained in order to be accepted, in order to conform with the expectations of the EU-"watcher", i.e. "teacher-judge". Thus, "Europeanisation" produces "Balkanisation". A new form of "nesting orientalisms" appears between the countries of this new region. The membership in the EU is perceived as an

572 Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir, op. cit.,* p. 185.

573 *Ibid.,* pp. 180-186.

574 Cf. Arpad Szakolczai, "Permanent (trickster) liminality: The reasons of the heart and of the mind", *Theory& Psychology*, vol. 27, n° 2, 2017, pp. 231-248.

affirmation of a country's "Europeanness", while the "others" are perceived as essential, non-European "Balkans". Thus, the Western Balkans became a "repository" of discursive patterns available to the countries of the region to produce the discourse of otherness through the Europeanness/Balkanness dichotomy. At the same time, a deep-rooted sense of ambivalence regarding the liminal status of the Western Balkan countries is reflected in the perception of the EU as both positive and negative, as a process both of approval and disapproval, acceptance and denial, as a mixture of "resigned and fatalistic Euro-realism and growing Euro-scepticism".[575] As a temporary situation, the liminality of the Western Balkans becomes extended, lasting, and threatens to be a permanent state, like "an illness that was supposed to last for a few days becoming acute, or a war that was supposed to last for a few months dragging on for years and years".[576]

The EU's rhetoric about the accession of the Western Balkans describes the Western Balkans as sites of various security problems and threats. For Western Balkans, "Europe" is the starting point for the EU membership, but also a final destination. Through the representation of the political and economic readiness in the process of enlargement, the "essence" of the Western Balkans has been determined by the EU. Western Balkans is represented as ambivalent "sameness-not-yet", and therefore the enlargement is a test of its "Europeanness". However, it is not only "the difficulties" faced by the Western Balkans in efforts to "Europeanize" themselves that make the journey towards the European family "endless". The enlargement perspective in the Western Balkans is constantly postponed in terms of "danger". Jeff Huysmans argues that political communities are constituted around the fear of power of other to *kill* and because of uncertainty about life. According to him, however, the community does not just face danger as a representation of a possibility of death, but is also indebted to danger for its own very existence.[577] In other words, if the other against whose image the community is defined is unleashed, then the identity is "damaged".

575 Roberto Belloni, Marco Brunazzo, "After 'Brexit': the Western Balkans in the European Waiting Room", *European Review of International Studies*, vol. 4, n° 1, 2017, pp. 21-38, p. 29.

576 Arpad Szakolczai, "Living permanent liminality: the recent transition experience in Ireland", *Irish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 22, n° 1, 2014, pp. 28-50, p. 34.

577 Jeff Huysmans, "Security! What do you mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 4, n° 2, 1998, pp. 226-255, p. 238.

Hence, the security policy faces a paradox: one the one hand, it needs an "evil" against which it can articulate its identity, but on the other hand, if the threat is eliminated, the political identity could collapse.[578] In this regard, the Western Balkans is a "danger" that can make the EU "weaker" and therefore put in question its transformative power as a "community of values". Hence, the EU "must be stronger and more solid before it can be bigger".

c. The EU as a "global actor" and the Western Balkans as Other

In parallel with the construction of the EU as a "community of values", the Western Balkans was the significant Other in the construction of the EU as a "global actor". It gave legitimacy to the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and to the launching of military and civilian missions in the framework of this policy. CSDP missions, both civilian and military, were first introduced in the region of the Western Balkans. According to the EU official documents, the aim of these missions was to contribute to peace and stability in the region and to create conditions that will prevent further conflicts. Parallel with this aim, CSDP missions in the Western Balkans were oriented towards institutionalisation of the norms and rules prescribed by the EU, in order to establish more "orderly and effective judicial and social-making processes".[579] As stated by Javier Solana,

> "(...) The experience of the Balkans has been a *sobering one* for the European Union. But it has I believe also provided us with an opportunity. It is a *test* of our commitment to the region, to a wider Europe, and to a *mature* common foreign and security policy. The Balkans has shown that the European Union can no longer remain a force for peace simply through example. It has also to be forthright in *defending* the basic values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law on which it is founded".[580]

578 *Ibid.,* p. 239.

579 Emil Kirchner, "Common Security and Defence Policy peace operations in the Western Balkans: impact and lessons learned", *op. cit.,* p. 44.

580 Speech by dr Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, "The Development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Role of the High Representative", *op. cit.*

As Solana puts it in his statement, the "experience" of the EU in "the Balkans" has been a "sobering one". However, according to him, the EU also has a new "opportunity" to demonstrate the "maturity" of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP). As already mentioned in the previous chapter, from the outset of the war in Yugoslavia, European leaders repeatedly asserted that the events in Yugoslavia "must" be managed and solved by the EC/EU. The EC/EU thus adopted a high profile at the beginning of the conflict in order to "force" the parties in conflict to a negotiated solution. The failure of the EC/EU in Yugoslavia was transformed into a discourse on the *immaturity* of the EU and the necessity to take a "full responsibility", including collective military action, if necessary. Jacques Delors, the European Commission president at that time, declared that

> "the Community is like an *adolescent* facing the *crisis of adulthood*. If the Community were 10 years older there would have been an intervention force".[581]

Therefore, the EC was identified with a living organism, which was at a stage of "facing the crisis of adulthood", i.e. in a liminal, ambiguous position. When speaking about liminality, Arnold van Gennep emphasized the universal constant of transition of human beings from one social status to another (e.g. from childhood to adulthood, singledom to married life, life to death). According to him, there is a *pattern* that always occurs in this process of transition i.e. *rites of passages*, which involves three distinct stages. First, the rites of separation, i.e. transition of a person from the previous social status. Second, the liminal, or transition rites, as those executed during the transitional stage. This stage is characterized by a temporary period of timelessness and social structurelessness. Third, the rites of incorporation, comprising the person's entry into a new phase of life and of acquiring a new social status.[582] Hence, as a living organism, the EC was in a status of liminality: it represented the "adolescent" who was in the phase of transition towards adulthood. In other words, it was an immature political player in transition on its way into a new phase of "life", i.e. to becoming an "adult" political player.

581 Quoted in Mika Luoma-Aho, "Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism: A Pathology of the Balkans in European Security Discourse", *op. cit.,* p. 139.

582 Arnold van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960, pp. 10-11.

From Saint-Malo onwards, with the creation of ESDP and later CSDP, the discourse of the EU as a "global actor", which possesses the military and civilian means indispensable to respond to international events in the "EU way" has been articulated. The "EU way" comprises the possibility of drawing on military and civilian means if necessary in order to effectively contribute to crisis management. In this presentation, the military and civilian means are conceived as instruments enabling the EU to assume responsibility, i.e. to make the world "more stable" and "more secure". At the same time, with the development of the ESDP/CSDP, the EU portrays itself as a value-oriented security provider that privileges peace support operations over war-fighting. It prioritizes the establishment and maintaining of peace in conflict-prone or war-torn countries. CSDP is thus constructed as part of "ethical power Europe", with the aim to promote its international "civilizing mission".[583] From a promoter of peace, the EU has been constructed as a peace-builder with CSDP. However, this "ethos of care" lying at the heart of the EU as a "global actor", also reveals the other side: it is also power over societies in crisis or those that emerged from violence. It is a power of disciplinary practice. In the name of safety and security, difference in the self-other relation is produced, reproduced and disciplined, to become sameness.

In the construction of the EU as a "global actor", the Western Balkans as the external other has been of particular importance. In parallel with the launch of the SAP and "inclusion" of the Western Balkans into the enlargement process, regional stability has been perceived as crucial to the future development of CFSP. As stressed by Javier Solana,

> "The Union is already a positive factor for peace not just in the wider Europe, but around the world. It offers a model for regional integration as a guarantee for peace. It is a potent symbol of reconciliation. By looking beyond its own frontiers, the Union can be a powerful catalyst for stability and peace. If we want to find a region where *stability and peace are still far from guaranteed*, we do not have to look far. The *Balkan*s lies on the very doorstep of the European Union. The Union has a *unique role to play in bringing lasting peace*

583 Cf. Hanns Maull, "Europe and the new balance of global order", *International Affairs*, vol. 81, n° 4, 2005, pp. 775-799.

> *and prosperity* to the region. We have the experience of cooperation and integration. The recipe has worked for us. It should work for the Balkans. We have many of the tools, but we also require total commitment. It has been said that *the future of our CFSP depends on success in the Balkans*".[584]

What is interesting in this statement is the use of the term "Balkans" i.e. the absence of the term Western Balkans. This is also the case with other High Representative's speeches. Hence, "the Balkans" is still present in security discourse. However, in parallel with its becoming a "global player", the term "Balkans" in the EU security discourse gained a new meaning. It was not "Western" yet, but not the "old" "Balkans" either. It was the "liminal Balkans", i.e. "the Balkans" on its way to becoming the Western Balkans. This liminal "Balkans" is thus in-between "the Balkans" and the Western Balkans. As such, it was constructed as a source of potential violence, a space with the legacy of war, where "stability and peace are still far from guaranteed" and as a risk (or later "threat" in the ESS vocabulary) and challenge for the EU as a promoter of peace and prosperity. Therefore, the EU's role in managing the post-conflict settlement through CFSP in this conception of "the Balkans" was presented as being of crucial importance. The "unique role" that the EU had to play in "bringing lasting peace and prosperity to the region was indispensable in order to enable the liminal Balkans to become the Western Balkans. According to Jean-Claude Juncker, "living up to Europe's rallying cry – never again war – is our eternal duty, our perpetual responsibility".[585] At the same time, the success of this EU "mission" is linked to "the future" of the CFSP.

In the European Security Strategy (ESS), "the (liminal) Balkans" has been identified as one of the "key threats" outside the EU borders. When describing the key threats outside the EU borders, the ESS classifies "the Balkans" in the group of "failed states". Hence, the ESS stresses that

584 Speech by dr Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, "The Development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Role of the High Representative", *op. cit.*

585 President Jean-Claude Juncker's State of the Union Address 2018, Strasbourg, 12 September 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-5808_en.htm

> "The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put *failed states* back on their feet, *including in the Balkans*, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organized crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU".[586]

The term "failed state" is associated with "bad governance", i.e. corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and the lack of accountability. It represents, according to the wording of the ESS, an "alarming phenomenon" that "undermines global security and adds to regional instability". "The Balkans" was placed in the context of "badly governed countries" outside the "bounds of international society". Thus, on the one hand, as an unstable region "outside" the EU that had recently emerged from the civil war, it was constructed as a potential "threat" to the security "inside", i.e. within the EU. The "Balkans" in transition was presented as a potentially "threatening" through the internal/external security linkage. On the other hand, as part of the integration project, the EU had a responsibility to extend its system of governance to this "troubled space" in order to bring stability and security. Therefore, "good governance" of "the Balkans", i.e. its embracement of the EU governing norms and standards, is of crucial importance for the security of "Europe", i.e. EU, but also for the "better and secure world". It was thus the "duty" of the EU to provide assistance to the region in order to rejoin the international community and more importantly, to advance in the EU integration process.

The liminal "Balkans" gave legitimacy to the launch of the first military and civilian missions in the framework of the ESDP/CSDP, with the aim to make the region "safe and secure". Thus, the first ESDP mission was a civilian police mission launched on 1 January 2003 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with aim to take over the International Police Task Force (IPTF) established by the Dayton agreements.[587] It was soon followed by various military and civilian missions in the Western Balkans region.[588]

586 *A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy*. *op. cit.*, p. 4.

587 Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action of 11 March 2002 on the European Union Police Mission (2002/210/CFSP), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 70, 13.3.2002, p. 1.

588 Three missions were launched in North Macedonia, one military, Concordia, and two civilian

Two types of the EU's responsibilities were represented through the launch of the ESDP/CSDP missions in "the Balkans". On the one hand, there was a necessity for the establishment of peace in the region, which was the initial priority of the first ESDP missions on the ground. On the other hand, together with the establishment of peace, there was also a necessity to prepare the region for its future integration into the EU, i.e. to transform "the liminal Balkans" into the Western Balkans. As stated by the Commission, "the prospect of membership has never been more important than today to help the countries to overcome crisis, state weaknesses and challenges to democracy".[589] The goals of the EU are linked to *universal good* rather than being in the narrowly defined self-interest of the EU.

On the occasion of the launch of the first ESDP/CSDP mission, the EU police mission in BIH (EUPM), Javier Solana stated:

> "The EUPM is the first crisis management operation launched by the Union as part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The fact that it takes place in Bosnia is the strongest statement yet of the EU's engagement in and partnership with the Balkans. The fact that the Union's first operation is a police mission - a civilian mission - demonstrates our commitment to a *comprehensive crisis management approach* that brings real added value".[590]
>
> And to conclude:
>
> "EUPM is here to assist you in your journey to Europe. It will *monitor, mentor, advise and inspect ongoing police reforms* to ensure they meet the highest European and international standards required for integration into Europe".

police missions "Proxima" and EUPAT. Also, in December 2004, the EU launched the EUFOR Althea military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is still in place. Finally, the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo was established in 2008 and is still ongoing. About missions, see: Dejana Vukčević, Evropska unija kao strateški akter. Teorija i praksa bezbednosne i odbrambene politike, *op. cit.,* pp.165-173, 191-201.

589 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-2008, COM (2007) 663 final, Brussels, 6.11. 2006, p. 9, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/strategy_paper_en.pdf

590 Remarks by Havier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy at the opening ceremony of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), Sarajevo, 15 January 2003, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/2/19/ae5fa0c4-5203-4a56-879e-92b1cd9d306a/publishable_en.pdf

Similarly, in referring to the police mission Proxima, Javier Solana stated that:

> "Under the leadership of Police Chief Commissioner Bart D'Hooge, the 200 man-strong EU Police Mission will *monitor, mentor* and *advise* the police in this country (...) We want to support you in the further development of an efficient and professional police service, living up to European standards (...) The launching of Proxima is also an important step for the EU. The mission is also a sign of the EU's ability to adapt the tools of the ESDP to specific situations, with specific needs".[591]

Hence, the disciplinary practice is part of the EU's comprehensive crisis management approach. The "journey" from "the Balkans" to "the Western Balkans" implies the practice of monitoring, mentoring, advising, and inspection of ongoing police reforms. It also includes the "experts'" "judgment" of the scope of the gaps between the standards of normality and the state of policing in the host country.[592] The rule of law EULEX mission in Kosovo goes one step further in this regard. Contrary to the aforementioned police missions which are non-executive in nature, EULEX Kosovo has "executive functions". The stated "EULEX mandate consists in "assisting Kosovo authorities, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress toward sustainability and accountability" through "*monitoring, mentoring*, and *advising*, while retaining certain *executive functions*".[593] Therefore, this mission demonstrates a new form of EU superiority: a form of "enforcing practice".

In parallel with its civilian mission, the EU military missions are also deployed in the framework of the CSDP. The first military mission was undertaken in FYROM, with the aim to "further contribute to a stable, secure environment, to allow the FYROM

591 Remarks by Javier Solana at the opening ceremony of the EU Police Mission in the Former-Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA), Skopje, 15 December 2003, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/78413.pdf

592 Cf. Michael Merlingen with Rasa Ostraukaite, *European Union Pecebuilding and Policing. Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy*, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p. 106.

593 Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 42, 16.02.2008, p. 92.

Governement to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement".[594] It was followed by the military mission Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the aim to "contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH".[595] At the same time, the mission was represented as indispensable in order to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to move from a phase of stabilisation to a phase of gradual integration into the European Union.[596]

The "success story" of the civilian and military missions in the Balkans enabled the articulation of the EU as a "global actor" in two ways. First, CSDP civilian and military missions have been portrayed as an expression of the EU's construction as a cosmopolitan power. Thus, the EU was represented as "doing good" through visible and active intervention but at the same time also as "being good", that is, its political values are based on a solidarist and cosmopolitan approach in international affairs, including the promotion of democracy, multilateralism and human rights[597], and therefore represent something of existential value for the entire world. In other words, represented as "successful" and "indispensable", CSDP missions are discursively constructed as a part of the EU's "comprehensive crisis management approach" that should bring real added value:

> "With war breaking out in the Balkans on our doorstep, we realised that we could not remain an island of tranquillity in a sea of instability (...) In the Balkans and elsewhere, we have learned that there is no simple sequencing of military first and civilians later. The strictly military phase of crisis management is never as short as one thinks or hopes. And the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts are never as civilian as one wishes. Thus we need both civilian and military tools from day one. The concept of comprehensive planning is all about this civil-military interplay. It is popular these days in

594 Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, *Official Journal of the European Union,* L 34, 11. 2. 2003, p. 26.

595 Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Journal of the European Communities, n° L 252, 28. 07. 2004, p. 10.

596 Dejana Vukčević, *Evropska unija kao strateški akter. Teorija i praksa bezbednosne i odbrambene politike, op. cit.,* p. 172.

597 Cf. Esther Barbé, Pol Morillas, "The EU global strategy: the dynamics of a more politicized and politically integrated foreign policy", *op. cit.*, p. 757.

> strategic circles, even if it is hard to put into practice. But for the EU, *because of our origins*, it comes *relatively natural*" (...) The EU started as a peace project. And in many ways it still is. Promoting peace and co-operative security is exactly what we are doing *in the Balkans, the Middle East, in Africa and elsewhere*. The EU will always favour negotiation over confrontation. But all of us also know that to secure peace and protect the vulnerable, it is sometimes necessary to intervene and, in extremis, *to coerce*".[598]

The combination of the civilian and military means is represented as "natural", given "our" (i.e. EU's) "origins". This "vision" that entails "the past" enabled the representation of the EU as a "unique player" on the international stage. It was "natural" for the EU to develop a specific EU approach to security, in order to make "Europe" safer and more peaceful. On the other hand, the liminal "Balkans" was at the same time constructed as a conflictual and unstable region that needs EU's assistance in order to become the Western Balkans. Therefore, the EU had the "moral" and "natural" task to spread the stability and prosperity with its CFSP and to take appropriate measures to fulfill this task, such as civilian and military missions in the framework of CSDP.

Second, the discursively constructed "successful effects" of the ESDP/CSDP missions were highlighted as an example of the EU's "maturity", i.e. its transition from a "regional" to a "global actor". This "*rite of passage*" of the EU was also enabled by the security-development nexus, i.e. by association of poverty and economic problems with political ones. The security-development nexus links the security and peace with sustainable development, and the absence of development and poverty eradication with the absence of sustainable peace. The "underdeveloped other" was constructed as isolated and attended by longstanding social insecurity that needed development with assistance of the EU as a "global actor". In this way, the necessity of the global character of the CSDP missions is constructed, focusing on strengthening security sector reform (SSR) and capacity-building in developing countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle-East:

598 Javier Solana's speech at the 40th Commanders Conference of the German Bundeswehr, Hambourg, 11 October 2005, https://www.voltairenet.org/article129614.html

> "This will be a test for the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. We are extending the capabilities which are available under this policy to enable us to be more effective in promoting our values and interests throughout the world. It is right that we do so. I am confident that the Union will show the determination to succeed in the Balkans. I am also certain that the European Union *will remain true to the vision of its founders*, and *help to ensure that others can share the values* and principles on which it is founded".[599]

At the same time, the security-development nexus enabled to construct the "liminal Balkans" as a potentially "threatening" Other. The "maturation" of the EU as a "global actor" went hand in hand with the "maturation" of "the Balkans" and its "transformation" into the Western Balkans in security discourse.

The new European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) offers a new mode of differentiation between the EU and the Western Balkans. As previously said, unlike the ESS, the EUGS is more oriented "internally", i.e. towards the promotion of peace and guarantying of the security of the EU. It states that "*fragility beyond our borders threatens* all our vital interests", and that the "credible enlargement policy grounded on strict and fair conditionality is an irreplaceable tool to enhance resilience within the countries concerned". Hence, the EUGS focus is on "security at home" which "entails a parallel interest in peace" in the neighbouring and surrounding regions. At the same time, the EUGS devises the concept of "resilience" as the ability of states and societies to reform and recover from internal and external crises. The concept of resilience is explicitly linked to security. The EUGS stresses that "a resilient state is a secure state, and security is key to prosperity and democracy".[600] At the same time, resilience is also explicitly linked to the enlargement policy. According to the EUGS, "a credible enlargement policy grounded in strict and fair conditionality is an irreplaceable tool to enhance resilience".[601] In other words, the enlargement policy is constructed

599 Speech by dr Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, "The Development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Role of the High Representative", *op. cit.*

600 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", *op. cit.,* p. 23.

601 *Ibid.,* p. 24.

as a security policy. However, according to the EUGS, resilience "cannot be taken for granted". Thus, "the strategic challenge for the EU is that of promoting political reform, rule of law, economic convergence and good neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans and Turkey, while coherently pursuing cooperation across different sectors".[602]

The European Council in March 2017 acknowledged "the fragile situation" in the Western Balkans, as well as "internal and external challenges that the region is facing".[603] Hence, the Western Balkans becomes a site of new security problems and threats. As stated in the EUGS, fragility beyond EU's borders "threatens all our vital interests". The EU is represented as being at risk when states and societies outside its borders are "vulnerable". In that context, the Western Balkans, being "fragile", is constructed as potentially "threatening" for the EU in the sense that it can make it "weaker", putting in question the security within the EU. In other words, the "fragility" of the Western Balkans can have an spill-over effect on the EU. At the same time, however, the Western Balkans is constructed as a region unable resolve this "fragility" on its own, but only with assistance of the EU. Therefore, the EU "must" remain committed to the region and engaged at all levels, to support and to deepen political and economic ties. In the words of the former EU Commissioner for Enlargement Johannes Hahn,

> "It is about *exporting* stability to our front-yard – or about importing instability if we were to hesitate (...) I am not the "cheerleader-in-chief" of the Western Balkans. But a hard look at the map will show you that a lack of engagement on our part would create a vacuum that other powers would only be too happy to exploit".[604]

602 *Ibid.*

603 European Council, 9-10 March 2017, Conclusions by the President of the European Council, Brussels, 9 March 2017, p. 6, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24113/09-conclusions-pec.pdf

604 Johannes Hahn, "Europe in a volatile world - Exporting stability to its neighbourhood", Princeton University, September 26, 2018, *op. cit.*

CONCLUSION

By arguing that identity is a result of a complexity of discursively constructed differences and that the EU-Self is constructed by being delineated from Others that it constructs at the same time, this book aimed to explore the nature of difference in the discursively constructed EU identity, i.e. different degrees of otherness in the relationship between the EU and its external others. In the first part, we discussed the question how the EU identity emerges in different forms according to the discourse in which it is constructed. We analysed the discursive construction of the EC identity during the Cold War, as well as the EU as a "community of values" and as a "global actor" after the end of the Cold War and the creation of the EU. Regarding the EC identity, the main question was how the EC identity was associated with the images of "Europe" and the development of the European integration process. We argued that the EC identity was constructed as a "historic entity", united by the cultural and civilizational heritage. The EC as a "cultural/civilization project" was associated with the concept of "Europe" understood as a distinguished "civilization". Therefore, the EC identity was constructed in terms of the past ("inherited civilization"), leading to the essentialization of the identity, perceived as a "natural", fixed and historically given, imposing boundaries through hierarchical vision of the relationship with its "outside".

As for the next two chapters, we demonstrated how the EU-self representation as a "community of values" and as a "global actor" produced the "knowledge" about the superiority of the EU-self in relation to its external other, thus providing for the legitimacy of the representational practices. Meanings are produced by constructing a particular "truth" that makes various foreign policy practices possible. As regards the discourse of the EU as a "community of values", the criterion of acceptance of the "common European values", which lies at the heart of the enlargement policy, constructs the difference in relation to others either as exclusion (non-European), or as assimilation. In this regard, otherness is reduced to sameness leading to blurred boundaries between the EU-Self and its others in the enlargement. This could therefore point to the conclusion that in general, the EU as a "community of

values" practices an analog mode of differentiation characteristic of a post-modern polity. However, the symbolic power inherent in soft borders helps to "naturalize" hard borders. In other words, even in the absence of the clear-cut binary opposition, the ambiguous other can be perceived and represented as "threatening". The hegemonization of the "inside" identity through foreign policy, does not exclusively imply a clear-cut dichotomy with its "outside". The similar is true when it comes to the construction of the EU as a "global actor", with shows the creation of boundaries through external/internal security linkage and security/development nexus. The linkage between the "inside" security and the "outside threats" ensures the domination of the security discourse on the inside.

At the same time, the first part of the book also demonstrates the tendency of "fixation" of the concept of "Europe" and of the "European identity" under the EU label, i.e. the representation of the EC/EU as a "reincarnation" of "Europe" and as discursively equated with the concept of "European identity". The discursive equation between the EC/EU and the concepts of "Europe" and of the "European identity" is clearly expressed in the EU official, but also academic discourse, both of which rarely refer to an "EU identity" but instead uses terms "European identity" and "Europe".

The second part of the book looks at the issue of the Balkans and the Western Balkans as Other in the construction of the EU identity. Through this case study, we sought to demonstrate the nature of difference in the Balkans/Western Balkans relationship in discourse, i.e. different degrees of otherness. At the same time, we also aimed to demonstrate whether the EU practices the modern or postmodern mode of differentiation in relation to the Balkans and the Western Balkans. The Balkans has been constructed as antithetical to the EU, i.e. as anti-EU-self. It was represented as a threat, as a danger to be located outside the "European" space. The EU-Balkans relationship was based on a clear-cut binary opposition, with a clear, unambiguous border between the EU-Self and the Balkans-Other, with nothing in-between. In contrast, the Western Balkans has been constructed as simultaneously "close and distant", as a bridge between "Europe" and "the Balkans", as a less-EU-self, as a region with a "European" perspective. The differentiation in this case is not based on clear-cut boundaries, but on fuzzy frontiers. At the same time, the case of the Western Balkans shows the

different forms of non-radical otherness, introduced by the security/development linkage, representing the Western Balkans as a "victim of the past" and an underdeveloped version of the EU-Self and at the same time enabling the domination of the security of the "inside", i.e. the EU. Another form of differentiation is linked to the internal/external security linkage, which makes it possible to represent the Western Balkans as a "threat" to the stability and security of the EU. More specifically, the Western Balkans was represented as the site of various "threats". In this book, we conclude that, in relation to "the Balkans" and the Western Balkans, the EU, as a "community of values" and as a "global actor", is not constituted as a postmodern collectivity, because the mode of differentiation is based on different forms of representations of the Other as a threat, from "danger to a stranger". In other words, the book concludes that the modern, nation-like mode of differentiation between the self and other does not exclusively need the drawing of clear-cut boundaries, as in the case of "the Balkans", but can also be practiced in cases of fluid, ambiguous frontiers.

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