Прегледни рад

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THE "UKRANIAN QUESTION" AND "KOSOVO PRECEDENT"

Summary

The research topic of this article is the "Ukrainian Question" in perspective of "Kosovo precedent" within the framework of the international law, international relations and global politics. The aim of the article is to investigate the possible solutions for the current Ukrainian political crisis through the prism of "Kosovo precedent". The article is composed by five sections dealing with the Ukrainian identity, historical background of the Ukrainian statehood, the 2014 Euromaidan coup and the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, "Kosovo precedent" and the "Ukrainian Question" and finally with the possible political solution of the current Ukrainian crisis founded on the example of "Kosovo precedent". The fundamental conclusion of the research is that "Kosovo precedent" already serves and will further serve in the recent future as the foundation for the territorial decomposition of Ukraine by neighbouring Russia.

Key words: Ukraine, Kosovo, separatism, international law, humanitarian intervention, international relations, global politics.

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1. A UKRANIAN IDENTITY?

Ukraine is an East European territory which was originally forming a western part of the Russian Empire from the mid-17th century.[1] That is a present-day independent state and separate ethnolinguistic nation as a typical example of Benedict Anderson's theory-model of the "imagined community" – a self-constructed idea of the artificial ethnic and linguistic-cultural identity. Before 2014 Ukraine was a home of some 46 million inhabitants of whom, according to the official data, there were around 77 percent of those who declared themselves as the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, many Russians do not consider the Ukrainians or the Belarus as "foreign" but rather as the regional branches of the Russian nationality. It is a matter of fact that, differently to the Russian case, the national identity of the Belarus or the Ukrainians was never firmly fixed as it was always in the constant process of changing and evolving.[2] The process of self-constructing identity of the Ukrainians after 1991 is basically oriented vis-à-vis Ukraine's two most powerful neighbours: Poland and Russia. In the other words, the self-constructing Ukrainian identity (like the Montenegrin or the Belarus) is able so far just to claim that the Ukrainians are not both the Poles or the Russians but what they really are is of a great debate. Therefore, an existence of an independent state of Ukraine, nominally as a national state of the *Ukrainians*, is of a very doubt indeed from both perspectives: historical and ethnolinguistic.

The Slavonic term *Ukraine*, for instance, in the Serbo-Croat case *Krajina*, means in the English language a *Borderland* – a provincial territory situated on the border between at least two political entities: in this particular historical case, between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as the Republic of Both Nations (1569−1795) and the Russian Empire.[3] The term

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1   This article is a critical contribution to the book Elizabeth A. Wood et al, *Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine*, New York−Chichester, West Sussex, Columbia University Press−Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2016.

2   On the Ukrainian self-identity construction, see [Karina V. Korostelina, *Constructing the Narratives of Identity and Power: Self-Imagination in a Young Ukrainian Nation*, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014].

3   A German historical term for Ukraine would be a *mark* – a term for the state's borderland which existed from the time of the Frankish Kingdom/Empire of Carl the Great.

is mostly used from the time of the treaty (truce) of Andrussovo in 1667 between these two states. In the other words, *Ukraine* and the *Ukrainians* as a natural objective-historical-cultural identity never existed as it was considered only as a geographic-political territory between two other natural-historical entities (Poland and Russia). All (quasi)historiographical mentioning of this land and the people as Ukraine/Ukrainians referring to the period before the mid-17th century are quite scientifically incorrect but in majority of cases politically inspired and coloured with the purpose to present them as something crucially different from the historical process of ethnic genesis of the Russians.[4]

It was a Roman Catholic Vatican that was behand the process of creation of the "imagined community" of the "Ukrainian" national identity for the very political purpose to separate the people from this borderland territory from the Orthodox Russian Empire. Absolutely the same was done by Vatican's client Austria-Hungary in regard to the national identity of Bosnian-Herzegovinian population when this province was administered by Vienna-Budapest from 1878 to 1918 as it was the Austria-Hungarian government who created totally artificial and very new ethnolinguistic identity – the "Bosnians", just not to be the (Orthodox) Serbs (who were at that time a strong majority of the provincial population).[5]

A creation of ethnolinguistically artificial *Ukrainian* national identity and later on a separate nationality was a part of a wider confessional-political project by Vatican in the Roman Catholic historical struggle against the eastern Orthodox Christianity (the eastern "schism") and its Churches within the framework of Pope's traditional proselytizing policy of reconversion of the "infidels". One of the most successful instruments of a soft-way reconversion used by Vatican was to compel a part of the Orthodox population to sign with the Roman Catholic Church the Union Act recognizing at such a way a supreme power by the Pope and dogmatic *filioque* ("and from the Son" – the Holy Spirit proceeds and from the Father and from the Son). Therefore, the ex-Orthodox believers who now became the Uniate Brothers or the Greek Ort-

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4   For instance, Alfredas Bumblauskas, Genutė Kirkienė, Feliksas Šabuldo (sudarytojai), *Ukraina: Lietuvos epocha, 1320−1569*, Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos centras, 2010.

5   Лазо М. Костић, *Наука утврђује народност Б-Х муслимана*, Србиње−Нови Сад: Добрица књига, 2000.

hodox believers became in a great number later on a pure Roman Catholics but as well as changed their original (from the Orthodox time) ethnolinguistic identity. It is, for instance, very clear in the case of the Orthodox Serbs in Zhumberak area of Croatia – from the Orthodox Serbs to the Greek Orthodox, later the Roman Catholics and finally today the Croats. Something similar occurred and in the case of Ukraine. On October 9th, 1596 it was announced by Vatican a Brest Union with a part of the Orthodox population within the borders of the Roman Catholic Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth (today Ukraine).[6] The crucial issue in this matter is that today Ukraina's Uniates and the Roman Catholics are most anti-Russian and of the *Ukrainian* national feelings. Basically, both the *Ukrainian* and the *Belarus* present-day ethnolinguistic and national identities are historically founded on the anti-Orthodox policy of Vatican within the territory of ex-Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that was in essence an anti-Russian one.

The Lithuanian historiography writing on the Church Union of Brest in 1596 clearly confirms that:

"… the Catholic Church more and more strongly penetrated the zone of the Orthodox Church, giving a new impetus to the idea, which had been cherished since the time of Jogaila and Vytautas and formulated in the principles of the Union of Florence in 1439, but never put into effect – the subordination of the GDL Orthodox Church to the Pope's rule".[7]

In the other words, the rulers of the Roman Catholic Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the GDL) from the very time of Lithuania's baptizing in 1387−1413 by Vatican had a plan to Catholicize all Orthodox believers of the GDL among whom overwhelming majority were the Slavs. As a consequence, the relations with Moscow became very hostile as Russia accepted a role of the protector of the Orthodox believers and faith and therefore the Church Union of Brest was seen as a criminal act by Rome and its client the Republic of Two Nations (Poland-Lithuania).

Today, it is absolutely clear that the most pro-western and anti-Russian part of Ukraine is exactly the West Ukraine – the

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6   Arūnas Gumuliauskas, *Lietuvos istorija: Įvykiai ir datos*, Šiauliai: Šiaures Lietuva, 2009, 44; *Didysis istorijos atlasas mokyklai: Nuo pasaulio ir Lietuvos priešistorės iki naujausiųjų laikų*, Vilnius: Leidykla Briedis, (without year of publishing) 108.

7   Zigmantas Kiaupa et al, *The History of Lithuania Before 1795*, Vilnius: Lithuanian Institute of History, 2000, 288.

lands that was historically under the rule by the Roman Catholic ex-Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the former Habsburg Monarchy. It is obvious, for instance, from the presidential voting results in 2010 as the pro-western regions voted for J. Tymoshenko while the pro-Russian regions do it for V. Yanukovych. It is a reflection of the post-Soviet Ukrainian identity dilemma between "Europe" and "Eurasia" – a dilemma that is of common nature for all Central and East European nations who historically played a role of a buffer zone between the German *Mittel Europa* project and the Russian project of a pan-Slavonic unity and reciprocity.

In general, the western territories of the present-day Ukraine are mainly populated by the Roman Catholics, the East Orthodox and the Uniates. This part of Ukraine is mostly nationalistic and pro-western oriented. The East Ukraine is in essence Russophone and subsequently "tends to look to closer relations with Russia".[8]

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD

The German occupation forces were those who have been the first to create and recognise a short-lived state's independence of Ukraine in January 1918 during the time of their-own inspired and supported anti-Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917−1921. As reoccupied by the Bolshevik Red Army, the eastern and southern parts of the present-day territory of (a Greater) Ukraine joined in 1922 the USSR as a separate Soviet Socialist Republic (without Crimea).[9] Therefore, a Jew V. I. Lenin has to be considered as the real historical father of the Ukrainian statehood but also and as of the contemporary nationhood. Ukraine was the most fertile agricultural Soviet republic but particularly catastrophically affected by (Georgian) Stalin's economic policy in the 1930s which neglected agricultural production in favour of the speed industrialisation of the country. The result was a great famine (*holodomor*) with around seven million people dead but majority of them

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8   John S. Dryzek, Leslie Templeman Holmes, *Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourses Across Thirteen Countries*, Cambridge−New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 114.

9   According to 1926 Soviet census of Crimea, the majority of its population were the Russians (382.645). The second largest ethnic group were the Tartars (179.094).

were of the ethnic Russian origin. A territory of the present-day Ukraine was devastated during the WWII by the Nazi German occupation forces from 1941 to 1944 who installed in Ukraine a puppet and criminal regime of S. Bandera (1900−1959) under which a genocide on Poles, Jews and Russians was committed.[10] For instance, the Ukrainian militia (12.000) directly participated in the 1942 holocaust of some 200.000 Volhynian Jews together with 140.000 German policemen. The Ukrainian mass killers learned their job from the Germans and applied their knowledge as well as on the Poles.[11]

After the war J. V. Stalin, supported by the Ukrainian party-cadre N. Khrushchev, deported about 300.000 Ukrainians from their homeland as they have been accused for the collaboration with the Nazi regime during the war and the participation in genocide done by S. Bandera's government. However, after the war the Ukrainians have been and directly rewarded by Moscow for the collaboration with the Germans and participation in S. Bandera's organized genocide as the lands of Transcarpathia, littoral Moldova (Bessarabia), Polish Galicia and part of Romania's Bukovina in 1945 followed by Crimea in 1954 became annexed by the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine. These territories, which never have been part of any kind of Ukraine and overwhelmingly not populated by the ethnolinguistic Ukrainians were included into the Soviet Ukraine primarily due to the political activity by the strongest Ukrainian cadre in the USSR − N. Khrushchev, a person who inherited Stalin's throne in Moscow in 1953. On this place, a parallel with Croatia is an absolute: for the Croat committed genocide on the Serbs, Jews and Roma by A. Pavelić's regime (a Croat version of S. Bandera) during the WWII on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia a post-war (Socialist Republic of) Croatia was awarded by a Croat-Slovenian dictator of Yugoslavia J. B. Tito with the lands of Istria, Adriatic islands and Dubrovnik − all of them never have been in any kind of the state of Croatia before the WWII.

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10   On Stepan Bandera, see [Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult*, Stuttgart, ibidem, 2014].

11 Timothy Snyder, *Tautų rekonstrukcija: Lieuva, Lenkija, Ukraina, Baltarusija 1569−1999*, Vilnius: Mintis, 2009, 183.

M. Gorbachev's policy of deliberate dissolution of the USSR from the time of Reykjavik bilateral meeting with Ronald Reagan in 1988 caused a revival of the ethnic nationalism of the Ukrainians who proclaimed an independence on August 24th, 1991 (confirmed on referendum on December 1st, 1991 only by those who did not boycott it) in the wake of anti-Gorbachev's military putsch in Moscow (mis)using the political situation of paralyzed central government in the country. The state's independence of Ukraine was proclaimed and later internationally recognized within the borders of a Greater Stalin-Khrushchev's Ukraine with at least 20% of the ethic Russian population living in a compact area in the eastern part of the country and as well as making a qualified (2/3) majority of Crimea's population. The coming years saw the rifts with neighbouring Russia with the main political task by Kiev to commit as possible as the Ukrainization (assimilation) of ethnic Russians (similar to the policy of the Croatization of ethnic Serbs in Croatia orchestrated by the neo-Nazi government in Zagreb led by Dr. Franjo Tuđman). At the same time the Russian majority in Crimea constantly required the peninsula's reunification with mother Russia but getting only an autonomous status within Ukraine – a country which they never considered as their natural-historical homeland. The Russians of Ukraine were becoming more and more unsatisfied with conditions in which they have been leaving from the time when in 1998–2001 the Ukrainian taxation system collapsed what meant that the central government in Kiev was not able to pay the salaries and pensions to its own citizens. A very weak Ukrainian state became in fact unable to function normally ("failed state") and as a consequence it did not have a power to prevent a series of politically motivated assassinations followed by popular protests which had been also very much inspired by economic decline of the country.[12]

As a matter of fact, it has to be stressed that the Ukrainian historiography on their own history of the land and the people is extremely nationalistic and in very cases not objective like many other national historiographies. It is basically politically coloured

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12 On history of Ukraine and the Ukrainians, see more and compare with [Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2009; Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, New York: Basic Books, 2015; Anna Reid, *Borderland: A Journey Through the History of Ukraine*, New York: Basic Books, 2015].

with the main task to present the Ukrainians as a natural ethnolin-guistic nation who have been historically fighting to create a uni-ted independent national state and unjustifiably claiming certain territories to be ethnohistorically the "Ukrainian". As a typical example of such tendency to rewrite history of the East Europe according to the nationalistic and politically correct framework is, for instance, the book by Serhy Jekelčyk on the birth of a modern Ukrainian nation in which, among other quasi-historical facts based on the self-interpreted events, is written that the USSR in 1939−1940 annexed from Poland and Romania the "West Ukrai-nian land".[13] However, this "West Ukrainian land" never was part of any kind of Ukraine before the WWII as Ukraine as a state or administrative province never existed before V. I. Lenin created in 1923 a Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine within the USSR but at that time without the "West Ukrainian land" as it was not a part of the USSR. Moreover, the Ukrainians were either not lea-ving or being just minority on this land what means that Ukraine even did not have ethnic rights over the biggest part of the "West Ukraine".[14]

As another example of the Ukrainian historiographic natio-nalistic misleading we can find in an academic brochure on Buko-vina's Metropolitan's residence, published in 2007 by the National University of Chernivtsi. In the brochure is written that this uni-versity is "…one of the oldest classical universities of Ukraine"[15] that is true only from the present-day rough political perspective but not and from a moral-historic point of view. Namely, the uni-versity is located in the North Bukovina which in 1775 the Hab-sburg Monarchy had obtained. The land was from 1786 admini-strated within the Chernivtsi district of Galicia and one hundred years after the affiliation of Bukovina to the monarchy, the *Franz-Josephs-Universität* was inaugurated on October 4th, 1875 (the na-me day of the emperor). In the other words, the university's origin as whole Bukovina has nothing to do with any kind of both histo-

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13 Serhy Jekelčyk, *Ukraina: Modernios nacijos gimimas*, Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 2009, 17

14 Even today around half of Ukraine's state's territory is not populated by the Ukrai-nians as a majority of the population. Moreover, in some regions there are no Ukrai-nians at all. Therefore, the cardinal question became: On which principles Ukrai-nian borders are formed?

15 *The Architecturial Complex of Bukovynian Metropolitan's Residence*, Chernivtsi: Yuriy Fedkovych National University of Chernivtsi, 2007, 31.

rical Ukraine and ethnic Ukrainians as before 1940 it was outside of administrative territory of Ukraine when the whole North Bukovina on August 13th, became annexed by the USSR according to the *Hitler-Stalin Pact* (or the *Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact*) signed on August 23rd, 1939.[16] Therefore, two notorious bandits (one Nazi another Bolshevik) decided to transfer the North Bukovina to the USSR and the land became after the WWII part of a Greater (Stalin's) Ukrainian SSR. Nevertheless, while the Ukrainian nationalists claim that "Russia" (in fact anti-Russian USSR) occupied Ukraine, the annexation of the North Bukovina and other territories from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania in 1940 are for them a legitimate act of historical justice. Here we have to notice that according to the same pact, the territories of the independent states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are as well as annexed by the USSR that is considered by their historians and politicians as "occupation", what means (illegal) act of aggression that is braking international law and legitimate order. Nevertheless, they never accused Ukraine of doing the same in regard to occupied lands from its three western neighbours in 1940/1944.[17]

Political assimilation of certain separate Slavonic ethnolinguistic groups in Ukraine was and is one of the standardized instruments for the creation and maintaining of the Ukrainian national identity in the 20th century. The most brutal case is of the Ruthenians (Rusyns) who are simply proclaimed as historical Ukrainians known under such name till the WWII. Their land, which was in the interwar period part of Czechoslovakia, that was annexed by the USSR at the end of the WWII and included into a Greater Soviet Ukraine is simply renamed from Ruthenia into the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine. However, the Ruthenians and the Ukrainians are two separate Slavonic ethnolinguistic groups as such officially recognized, for example, in Serbia's Autonomous Province of Vojvodina where the Ruthenian (Rusyn) language is even standardized and studied together with Ruthenian philology and literature at a separate department at the University of Novi Sad. Unfortunately, the Ruthenian position in Ukraine is even worst in comparison with the Kurdish position in Turkey as the

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16 *Ibid.*

17 See, for instance [Priit Raudkivi, *Estonian History in Pictures*, Tallinn: Eesti Instituut, 2004 (without numeration of the pages); Arūnas Gumuliauskas, *Lietuvos istorija (1795−2009)*, Šiauliai: Lucilijus, 2010, 279−295].

process of Ruthenian assimilation is much speeder than of the Kurdish case.

From the current perspective of the Ukrainian crisis and in general from the point of solving the "Ukrainian Question" it has to be noticed a very historical fact that a part of the present-day East Ukraine became legally incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1654 as a consequence of the decision by the local hetman of Zaporozhian territory Bohdan Khmelnytsky (c. 1595−1657) based on a popular revolt against the Polish-Lithuanian (the Roman Catholic) occupation of Ukraine which broke out in 1648.[18] It means that the core of the present-day Ukraine voluntarily joined Russia, therefore escaping from the Roman Catholic Polish-Lithuanian oppression. Subsequently, B. Khmelnytsky's ruled territory has to be considered from a historical point of view as the motherland of all present-day Ukraine – the motherland which already in 1654 chose Russia.

3. THE 2014 *COUP D'ETAT* AND THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

A current Ukrainian crisis and in fact civil war which stared at the very end of 2013 are grounded in for decades lasting internal interethnic antagonisms primarily on the Ukrainian-Russian relations including above all the "Crimean Question" as an apple of discord from 1954 between Ukraine and Russia.[19] The crisis came from Lithuania's capital Vilnius were in November 2013 an Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine had to be signed. Lithuania at that time (July 1st−December 31st, 2013) presided the European (Union) Council and formally had a full political responsibility for the breaking out of the crisis as being the host of the event on which the EU absolutely blamed only Ukraine's President V. Yanukovych for the failure of the agreement as he simply rejected to sign it.[20]

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18 Alfredas Bumblauskas, *Senosios Lietuvos istorija, 1009−1795*, Vilnius: R. Paknio leidykla, 2007, 306; Jevgenij Anisimov, *Rusijos istorija nuo Riuriko iki Putino: Žmonės. Įvykiai. Datos*, Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos centras, 2014, 185−186.

19 On the "Crimean Question" from the western perspective, see [Gwendolyn Sasse, *The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2014].

20 Nevertheless, the western pro-Neocon historiography and political science is di-

However, his decision was primarily based on the logic of a *realpolitik* as he preferred much more favourable economic-financial offer by Moscow (including and *de facto* legalization of stealing of the Russia's gas to Europe that was transported via Ukraine) for the purpose to try to resolve inner economic, social and political crisis which was threatening a stability of the Ukrainian society and state from 1991. The official Kiev recognizes that for Ukraine (up to 2014) Russia was:

"…the largest trade partner and a huge market. In addition, many Ukrainians have family and friendly relations with the Russian people. In this connection, it should be noted that Europeans are actually interested in stable partnership between the two countries. Ukraine remains the major transit country for Russian natural gas transported to Europe, and it is very important for Kyiv to make sure that Europeans regard it as a reliable and predictable partner".[21]

It was obvious that such Yanukovych's turn toward the Russian Federation would mean and closest political ties between Kiev and Moscow in the future – a cardinal reason for the EU and USA to directly fuel a new colour revolution in Ukraine for the purpose to overthrow Yanukovych and to install instead of him their own puppet regime which will drive the country to direction of both the EU and the NATO. The Ukrainian 2013/2014 coloured revolution was committed according to the model of the first CIA's sponsored East European colour revolution that was organized in Serbia (Belgrade) at the beginning of October 2000 (the ''2000 October 5th Revolution'').[22] The protest of the ''people'' in Kiev in 2014 finally was ended by a classic street-style *coup d'état* like

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rectly blaming Russia and especially Russia's President Vladimir Putin for all political troubles in Ukraine after the Vilnius Summit in 2013. See, for instance [Elizabeth A. Wood et al, *Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine*, New York–Chichester, West Sussex, Columbia University Press–Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2016].

21 *Ukraine. A Country of Opportunities*, Kyiv: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2010, 6.

22 In the official literature and memoirs on this revolution, however, the essence if it that it was directly financed and sponsored by the CIA and the western financed NGOs is not mentioned at all. See, for instance [Dragan Bujošević, Ivan Radovanović, *5. Oktobar: Dvadeset četiri sata prevrata*, Beograd: Medija centar Beograd, 2001]. On the coloured revolutions from the pro-NATO/EU/USA's viewpoint, see and compare with [Evgeny Finkel, Yitzhak M. Brudny (eds.), *Coloured Revolutions and Authoritarian Reactions*, New York: Routledge, 2015].

in Belgrade 14 years ago[23] and installation of as well as a classic (pro-USA/EU/NATO's) marionette regime. As it is known from any introductory course on democracy, any kind of *coup d'état* (putsch) is illegal and unconstitutional. As in the 2000 Belgrade Coup case, the 2014 Kiev Putsch case was formally justified as a "popular revolt" against the dictator who became ousted in February 2014.[24] In fact, however, unlawfully removed legally and legitimately elected head of state by the USA/EU's sponsored and supported ultranationalistic and even a neo-Nazi coloured political upheaval of the "Euromaidan" protesters in Kiev[25] and some other bigger western Ukrainian cities (like in Lvov) directly provoked a new popular coloured revolution in the Russian speaking provinces of the East Ukraine and Crimea with a final consequence of a territorial secession of self-proclaimed Luhansk, Kharkov, and Donetsk People's Republics and Crimea (according to Kosovo pattern from 2008).

In regard to the 2014 Kyiv Coup, according to Paul Craig Roberts, Washington used its funded NGOs ($5 billion according to Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland at the National Press Club in December 2013) to begin street protests when the elected Ukrainian Government turned down the offer to join the European Union.[26] Similarly to the Ukrainian coup in 2014, the Guatemala coup in 1954, when democratically elected Government of Jacobo Arbenz became overthrown, was also carried out by the CIA. Nonetheless, following R. Reagan's logic used in the US-led military invasion of Grenada in 1983, the Russian President could send a regular army of the Russian Federation to occupy Ukraine for the security reasons of Russia's citizens who were studying at the universities in Kiev, Odessa or Lvov. Similar R. Reagan's argument (to protect the US' students in Grenada)

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23 Dragan Bujošević, Ivan Radovanović, *5. oktobar: Dvadeset četiri sata prevrata*, Beograd: Medija centar Beograd, 2001. The English language title of this memoir book is: *5. October: Twenty four hours of the coup d'état.*

24 See documentary movie by Paul Moreira, *Ukraine: The Masks of the Revolution*, Premieres Lignes Production−Canal +, France, 2016.

25 Tony Cartalucci, "BBC Now Admits: Armed Nazis Led 'Revolution' in Kiev, Ukraine", *Global Research*, March 7th, 2014: http://www.globalresearch.ca/bbc-now-admits-armed-nazis-led-revolution-in-kiev-ukraine/5372232.

26 On this issue, see more by the same author in [Paul Craig Roberts, *The Neoconservative Threat to World Order: Washington's Perilous War for Hegemony*, Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, Inc., 2015, 7−16].

was (mis)used, among others, and by Adolf Hitler in April 1941 to invade and occupy the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as, according to the German intelligence service, the German minority in Yugoslavia (the Volksdeutschers) were oppressed and terrorized by the new (pro-British) Government of General Dušan Simović after the coup in Belgrade committed on March 27th, 1941.[27] Nonetheless, a new anti-Russian government in Kiev launched a brutal linguistic and cultural policy of Ukrainization directly endangering the rights of ethnolinguistic Russians, who represent a clear majority of the population of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of the East Ukraine, Crimean Peninsula respectively[28] but as well as and of other non-Ukrainian population who supported a pro-Russia's course of the country.[29]

4. "KOSOVO PRECEDENT" AND THE UKRAINIAN SUICIDE

The revolt and coloured revolution by the Russian-speaking population in the East Ukraine in 2014 finally resulted in separation of Crimea from Ukraine based on the *Declaration of Independence of the Crimea* as a legal document followed by the people's referendum on joining Russia based on the formal self-determination rights according to the model and practice of, for instance, the Baltic states in 1990 when they declared independence from the USSR.[30] It is clear from the official declaration by the Supreme Council of Crimea on peninsula's independence that

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27 On this issue, see more in: Коста Николић, *Историја Равногорског покрета 1941−1945.*, Књига прва, Београд: Српска реч, 1999, 25−42.

28 In the recent future, if Kiev will continue with its anti-Russian and pro-NATO/USA/EU's political-military course, it is expected that the *Republic of NovoRussia* is going to be declared as an independent state with a real possibility to join the Russian Federation as Crimea already did it in 2014. On Russia's foreign policy and national identity, see [Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016].

29 On the issue of the Ukrainian crisis from the western perspective, see [Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West*, New Haven−London, Yale University Press, 2014; Richard Sakwa, *Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*, London−New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015; Rajan Menon, Eugen Rumer, *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order*, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015].

30 Lithuania, for instance, declared her independence on March 11th, 1990 [Arūnas Gumuliauskas, *Lietuvos istorija: Įvykiai ir datos*, Šiauliai: Šiaures Lietuva, 2009, 142].

this legal and legitimate act is founded on international law and the people's right to self-determination, but moreover, as well as based on the so-called "Kosovo precedent" – a western created "precedent" in 2008 which came as a boomerang to Ukraine six years later. Basically, "Kosovo precedent" is a clear representative example of a flagrant violation of the international law and order including above all the UN's Charter and the UN's 1244 Resolution on Kosovo. This "precedent" is firstly created in 1999 by a brutal NATO's military aggression on the independent and sovereign state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) without any mandate of the SC UN that was followed in February 2008 by unilateral proclamation of Kosovo independence by Kosovo Parliament and its recognition by a part of the world (a members of the Neocon *Pax Americana*).[31] At such a way, the West created the "precedence" which by definition has to be a unique case of the time in the international relations and global politics what theoretically means that it cannot serve as a foundation or example for any similar case all over the world. However, this international and legal "precedent" was in 2010 internationally and legally empowered by the opinion by the UN's International Court of Justice that a proclamation of Kosovo independence does not violate an international law on self-determination (independence) what is true but at the same time it violates the UN's Charter on territorial integrity of the states and their domestic law. Nevertheless, the court's opinion is, formally, just of the advisory nature but in practice it has serious implications and consequences. The first coming one was exactly the Crimean case in 2014 that was clearly stated either by the local Crimean authorities or by Russia's Government.

Undoubtedly, "Kosovo precedent" not only shaken but even destroyed the very foundations of international law based primarily on the UN's Charter and resolutions. As a direct consequence, it had direct "boomerang effect" with regard to the case of Crimean secession from Ukraine and following annexation by Russia. We have to remember that Crimea broke away relations with Ukraine calling for the same formal reasons used by the Albanians in the case of the 2008 "Kosovo precedent" followed by

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31 On the Neocon concept of *Pax Americana* and the US' global hegemony, see [Paul Craig Roberts, *How America Was Lost: From 9/11 to the Police/Warfare State*, Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, Inc., 2014].

other legal arguments. Nevertheless, the western countries recognized Kosovo independence from Serbia but not Crimean, Donetsk and Luhansk separation from Ukraine regardless the fact that all of these cases are formally and officially based on the same legal and moral arguments. Moreover, differently to "Kosovo precedent", separation cases in Ukraine are based on the results of the plebiscites.

The western policy of double standards is very visible from the following written statement on Kosovo independence by the US' administration of April 17th, 2009 that was submitted to the UN's International Court of Justice: "Declarations of independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does not make them violations of international law."[32] Nonetheless, similar statement by the same US's administration on the independence cases of the Republic of Serbian Krayina, Republic of Srpska, Republic of Transnistria, Republic of Abkhazia, Republic of South Ossetia or three separatist republics in the East Ukraine and Crimea we did not hear. Obviously, the UN's International Court of Justice accepted the US' statement and issued on July 22nd, 2010 its own two that "No general prohibition may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council with regard to declarations of independence," and "General international law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence." According to the above statements, however, it is clear that Moscow was absolutely truthful in the case of Crimea's secession but with one important distinction: Russia did not bomb Kiev previously!

As a matter of fact, the West did not offer to Belgrade possibility of federalization of Serbia with Kosovo as one federal unit as only the independence of Kosovo was advocated as the optimal solution for Kosovo problem. However, Moscow is advocating exactly the federalization as the best solution for the Ukrainian crisis with the East Ukrainian Russian-speaking regions as a single federal territory. Crimea, following the logic of both historical and ethnic rights, has to stay in Russia as the peninsula has nothing to do with Ukraine but has much to do with Russia. Even Turkey or Greece have more rights on Crimea in comparison to Ukraine. The scenario of federalized Ukraine would surely

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32 From this perspective, the southern *Confederation* had absolute legal and moral rights to proclaim independence from the USA in 1861 what means that Abraham Lincoln is simply a war criminal.

positively influence the process of stopping already ongoing new
Cold War in this case between the West (the NATO and the EU)
and the bloc of the countries around Russia, China and Iran.[33]
However, if the western mentors of the Euromaidan Government
in Kiev will reject such Russia's proposal it is most probably that
Ukraine will be left to commit suicide as the western policy of
double standards, promoted by the US and the EU in the 2008 Ko-
sovo Case will continue to have the boomerang effect in the rest
of the East Ukraine following the Odessa region as well.

5. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND FINAL SOLUTION

Current Ukrainian crisis in this case can be solved according
to the 1667 Andrussovo Treaty signed on February 9th between
Poland-Lithuania and Russia. According to the treaty a present-
day territory of Ukraine was simply divided between two states:
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (the Republic of Both Nati-
ons) and the Russian Empire with Dnieper river as a demarcation
line. In the other words, Russia received from Poland-Lithuania
territories eastward from Dnieper but with Kiev and whole Zapo-
rozhie region (from both sides of the river).[34] Therefore, Dnieper
became a (natural-political) border between "Europe" and Russia
with divided present-day Ukraine into two *borderlands*. As it is
said at the beginning of this article, the Slavonic word Ukraine
means in English a *borderland*. It is clear even from the name
of the country what is going to be its ultimate destiny. Before
or later, no matter. The case of the Republic of Serbian Krayina
(Ukraine) proved it clearly in the 1990s – the *Borderland* can be
only a periphery of some more natural state. It does not matter on
which side of the border.[35]

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33 On this issue, see [Marvin Kalb, *Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New
Cold War*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2015].

34 Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, *Istorijos egzamino gidas. Nauja programa nuo A
iki Ž*, Vilnius: Leidykla "Briedas", 2013, 125−126.

35 The independent state of Serbian Krayina was declared on December 19th, 1991
by the Constitutional Assembly (Parliament) of the Serbian Autonomous Region
of Krayina in Knin. The republic was occupied and cancelled by Croatia's mili-
tary and police forces on August 4th–9th, 1995 under the operation "Storm" [Вељко
Ђурић Мишина (уредник), Република Српска Крајина: Десет година послије,
Београд: Добра воља, 2005, 26, 48].

At this point we cannot forget and a humanitarian intervention aspect of the final solution of the "Ukrainian Question". In general, "intervention" is considered as forcible action committed by some state(s) against another one(s) but without the consent by the attacked side. Therefore, "humanitarian intervention" is a military intervention carried out by some state(s) for the sake to protect human rights (usually as a group minority rights). Speaking from the very morality point of view, a humanitarian intervention is grounded, or at least (mis)used as a formal pretext, on the notion of being "humanitarian" what means to be concerned about the interest of and benefits to mankind particularly if the suffering of someone has to be reduced.[36] The concept of humanitarian intervention is (mis)used especially after the Cold War as in the cases of Iraq (in 1991 to create "safe havens" for the Kurds by establishing a no-fly zone policed by three NATO's pact countries: the USA, UK and France), Somalia (in 1992 to create a protected environment), Haiti (in 1994 to restore order by the civil authority), Rwanda (in 1994 to create "safe zone" for the Hutu refugees), Kosovo (in 1999 to protect the Albanians from Serbia's military and police forces), East Timor (in 1999 to prevent possible ethnic cleansing by Indonesia's security forces) and Sierra Leone (in 2000 to protect the UK's citizens at the time of the local civil war).[37]

Very controversial wars of humanitarian intervention in above mentioned cases, in which participated only the western powers, were formally justified on humanitarian grounds. However, in majority of these cases the intervention had in essence very political and geopolitical real background as it clearly shows the cases of Kosovo and Sierra Leone.

In Kosovo case, the intervention was committed just in a context of fears about the possibility of ethnic cleansing but not on the real ground. Following NATO's airstrikes campaign for 78

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36 On human rights and humanitarian intervention from academic point of view, see more in [Andrew Heywood, *Global Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, 303−330].

37 On the concept and ideas of humanitarian intervention, see [Brendan Simms, D. J. B. Trim (eds.), *Humanitarian Intervention: A History*, Cambridge−New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011; Aidan Hehir, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action*, Cambridge−Maiden, MA: Polity Press, 2016].

days was conducted without the SC UN's authorization but finally it forced Serbia to withdraw its complete military and police forces from the province. As a consequence, the province was occupied by the NATO's troops with creation of a huge US' military base and finally it was separated from Serbia by proclamation and recognition of independence which was in fact a real and ultimate geopolitical goal of the formally humanitarian intervention in 1999.

In Sierra Leone, after a prolonged civil war, the UK's Government decided to send the British military forces to the country, formally to protect the UK's citizens, but in fact ultimately to support the elected government against the rebel forces that have been accused of carrying out atrocities against the civilians.

Here, we came probably to the crux of the matter of current Ukrainian crisis and most probably "Ukrainian Question" in general. It is well known that Russia's president V. Putin is extremely frustrated with the NATO's 1999 Kosovo humanitarian intervention as it is seen by Moscow as a great humiliation of Russia and the Russian national proudness and the regional state's interest. It is also well known that the Euromaidan regime in Kiev committed and still is committing the terrible war crimes in Donbass region which can be classified as the ethnic cleansing and even a form of the genocide as thousands of Donbass region inhabitants are brutally killed (among them around 200 kids) and approximately one million of them became the refuges in Russia.[38] For Moscow, it is very easy, at least formally, to "prove" the acts of war crimes of Kiev Euromaidan junta in Donbass region as it was, similarly, very easy for Washington formally to "prove" Serbia's war crimes in Kosovo before the NATO's intervention in 1999. As a result, Moscow can all the time launch Russia's military humanitarian intervention in the East Ukraine with a consequence of its final separation from Kiev. A "Kosovo precedent" is still on agenda.

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38 On shocking UN's High Commissionier for Human Rights' 13th Report on the war crime atrocities committed by the Ukrainian Government in the East Ukraine in the period from November 16th 2015 to February 15th, 2016, when the Minsk Agreements were in force, see [Arina Tsukanova, „Schocking UN Report Lists Crimes by the Ukrainian Authorities", *Strategic Culture Foundation*, June 11th, 2016: http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/06/11/shocking-un-report-lists-crimes-ukrainian-authorities.html].

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Владислав Б. Сотировић

„УКРАЈИНСКО ПИТАЊЕ"
И „КОСОВСКИ ПРЕСЕДАН"

Сажетак

　　Истраживачки предмет чланка је „украјинско пита-
ње" у перспективи „косовског преседана" у оквирима међу-
народног права, међународних односа и светске политике.
Циљ чланка је да истражи могућа решења за тренутну по-
литичку кризу у Украјини кроз призму „косовског преседана".
Чланак се састоји од пет поглавља у којима се расправљају
питања идентитета Украјине, историјског развоја украјин-
ске државности, државног удара из 2014. г. и почетка поли-
тичке кризе, питања повезаности „косовског преседана" и
тренутне кризе у Украјини и могућности коначног решења
за украјинску кризу заснованог на примеру и искуству косов-
ске самопроглашене независности 2008. г. Главни закључак
овог истраживачког рада је да „косовски преседан" већ уве-
лико служи и служиће у скоријој будућности као међународ-
но-правна основа за даље растурање територијалног инте-
гритета Украјине од стране суседне Русије. Овај чланак је
замишљен као критички допринос књизи Elizabeth A. Wood
et al, Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine, New York−Chichester,
West Sussex, Columbia University Press−Woodrow Wilson Cen-
ter Press, 2016.

Кључне речи: Украјина, Косово, сецесија, међународно право,
*　　　　　　　хуманитарна интервенција, међународни одно-*
*　　　　　　　си, светска политика.*