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## **BIDEN ADMINISTRATION’S TRANSATLANTIC CHALLENGE\*\***

### **Abstract**

Joseph Biden’s electoral win in November 2020 was widely anticipated as American return to the global stage. In many academic and policy circles, the removal of “isolationist” Donald Trump and important triumph of liberal internationalist Biden was expected to bring about a new chapter in US relations with allies worldwide, leaving behind the awkwardness of previous administration’s reckless political style. However, once the global affairs started unfolding in 2021, Biden Administration’s key international slogan “America is back” also proved to be much more a thing of political style than well-developed substance. This article aims to examine the ways in which the Biden administration’s strategic posture during the first year of the presidency affected transatlantic relations. To that effect, key foreign policy speeches and documents have been analyzed and major international developments tracked. The key finding is that, despite the permissive context shaped by the Trump administration’s disparagement of European allies, the new administration has failed to move forward in terms of strengthening transatlantic ties. This goes to indicate that many of the issues have all along been more structural and had predated Trump’s policies, which means that they will be all the more difficult to overcome.

**Keywords:** *United States of America, Joseph Biden, European Union, transatlantic relations, foreign policy, strategy*

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## INTRODUCTION

American presidential election of 2020 has easily been the most turbulent one in the country's modern history. Deeply divided between the transformed Republican Party of Donald J. Trump and disoriented Democratic Party which eventually decided to nominate centrist Joseph R. Biden as Trump's challenger, the country was also struggling to overcome the grave economic and public health consequences of the novel corona virus pandemic. Previous four years have brought about far reaching shifts in style and substance of many US policies, not least its relationship with longtime allies in Europe and beyond. One analyst observed that "President Trump has burned like a wildfire through the goodwill accrued by the United States in its seventy years of being the leader of the Free World" (Schake 2018, 3). The United States made a series of unilateral withdrawals from international treaties and regimes, most notably the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, regulating Iran's nuclear program – both of them major 2015 successes of the administration of Barack Obama. Arguably, Trump's scorn for NATO as a defense pact, as well as his ill-treatment of many a European ally, were the policy shifts that produced the largest global commotion. Transatlantic ties, conventionally considered one of key pillars of post-World War II global stability, have suddenly become an area of constant contention and strife.

Joseph Biden's 2020 electoral win was widely anticipated as American return to the global stage. In many academic and policy circles, the removal of "isolationist" Donald Trump and important triumph of liberal internationalist Biden was expected to bring about a new chapter in US relations with allies worldwide, leaving behind the awkwardness of previous administration's reckless political style. The most resonating slogan of Biden's June 2021 European tour was "America is back". However, once the global affairs started unfolding in 2021, culminating with Afghanistan withdrawal and the AUKUS arrangement in August and September, the phrase also proved to be much more a thing of political style than well-developed substance.

This article aims to examine the ways in which the Biden administration's strategic posture during the first year of the presidency affected transatlantic relations. To that effect, key foreign policy speeches and documents such as *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (Biden 2021c) have been analyzed and major international developments tracked. The key finding is that, despite the permissive context shaped by the Trump administration's disparagement of European allies, the new administration has failed to make a significant

move forward in terms of strengthening transatlantic ties. This goes to indicate that many of the issues have all along been more structural than personal and had predated Trump's policies, which in turn means that they will be all the more difficult to overcome.

## **THE CONTEXT: TRUMP'S LEGACY AND CAN IT BE TROUNCED**

As noted by Stephen Walt, "Trump's foreign policy program promised a radical departure from the internationalist agenda that had informed U.S. foreign policy since the end of Second World War, and especially since the end of the Cold War. Instead of striving to expand and deepen a rules-based international order – one that actively sought to spread democracy, promote free trade, strengthen alliances and international institutions, and defend human rights – Trump was offering a self-centered, highly nationalist foreign policy that eschewed long-term efforts to spread American ideals and focused instead on securing short-term advantages." (Walt 2018, 11)

Although often portrayed as impulsive, erratic and irrational, Trump has demonstrated some consistent positions of foreign policy throughout his electoral run and presidency (Simic and Zivojinovic 2019, 17–19). At the very onset of his campaign, in the spring of 2016, Trump began announcing that, if elected, he might reconsider American relations with European allies and the country's overall status within NATO. In public appearances, he specified that NATO's problems are that it was designed in a radically different international context, and that it allows most of its members to have a security free ride. As of June 2016, the notion that NATO is outright obsolete became one of Trump's key campaign motifs, and he repeated such a qualification upon becoming President-elect. He revoked the formulation only in the spring of 2017, after the inauguration; nevertheless, the issue remained the source of serious transatlantic friction, especially in US relations with countries which did not meet the 2% GDP threshold for defense spending – which, in 2017, were all NATO members except Estonia, Greece, the United Kingdom and the US itself (NATO 2021b, 8). The crisis culminated in 2019-2020, with the announcements of relocation of US troops from Germany to Poland and possibility of constructing a permanent US base (provisionally called "Fort Trump") on Polish soil (Lišanin 2021, 148). These plans have been brought to a halt with Trump's electoral defeat.

Already in 2017, the US and Israel announced that they would be leaving the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization (UNESCO), stating the structures alleged anti-Israel bias as a reason for such a decision (which took effect on January 1, 2019). This was the second time that the US leaves UNESCO, having previously withdrawn under Reagan administration in 1984 and rejoined under George W. Bush in 2003. This is why the move was not necessarily viewed as one of the signature peculiarities of the Trump presidency. However, any possible doubts about the administration's adherence to international treaties and regimes were dispersed in May and June of 2018.

Trump first announced American intent to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an international treaty regulating Iranian nuclear program negotiated in cooperation with the United Kingdom, Germany, France, China and Russia – a move which caused almost unequivocal condemnations among allies and rivals alike. Subsequently, the US delegation sabotaged the adoption of a communiqué at the G7 summit in Canada, objecting to the mention of the phrase 'rules-based international order', with Trump leaving early. Photograph of the US president and German Chancellor Angela Merkel looking at each other irately across the table subsequently became a symbol of transatlantic relations and American global posture under Trump. Referring to the G7 meeting that failed abysmally, European Council President Donald Tusk said that "the rules-based international order is being challenged, quite surprisingly, not by the usual suspects, but by its main architect and guarantor, the US." (Schake 2018, 2) Once Trump declared that America would also be withdrawing from the Paris Treaty on climate change, in November 2019, there could be no more surprises in this regard.

In the words of James Seroka, "to an unprecedented degree since the end of World War II, the American public has expressed a willingness to try something new in world affairs by reasserting the primacy of America's national interests separate and apart from its international obligations, responsibilities, and constraints" (Seroka 2016, 13). Indeed, the public in the US was increasingly prone to adopting Trump's unilateralist worldview – even in 2020, in the election which he lost, he managed to win over 74 million votes, which was, apart from Biden's victorious 81 million, more than any candidate has ever won. At the same time, the US image throughout the world, and especially in major Western European allied countries, kept declining steadily. As indicated by Figures 1 and 2, by the summer of 2020, three months before the election, data recorded by Pew Research Center show that public opinions in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain were over 80% negatively disposed towards Trump's competences in

handling world affairs, while the percentage of favorable views of the US in the United Kingdom, France and Germany reached near-historic lows.

Figure 1. Lack of confidence in Trump’s handling of world affairs (source: Ganesh 2020)





Figure 2. Public opinion of the US (source: Ganesh 2020)




Despite inflammatory and undiplomatic rhetoric by Trump and some of his aides, the image of Europe in the US public opinion had not suffered significantly during the presidency – American views of Europe have been consistent and compellingly net positive. On the other hand, the end of Trump’s term saw American popularity in Europe completely

sunk, and according to an Atlantic Council survey, the digits kept rising consistently between Biden's inauguration in January 2021 and May (Figure 3). Arguably, this was mostly based on the public's expectations of what the new administration might do, and not specific policy moves, although Biden's signature on a decision to rejoin the Paris climate agreement on the first day in office was certainly a positive signal. The events which ensued during the summer and autumn of 2021, however, saw European enthusiasm about the US drastically curbed.

Figure 3. American views towards EU and vice versa (source: Walla, 2021)

American views towards the EU have been consistent, and positive, while European attitudes towards the US were net negative months ago and have since rebounded

Showing net favorability (totally favorable – total unfavorable)



## RESTORING AMBITION

Upon winning the 2020 presidential election, Joseph R. Biden had a dual task. The easy one was to not be Donald Trump: this was bound to be enough for the US credibility with its European allies to soar up. A somewhat more difficult job before the new President was to develop policies which would plausibly demonstrate the differences between his handling of world affairs and that of his predecessor. Generally speaking, in spite of major global challenges brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic as well as more traditional power politics, Biden faced a permissive international environment, shaped by his predecessors plummeting reputation among most allies (Ganesh 2020; Krastev and Leonard 2021). The road he logically chose to take was to present the US under his administration as an ambitious, self-confident and competent global actor. In major foreign policy speeches as President, as well as key strategic document during the administration's first year, the *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, Joseph

Biden indicated, although not particularly thoroughly, what his main positions on transatlantic relations would be.

On February 4, two weeks after the inauguration and a day after the US and Russia had agreed to renew the New START Treaty for additional five years, President Biden gave remarks on America's place in the world at the State Department headquarters. Key idea of the address was that the US is "a country that does big things" and that it "cannot afford to be absent any longer at the world stage" (Biden 2021a). Among specific issues, transatlantic relations did not figure particularly prominently: the President informed the public that since the inauguration he had "spoken with the leaders of many of our closest friends — Canada, Mexico, the UK, Germany, France, NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia — to begin reforming the habits of cooperation and rebuilding the muscle of democratic alliances that have atrophied over the past few years of neglect and, I would argue, abuse", reiterating that there would be no troop withdrawals from Germany.

Two weeks later, Biden took part at a virtual session of the Munich Security Conference, touching more extensively upon the issue of transatlantic relations. The key takeaway was that "the transatlantic alliance is a strong foundation — the strong foundation — on which our collective security and our shared prosperity are built. The partnership between Europe and the United States, in my view, is and must remain the cornerstone of all that we hope to accomplish in the 21st century, just as we did in the 20th century." (Biden 2021b) The President reasserted his firm intent to pursue comprehensive diplomatic engagement with the EU and its member states on a wide range of issues: climate change, trade, AI and cyber, curtailing Russian and Chinese influences, strengthening NATO or fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. However, apart from allocating 2+2 billion USD to the COVAX mechanism, and stepping up in the field of non-proliferation by renewing the New START agreement, most of the points remained at the level of principles or signaling intentions, without much detail on how specific goals would be achieved.

The next major foreign policy speech came within the address to the joint session of Congress in late April, on the occasion of the administration's first 100 days. The tone of the speech was once again one of optimism and self-confidence: "We are the United States of America. There is not a single thing — nothing — nothing beyond our capacity." (Biden 2021d) Competition with China was once again the central foreign policy issue, and the only time Europe was mentioned was in passing, also in reference to China: Biden revealed that he had "told President Xi that we'll maintain a strong military presence in

the Indo-Pacific, just as we do with NATO in Europe — not to start a conflict, but to prevent one.”

Until the administration’s National Security Strategy is written and published, the document shaping the country’s strategic posture will be the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, published in March 2021. It contains the most extensive review of US–European ties since the inauguration, although there is still significant room for elaboration. In the section about the need to “reinvigorate and modernize alliances and partnerships around the world” in order to advance vital national interests which “compel the deepest connection to the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere”, Biden pledges to “reaffirm, invest in, and modernize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)” and to “recommit ourselves to our transatlantic partnerships, forging a strong, common agenda with the European Union and the United Kingdom on the defining issues of our time” (Biden 2021c). It is once again explicitly signaled that diplomatic and military withdrawal from European affairs is out of the question: “as we position ourselves to deter our adversaries and defend our interests, working alongside our partners, our presence will be most robust in the Indo-Pacific and Europe” (Biden 2021c).

Although the document is more detailed when it comes to transatlantic relations than most other foreign policy declarations since the beginning of Biden’s mandate, its provisions largely remain a list of principles and broadly conceived goals, without much elaboration on specific policies and instruments to pursue them. By the end of the year, it would become obvious no such specific ideas were developed to begin with. As early as May, Brattberg (2021) observed that “the new, more positive tone is certainly a welcome change, but it has yet to deliver any tangible policy breakthroughs either in terms of resolving bilateral irritants inherited from the Trump administration, making progress on other thorny issues, or producing any new major policy initiatives.” From the inauguration onward, however, Biden kept demonstrating a revived diplomatic vigor, taking part in several ministerial level meetings of the EU, NATO and G7.

In June 2021, Biden took a big European tour, participating in a bilateral summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Geneva, the G7 Summit in Cornwall, and EU–US and NATO summits on Brussels. The stay in Europe set off with the summit of G7 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States), wherein they adopted a six point common global agenda: ending the pandemic; reinvigorating the economies; securing future prosperity through freer trade; protecting the planet by



supporting a green revolution; strengthening worldwide partnerships; and embracing common values such as democracy, freedom, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights (G7 2021). In terms of substance, and particularly of atmosphere, the Summit was the exact opposite to the infamous 2018 meeting. Not only did the US delegation not sabotage the communiqué vocabulary, all the partners agreed to the inclusion of the Biden campaign slogan “Build Back Better” into the official title of the joint document. If, once again, the meeting produced little substance, it was a successful PR stunt and confidence boost. The tour was concluded with the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva, where the two leaders agreed to “embark together on an integrated bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue in the near future that will be deliberate and robust. Through this Dialogue, we seek to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures” (CNN 2021).

Between the G7 meeting and the bilateral summit with Vladimir Putin, Joseph Biden took part in two events of particular importance for transatlantic relations. On June 14, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Meeting of Heads of State and Government took place in Brussels. Summit Communiqué, by far the most extensive document covering global issues since Biden’s inauguration, proclaims opening of “a new chapter in transatlantic relations”, reaffirming NATO as “the unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum for consultations and joint action on all matters related to our individual and collective security” and “the organising framework for the collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic area, against all threats, from all directions” (NATO 2021a). It is worth noting that the issues covered at the NAC meeting and the subsequent EU-US summit correspond quite fittingly with the ideas of American public on key areas of US-European cooperation (Figure 4). It covers transatlantic issues quite extensively, although in a somewhat misbalanced manner: ten out of 79 points directly deal with the question of Russia, while several others cover Russia-related issues without mentioning the country explicitly (reiteration of 2008 membership support for Georgia and Ukraine, or assessment of Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the Baltic). China, arguably the crucial rival of the Alliance’s most powerful member, in comparison, figures in just two points, as a “systemic challenge”.


Stressing the importance of adhering to Article 5 of the Atlantic charter, the document stipulates that “the European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO” and that “NATO-EU strategic partnership is essential for the security and prosperity of our nations

and of the Euro-Atlantic area”. Stronger and more capable European defence should be based upon “coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities, avoiding unnecessary duplication”. Summing up the section on the relations with the EU, NATO expresses intent to “further strengthen our strategic partnership in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the organisations’ different mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity, and as agreed by the two organizations” (NATO 2021a).

*Figure 4. Opinion of Americans regarding cooperation with the EU (source: Walla, 2021)*

**A plurality of Americans say the US and EU should partner on security and defense, and nearly as many say climate and the environment**

In your opinion, which of the following is the most important area for the United States and the European Union to partner on?



The European Union-United States summit, held in Brussels the next day, eluded the traditional hard security issues, focused much more on the questions of values, trade, environment and human security. The Joint Statement identified four major areas of cooperation: 1) ending the COVID-19 pandemic, preparing for future global health challenges, and driving forward a sustainable global recovery; 2) protecting the planet and fostering green growth; 3) strengthening trade, investment and technological cooperation; and 4) building a more democratic, peaceful and secure world (The White House 2021a). The transatlantic partners pledged to reinvigorate international institutions and pursue their goals within the United Nations system. This was to signal as many differences from the previous U.S. administration as possible. Indeed, after Biden’s European tour, a newfound spirit of optimism permeated the transatlantic relations. European leaders seemed to believe that America, indeed, was “back”, at least for the duration of this administration, and that the opportunity should be seized (Büthe 2021b). However, international events would start unfolding soon enough, demonstrating that it takes more than just nice words and warm atmosphere to actually rebuild broken ties.

## **REALITY HITS BACK**

The possibility – indeed, necessity – to withdraw forces from Afghanistan has been a consistent motif in U.S. politics since at least the Obama administration. American allies have generally been supportive of the idea, but when the Biden administration decided to proceed with the calendar-driven decision to leave Afghanistan completely, many U.S. partners felt that they have been humiliated by the lack of consultations. Before the withdrawal was even over, voices of criticism rose within the EU and its member states, including key transatlantic partners like Italy, Germany, France, and the UK (Carafano 2021). The European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell took issue with President Biden’s remarks on state-building record in Afghanistan, calling them “arguable” (de La Baume 2021). Once all U.S. and allied forces were withdrawn, and full record of the chaotic events, including terrorist attacks, humanitarian catastrophe, and the Taliban taking over almost the entire country, could be made, voices of criticism turned even louder.

The Afghanistan episode was particularly unpleasant for American partners because it is seen as “simply a continuation of the long-standing American tendency to go it alone” (Lowen 2021). Per Ted Galen Carpenter, there were two key foundations of allied criticism of U.S. decision to withdraw, and the way it was conducted. “First, there is the perception that the withdrawal process was handled in an utterly incompetent manner—an amateurish operation that might have been expected from the Trump administration, but was utterly shocking coming from the experienced military and foreign policy professionals surrounding Biden. Second, NATO governments insisted that they were caught off guard both by the administration’s decision to adhere to the withdrawal agreement that President Trump had negotiated with the Taliban and by the speed of the withdrawal itself. Leaders in NATO members contended that Washington had not adequately consulted its allies, much less taken their concerns into account.” (Galen Carpenter 2021) Although NATO officials insisted that the policy had been discussed at meetings in the spring of 2021, they conceded that it was in essence a unilateral decision by the U.S.

Once the withdrawal was completed, however disorderly, after August 30, Afghanistan was swept by the Taliban fighters and was entering a new period of turmoil; in the meantime, the rhetoric had somewhat cooled off among the Atlantic allies. European countries realized that they would have to come to terms with the ongoing developments and that they can ill afford to spoil relations with the U.S.

over the damage that has already been made and could be left behind. Just as the dust was starting to settle, however, transatlantic relations suffered a new and unexpected blow.

On September 15, the AUKUS enhanced trilateral security partnership, consisting of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States was announced. In addition to provisions on cooperation in information and technology sharing, the partnership comprised the commitment on the side of the UK and the US to assist Australia in acquiring nuclear powered submarines. This meant that the previous Australian 90 million USD nuclear submarine deal with France was instantly scrapped, and to add insult to injury, without France being informed beforehand. French officials were outraged, calling the move “a stab in the back”, and withdrawing ambassadors from Australia and the United States. It took over a month and a half for relations between France and the U.S. to move from the dead end: on the occasion of Biden’s newest European tour in October and November 2021, he met in Rome with the French President Emmanuel Macron, calling France “an extremely, extremely valued partner” and admitting the U.S. had been “clumsy” in the way it handled the announcement of a submarine deal with Australia (Collins 2021). Macron called the clarification important and the sides generally seemed to have turned a new leaf; however, the reconciliation seemed lukewarm and the episode certainly left a bitter taste on the French side. Other allies have, of course, been watching closely, and the way France was treated encouraged further skepticism with regard to American devotion to transatlantic ties in good faith. Recent Chicago Council for Global Affairs and European Council of Foreign Relations data showed that U.S. views of France are much more congenial than vice versa (Dennison and Smeltz 2021).

Some of the damage was repaired during Biden’s visit to Europe in late October and early November, on the occasions of G20 meeting in Rome and COP26 environmental summit in Glasgow, along with a series of bilateral meetings of the margins of two main events, most notably with leaders of Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, as well as Pope Francis. The G20 leaders reached an agreement to enhance cooperation on four main points: Global Minimum Tax; health security and fight against COVID-19; climate change; and fight against corruption, ransomware and other cyber-crimes (The White House 2021b). During autumn, some steps forward have been made, including some very important ones such as the pledge to remove the Trump-era retaliatory tariffs on aluminum and steel, a continuation of improving trade relations from March and June when the Boeing-Airbus dispute was put on hold, allowing for a number of other tariffs to be suspended

for five years. Still, despite willingness to cooperate on pressing issues such as trade, environment and global health, it seems that European participation in joint endeavors will be much more apprehensive than it seemed in the first half of the year.

## CONCLUSION

Many, if not most, analyses do not ascribe much agency to European allies when it comes to managing transatlantic relations. Indeed, the power disproportion between the U.S. and the EU, let alone the US and individual EU member states, is such that the relationship will clearly depend mostly on American policy choices. As demonstrated by the Afghanistan and AUKUS episodes, even when they are dissatisfied, there is little European countries can do to alter American course of action, while breaking ties with the U.S. remains out of the question. Still, there are steps that can be made, regarding the strengthening internal EU cohesion or addressing the issue of trade imbalance (Büthe 2021a). Germany is particularly important in this regard, as a crucial economic power within the bloc and key driver of the integration process (Ohnesorge 2020). In addition to occupying the economic and financial commanding heights of the Union, it also holds an important key of potential continent-wide reset with Russia, which is an important and often neglected aspect of transatlantic relations (Lišaniin 2020, 12–13; Janes 2021, 70–71). Reassuring Germany about the status of American troops in the country might be a prudent way to start (Vandiver 2021), but it is a move that, in and of itself, will not induce major gains in the long run.

Starting from less controversial issues, as was the case at the US-EU and G20 summits of 2021 might also be a logical path to take. Climate and energy, trade, or global health will not necessarily find all the European Countries on the same page, let alone the whole EU and the United States. According to Gasparini (2021, 3), “the US-EU trade relations are likely to remain tense over topics such as corporate and tech giants’ taxation, despite possible agreements”. Nevertheless, those are the aspects of transatlantic relations wherein potential gains are more obvious, and potential failures less likely to produce as much discord as hard security matters, as was made obvious by the French-Australian nuclear submarine quarrel. Obviously, this does not mean that security and defense issues should be avoided – after all, this would be impossible as long as a structure like NATO is mainly responsible for security in the Atlantic area and beyond. Still, insisting on hard security issues under the circumstances in which neither the U.S. nor the EU

have a lot to worry about when it comes to their territorial defense, and the main systemic challenge comes from an actor (China) which is not viewed uniformly throughout the Western political bloc, might very well prove to be counterproductive.

The rush of relief and optimism in most European countries after Joseph Biden's inauguration may have very well represented a rational reaction; nevertheless, it is crucial to acknowledge that many transatlantic rifts during the Trump presidency have been superficial issues of political style, while some others were issues of substance and will not necessarily be changing as quickly as anticipated. In other words, numerous challenges have all along been structural rather than personal, and predated Trump's administration just as surely as they will outlast Biden's.

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## ТРАНСАТЛАНТСКИ ИЗАЗОВ БАЈДЕНОВЕ АДМИНИСТРАЦИЈЕ

### Резиме

Изборна победа Џозефа Бајдена у новембру 2020. Године нашироко је очивана као амерички повратак на глобалну сцену. У бројним академским и политичким круговима очекивало се да уклањање „изолационисте“ Доналда Трампа и важна победа либералног интернационалисте Бајдена донесе ново поглавље у односима са савезницима широм света, остављајући за собом непријатности изазване безобзирним политичким стилем претходне администрације. Међутим, када су глобални послови почели да се одвијају својим током у 2021. години, кључни међународни слоган Бајденове администрације „Америка се вратила“, такође се показао као пре свега ствар политичког стила, пре него добро промишљене суштине. Овај чланак тежи да истражи начине на које је стратешко држање Бајденове администрације у првој години мандата обликовало трансатлантске односе. У том циљу, анализирани су најважнији спољнополитички говори и документи и идентификовани главни међународни догађаји. Кључни налаз је да, упркос пермисивном контексту који је обликовало омаловажавање европских савезника од стране Трампове администрације, нова администрација није успела да направи помак у погледу јачања трансатлантских веза. Та чињеница наговештава да су проблеми све време били претежно структурне природе и да су претходили Трамповим политикама, што значи да ће их бити утолико теже превазићи.

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